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Despite obvious advantages, no generalised ideographic codes have evolved through cultural evolution to rely on iconicity. Morin suggests that this is because of missing means of standardisation, which glottographic codes get from natural languages. Although we agree, we also point to the important role of the available media, which might support some forms of reference more effectively than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contradicting our earlier claims of American moral exceptionalism, recent self-replication evidence from our laboratory indicates that implicit puritanism characterizes the judgments of people across cultures. Implicit cultural evolution may lag behind explicit change, such that differences between traditional and non-traditional cultures are greater at a deliberative than an intuitive level. Not too deep down, perhaps we are all implicit puritans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the cultural evolution of a puritanical moral norm in Turkey illustrates, puritanical moral norms are not developed by nonrational reasoning concerned with purity and cleanliness. People use puritanical moral rules as moral heuristics for making intendedly rational decisions about whether to cooperate or not when the commitment of the counterparty is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grossmann used evolutionary analysis to argue for the adaptive nature of fearfulness. This analysis, however, falls short of addressing why negative affectivity is maladaptive in contemporary Western societies. Here, we fill the gap by documenting the implied cultural variation and considering cultural (rather than biological) evolution over the last 10,000 years to explain the observed cultural variation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of our main goals with "Expression unleashed" was to highlight the distinctive, ostensive nature of human communication, and the many roles that ostension can play in human behavior and society. The commentaries we received forced us to be more precise about several aspects of this thesis. At the same time, no commentary challenged the central idea that the manifest diversity of human expression is underpinned by a common cognitive unity. Our reply is organized around six issues: (1) languages and their cultural evolution; (2) the pervasiveness of expression in human behavior; (3) artificial intelligence and ostensive communication; (4) communication in other animals; (5) the ecology and evolution of ostensive communication; and (6) biolinguistics and pragmatics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bifocal stance theory (BST) of cultural evolution has prompted a wide-ranging discussion with broadly three aims: to apply the theory to novel contexts; to extend the conceptual framework; to offer critical feedback on various aspects of the theory. We first discuss BST's relevance to the diverse range of topics which emerged from the commentaries, followed by a consideration of how our framework can be supplemented by and compared to other theories. Lastly, the criticisms that were raised by a subset of commentaries allow us to clarify parts of our theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural evolution depends on both innovation (the creation of new cultural variants by accident or design) and high-fidelity transmission (which preserves our accumulated knowledge and allows the storage of normative conventions). What is required is an overarching theory encompassing both dimensions, specifying the psychological motivations and mechanisms involved. The bifocal stance theory (BST) of cultural evolution proposes that the co-existence of innovative change and stable tradition results from our ability to adopt different motivational stances flexibly during social learning and transmission. We argue that the ways in which instrumental and ritual stances are adopted in cultural transmission influence the nature and degree of copying fidelity and thus also patterns of cultural spread and stability at a population level over time. BST creates a unifying framework for interpreting the findings of otherwise seemingly disparate areas of enquiry, including social learning, cumulative culture, overimitation, and ritual performance. We discuss the implications of BST for competing by-product accounts which assume that faithful copying is merely a side-effect of instrumental learning and action parsing. We also set out a novel "cultural action framework" bringing to light aspects of social learning that have been relatively neglected by behavioural ecologists and evolutionary psychologists and establishing a roadmap for future research on this topic. The BST framework sheds new light on the cognitive underpinnings of cumulative cultural change, selection, and spread within an encompassing evolutionary framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 29 commentaries amplified our key arguments; offered extensions, implications, and applications of the framework; and pushed back and clarified. To help forge the path forward for cultural evolutionary behavioral genetics, we (1) focus on conceptual disagreements and misconceptions about the concepts of heritability and culture; (2) further discuss points raised about the intertwined relationship between culture and genes; and (3) address extensions to the proposed framework, particularly as it relates to cultural clusters, development, and power. These commentaries, and the deep engagement they represent, reinforce the importance of integrating cultural evolution and behavioral genetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imaginary worlds are extremely successful. The most popular fictions produced in the last few decades contain such a fictional world. They can be found in all fictional media, from novels (e.g., Lord of The Rings and Harry Potter) to films (e.g., Star Wars and Avatar), video games (e.g., The Legend of Zelda and Final Fantasy), graphic novels (e.g., One Piece and Naruto), and TV series (e.g., Star Trek and Game of Thrones), and they date as far back as ancient literature (e.g., the Cyclops Islands in The Odyssey , 850 BCE). Why such a success? Why so much attention devoted to non-existent worlds? In this paper, we propose that imaginary worlds co-opt our preferences for exploration, which have evolved in humans and nonhuman animals alike, to propel individuals toward new environments and new sources of reward. Humans would find imaginary worlds very attractive for the very same reasons, and under the same circumstances, as they are lured by unfamiliar environments in real life. After reviewing research on exploratory preferences in behavioral ecology, environmental esthetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary and developmental psychology, we focus on the sources of their variability across time and space, which we argue can account for the variability of the cultural preference for imaginary worlds. This hypothesis can, therefore, explain the way imaginary worlds evolved culturally, their shape and content, their recent striking success, and their distribution across time and populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioral genetics and cultural evolution have both revolutionized our understanding of human behavior – largely independent of each other. Here, we reconcile these two fields under a dual