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Recent advances in human brain organoid systems have raised serious worries about the possibility that these in vitro 'mini-brains' could develop sentience, and thus, moral status. This article considers the relative moral status of sentient human brain organoids and research animals, examining whether we have moral reasons to prefer using one over the other. It argues that, contrary to common intuitions, the wellbeing of sentient human brain organoids should not be granted greater moral consideration than the wellbeing of nonhuman research animals. It does so not by denying that typical humans have higher moral status than animals, but instead by arguing that none of the leading justifications for granting humans higher moral status than nonhuman animals apply to brain organoids. Additionally, it argues that there are no good reasons to be more concerned about the well-being of human brain organoids compared to those generated from other species., (© 2024 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) has recently released the 2021 update of its guidelines. The update includes detailed new recommendations on human-animal chimera research. This paper argues that the ISSCR recommendations fail to address the core ethical concerns raised by neurological chimeras-namely, concerns about moral status. In minimising moral status concerns, the ISSCR both breaks rank with other major reports on human-animal chimera research and rely on controversial claims about the grounds of moral status that many people will rightly reject. A more robust framework for regulating human-animal chimera research still needs to be developed., (© 2022 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Genomic sequencing technologies (GS) pose novel challenges not seen in older genetic technologies, making traditional standards for fully informed consent difficult or impossible to meet. This is due to factors including the complexity of the test and the broad range of results it may identify. Meaningful informed consent is even more challenging to secure in contexts involving significant time constraints and emotional distress, such as when rapid genomic testing (RGS) is performed in neonatal intensive care units. In this article, we propose that informed consent matters not for its own sake, but because obtaining it furthers a range of morally important goals, such as promoting autonomy, well-being, and trust in medicine. These goals form the basis of a new framework [PROmoting Morally Important Consent Ends (PROMICE)] for assessing the ethical appropriateness of various informed consent models. We illustrate this framework with two examples: (a) a tiered and layered consent model for obtaining consent for GS, and (b) consent for RGS in critically ill newborns. We conclude that appropriately-rather than fully-informed consent provides the correct standard for genomic medicine and research., (© 2022 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The precautionary principle aims to influence decision-making in contexts where some activity poses uncertain but potentially grave threats. This perfectly describes the controversy surrounding germline gene editing. This article considers whether the precautionary principle should influence how we weigh the risks and benefits of human germline interventions, focusing especially on the possible threats to the health of future generations. We distinguish between several existing forms of the precautionary principle, assess their plausibility and consider their implications for the ethics of germline modification. We also offer a novel form of the precautionary principle: the sufficientarian precautionary principle. Some plausible versions of the precautionary principle recommend placing somewhat greater weight on avoiding threats to future generations than on achieving short-term benefits. However, no plausible versions of the precautionary principle entail that we should outright reject the use germline gene editing in human reproduction and some, such as the sufficientarian version, might endorse its use., (© 2019 The Authors Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

A common strategy in bioethics is to posit a prima facie case in favour of one policy, and to then claim that the burden of proof (that this policy should be rejected) falls on those with opposing views. If the burden of proof is not met, it is claimed, then the policy in question should be accepted. This article illustrates, and critically evaluates, examples of this strategy in debates about the sale of organs by living donors, human enhancement, and the precautionary principle. We highlight general problems with this style of argument, and particular problems with its use in specific cases. We conclude that the burden ultimately falls on decision-makers (i.e. policy-makers) to choose the policy supported by the best reasons., (© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)