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Abstract Background Immunodeficient persons with persistent vaccine-related poliovirus infection may serve as a potential reservoir for reintroduction of polioviruses after wild poliovirus eradication, posing a risk of their further circulation in inadequately immunized populations. Methods To estimate the potential for vaccine-related poliovirus persistence among HIV-infected persons, we studied poliovirus excretion following vaccination among children at an orphanage in Kenya. For 12 months after national immunization days, we collected serial stool specimens from orphanage residents aged Results Twenty-four children (15 HIV-infected, 9 HIV-uninfected) were enrolled, and 255 specimens (170 from HIV-infected, 85 from HIV-uninfected) were collected. All HIV-infected children had mildly or moderately symptomatic HIV-disease and moderate-to-severe immunosuppression. Fifteen participants shed vaccine-related polioviruses, and 22 shed NPEV at some point during the study period. Of 46 poliovirus-positive specimens, 31 were from HIV-infected, and 15 from HIV-uninfected children. No participant shed polioviruses for ≥ 6 months. Genomic sequencing of poliovirus isolates did not reveal any genetic evidence of long-term shedding. There was no long-term shedding of NPEV. Conclusion The results indicate that mildly to moderately symptomatic HIV-infected children retain the ability to clear enteroviruses, including vaccine-related poliovirus. Larger studies are needed to confirm and generalize these findings.

Background: Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation.Methods: We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies.Results: Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation.Conclusions: Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]