inheritance framework, offering a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between genes and culture. Going beyond typical analyses of gene–environment interactions, we describe the cultural dynamics that shape these interactions by shaping the environment and population structure. A cultural evolutionary approach can explain, for example, how factors such as rates of innovation and diffusion, density of cultural subgroups, and tolerance for behavioral diversity impact heritability estimates, thus yielding predictions for different social contexts. Moreover, when cumulative culture functionally overlaps with genes, genetic effects become masked, unmasked, or even reversed, and the causal effects of an identified gene become confounded with features of the cultural environment. The manner of confounding is specific to a particular society at a particular time, but a WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) sampling problem obscures this boundedness. Cultural evolutionary dynamics are typically missing from models of gene-to-phenotype causality, hindering generalizability of genetic effects across societies and across time. We lay out a reconciled framework and use it to predict the ways in which heritability should differ between societies, between socioeconomic levels, and other groupings within some societies but not others, and over the life course. An integrated cultural evolutionary behavioral genetic approach cuts through the nature–nurture debate and helps resolve controversies in topics such as IQ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jagiello and colleagues offer a bifocal stance theory of cultural evolution for understanding how individuals flexibly choose between instrumental and ritual stances in social learning. We argue that the role of culture, developmental age-related differences, and the intersectionality of these and other individual's identities need to be more fully considered in this theoretical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We put the bifocal stance theory (BST) into dialogue with the Confucian approach to ritual. The aim of the commentary is two-fold: To draw on BST to provide an explanatory framework for a Confucian approach to social learning and, while doing so, to show how Chinese (Confucian) philosophy can contribute to debates in cultural evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While I agree with the distinction between expedient and proper ways of action, I find Jagiello et al.'s account of "stance switching" debatable. Fundamental to theories of cultural evolution is the fact that the shared environment is indefinitely rich, in which individuals are provided with opportunities for learning to tune themselves to specific affordances that are relevant to emerging situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the physical world becomes tamed and mapped out, opportunities to experience the unknown become rarer; imaginary worlds provide a much-needed sense of potentiality. Potentiality is central to the Self-Other Re-organization theory of cultural evolution, which postulates that creativity fuels cumulative cultural change. We point to evidence that fear affects, not the magnitude of exploration, but how cautiously it proceeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uchiyama et al. provide a theoretical framework to explain the gap between reported gene–environment interactions and real-life epidemiological statistics. Through cultural evolution, informed behavioral approaches mitigate the impact of environmental risk on disease onset. Similarly, here we propose that fostering certain behavioral traits, transmitted culturally or through access to scientific knowledge, could confer resilience to mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpreting heritability estimates through the lens of cultural evolution presents two broad and interlinking problems for educational behavior genetics. First, the problem of interpreting high heritability of educational phenotypes as indicators of the genetic basis of traits, when these findings also reflect cultural homogeneity. Second, the problem of extrapolating from genetic research findings in education to policy and practice recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uchiyama et al. productively discuss how culture can influence genetic heritability and, by modifying environmental conditions, limit the generalizability of genome-wide association studies (GWASs). Here, we supplement their account by highlighting how recent changes in culture and institutions in industrialized, westernized societies – such as increased female workforce participation – may have increased assortative mating. This alters the distribution of genotypes themselves, increasing heritability and phenotypic variance, and may be detectable using the latest methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We need better understanding of functional differences of behavioral phenotypes across cultures because cultural evolution (e.g., temporal changes in innovation within populations) is less important than culturally molded phenotypes (e.g., differences across populations) for understanding gene effects. Furthermore, changes in one behavioral domain likely have complex downstream effects in other domains, requiring careful parsing of phenotypic variability and functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Music As a Coevolved System for Social Bonding" (MSB) is a brilliant synthesis and appealing hypothesis offering insights into the evolution and social bonding of musicality, but is so broad and sweeping it will be challenging to test, prove or falsify in the Popperian sense (Popper, 1959). After general comments, I focus my critique on underlying neurobiological mechanisms, and offer some suggestions for experimental tests of MSB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Savage et al. make a compelling case, Mehr et al. less so, for social bonding and credible signalling, respectively, as the main adaptive function of human musicality. We express general advocacy for the former thesis, highlighting: (1) overlap between the two; (2) direct versus derived biological functions, and (3) aspects of music embedded in cultural evolution, for example, departures from tonality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Music is an artistic cultural innovation, and therefore it may be considered as intuitive thought expressed in symbols, which can efficiently convey multiple meanings in learning, thinking, and transmission, selected for and passed on through cultural evolution. The symbolic system has personal adaptive benefits besides social ones, which should not be overlooked even if music may tend more to the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biologists have replaced the metaphor of "genetic transmission" with a detailed account of the molecular mechanisms underlying the phenomenon which Darwin referred to as "like produces like." Cultural evolution theorists, in contrast, continue to appeal to "imitation" or "copying." The notion of ritual and instrumental stances does not resolve this issue, and ignores the institutions in which people live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary we advance Jagiello et al.'s proposal by zooming in on the possible evolutionary origins of the "bifocal stance" that may have enabled a major transition in human cultural