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Background: Trust within organizations is important for ensuring members' acceptance of the organization's activities and to expand their scope of action. Remarkably, Patient Organizations (POs) that often both function as a forum for self-help and represent patients on the health-political level, have been understudied in this respect. This paper analyzes the relation between trust and representation in POs. We distinguish between two models of representation originating from political theory: the trustee and delegate model and between two types of trust: horizontal and vertical trust.Methods: Our theoretical approach is illustrated with an analysis of 13 interviews with representatives of German POs.Results: We have found that the delegate model requires horizontal trust and the trustee model vertical trust. Both models: horizontal/delegate and vertical/trustee exist within single POs.Conclusions: The representation process within POs demands a balancing act between inclusion of affected persons and strategically aggregating a clear-cut political claim. Trust plays in that process of coming from individual wishes to collective and political standpoints a major role both in terms of horizontal as well as vertical trust. Horizontal trust serves the communication between affected members, and vertical trust allows representatives to be decisive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Against the background of well-described associations between oral and general health, collaboration between dentists and general practitioners (GP) is crucial to provide therapeutic and preventive patient care. However, in the German health system, GPs and dentists are organizationally separated, implying that interprofessional collaboration can only occur informally and on a voluntary basis. Given the scarce evidence of interprofessional collaboration between dentists and GPs, an explorative study was conducted. This paper outlines the findings of this study with regard to GPs' and dentists' experiences and expectations of interprofessional collaboration.Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with GPs (n = 15) and dentists (n = 13) from three structurally different regions in Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany. The interview guide included questions on occasions, expectations and experiences of interprofessional collaboration. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using qualitative content analysis according to Mayring.Results: Both GPs and dentists reported perceived knowledge deficits of the other profession with regard to medication, particularly anticoagulants and bisphosphonates, as well as systemic and general respectively dental diseases. Expectations regarding the scope of collaboration diverge: whereas dentists were interested in extending collaboration, most GPs saw no need for collaboration.Conclusions: The perceived medical knowledge deficits of the other profession as well as divergent expectations concerning the scope of collaboration hinder profound and regular interprofessional collaboration between GPs and dentists. These perceived knowledge deficits may be rooted in the separate education of dentists and GPs in Germany. Fostering interprofessional education is a promising way to improve cooperation between GPs and dentists in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Interest in assessing the value of health-care services in Germany has considerably increased since the foundation of the Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG (Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care). The practical application of value assessment illustrates how problematic the process can be. In all decisions made for the provision of health care, data concerning the measurable dimensions (quantity and quality of efficacy and effectiveness, validity of the results and costs) flow into a complex and not yet standardized decision-making process concerning public financing. Some of these decisions are based on data of uncertain validity, unknown reproducibility and unclear appropriateness. Discussion: In this paper we describe the theoretical aspects of value from psychological and economic viewpoints and discuss national and international approaches. Methodic details and difficulties in assessing the value of health-care services are analysed. A definition of the intangible value of health-care services will be proposed which contains only three factors: the absolute risk reduction (usually a measure of efficacy), the validity of the scientific papers examined and the type of the expected effectiveness (prevention of death and disability, restitution of well-being). The intangible value describes the additional benefit when comparing two possible actions, like treatment or observation only. Conclusion: The description of intangible value from the viewpoint of different stakeholders is a useful measure for subsequent steps (not discussed here) - the evaluation of costs and of patient benefit. A standardised, transparent, fair and democratic evaluation is essential for the definition of a basic benefit package. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In quasi-markets governance over healthcare providers is mediated by commissioners. Different commissioners apply different combinations of six methods of control ('media of power') for exercising governance: managerial performance, negotiation, discursive control, incentives, competition and juridical control. This paper compares how English and German healthcare commissioners do so. Methods: Systematic comparison of observational national-level case studies in terms of six media of power, using data from multiple sources. Results: The comparison exposes and contrasts two basic generic modes of commissioning: 1. Surrogate planning (English NHS), in which a negotiated order involving micro-commissioning, provider competition, financial incentives and penalties are the dominant media of commissioner power over providers. 2. Case-mix commissioning (Germany), in which managerial performance, an 'episode based' negotiated order and juridical controls appear the dominant media of commissioner power. Conclusions: Governments do not necessarily maximise commissioners' power over providers by implementing as many media of power as possible because these media interact, some complementing and others inhibiting each other. In particular, patient choice of provider inhibits commissioners' use of provider competition as a means of control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]