evolution, arguing that the evolution of the bifocal stance was driven by an explosion in cultural complexity arising from cooperative foraging, which led to a feedback loop between the ritual and instrumental stances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that music can serve as a time-sensitive lens into the interplay between instrumental and ritual stances in cultural evolution. Over various timescales, music can switch between pursuing an end goal or not, and between presenting a causal opacity that is resolvable, or not. With these fluctuations come changes in the motivational structures that drive innovation versus copying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We support the idea of applying cultural evolution theory to the study of storytelling, and fiction in particular. However, we suggest that a more plausible link between real and imaginary worlds is the feeling of "presence" we can experience in both of them: we feel present when we are able to correctly and intuitively enact our embodied predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Characterizing the cultural evolution of imaginary worlds as a hedonic but non-adaptive exaptation from evolved exploratory tendencies, Dubourg and Baumard defend too narrow a conception of the adaptive evolution of imaginary worlds. Imagination and its imaginary worlds are ancient and adaptive, allowing deliberation over actions, consequences, and futures worth aspiring to, often engendering the world we see around us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As emphasized in early cultural evolutionary theory, understanding heritability of human traits – especially, behavioural traits – is difficult. The target article describes important ways that culture can enhance, or obscure, signatures of heritability in genetic studies. Here, we discuss the utility of calculating heritability for behavioural traits influenced by cultural evolution and point to conceptual and technical complications to consider in future models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uchiyama et al. present a dual inheritance framework for conceptualizing how behavioural genetics and cultural evolution interact and affect heritability. We posit that to achieve a holistic and nuanced representation of the cultural environment and evolution against which genetic effects should be evaluated, it is imperative to consider the multiple geographic cultural layers impacting individuals and genetic heritability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We advocate for an integrative long-term perspective on time, noting that culture changes on timescales amenable to behavioral genetic study with appropriate design and modeling extensions. We note the need for replications of behavioral genetic studies to examine model invariance across long-term timescales, which would afford examination of specified as well as unspecified cultural moderators of behavioral genetic effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uchiyama et al. provide a compelling analysis of cultural influences on estimates of the genetic contribution to psychological and behavioral traits. Their focus is on the relevance of their arguments for behavioral genetics and their work resonates with other contemporary approaches that emphasize extra-genetic influences on phenotype. I extend their analysis to consider its relevance for evolutionary psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epigenetics impacts gene–culture coevolution by amplifying phenotypic variation, including clustering, and bridging the difference in timescales between genetic and cultural evolution. The dual inheritance model described by Uchiyama et al. could be modified to provide greater explanatory power by incorporating epigenetic effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uchiyama et al. propose a unified model linking cultural evolutionary theory to behavior genetics (BG) to enhance generalizability, enrich explanation, and predict how social factors shape heritability estimates. A consideration of culture evolution is beneficial but insufficient for purpose. I submit that their proposed model is underdeveloped and their emphasis on heritability estimates misguided. I discuss their ambiguous conception of culture, neglect of social structure, and the lack of a general theory in BG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cultural evolutionary approach to the dynamics of cumulative culture is insufficient for understanding how culture affects heritability estimates; it ignores the agency of individuals and internal complexity of social groups that drive cultural evolution. Both environmental and social selection need consideration. The WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) problem has never plagued anthropology: A wealth of ethnography is available for the problem at hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A group in intergroup conflict needs to overcome the collective action problem in order to defend itself against an external enemy. This leads to increasing complexity that cannot be adequately covered by just scaling up the model of intragroup conflicts. Research on cultural evolution and evolutionary psychology shows that external conflict has profound effects on group organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of the most important properties of human groups – including properties that may give one group an evolutionary advantage over another – are properly defined only at the level of group organization. Yet at present, most work on the evolution of culture has focused solely on the transmission of individual-level traits. I propose a conceptual extension of the theory of cultural evolution, particularly related to the evolutionary competition between cultural groups. The key concept in this extension is the emergent group-level trait. This type of trait is characterized by the structured organization of differentiated individuals and constitutes a unit of selection that is qualitatively different from selection on groups as defined by traditional multilevel selection (MLS) theory. As a corollary, I argue that the traditional focus on cooperation as the defining feature of human societies has missed an essential feature of cooperative groups. Traditional models of cooperation assume that interacting with one cooperator is equivalent to interacting with any other. However, human groups involve differential roles, meaning that receiving aid from one individual is often preferred to receiving aid from another. In this target article, I discuss the emergence and evolution of group-level traits and the implications for the theory of cultural evolution, including ramifications for the evolution of human cooperation, technology, and cultural institutions, and for the equivalency of multilevel selection and inclusive fitness approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Mehr et al.'s credible signaling hypothesis and Savage et al.'s music and social bonding hypothesis emphasize the role of multilevel social structures in the evolution of music. Although empirical evidence preferentially supports the social bonding hypothesis, rhythmic music may enable bonding in a way uniquely fitted to the normative and language-based character of multilevel human societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two target articles agree that processes of cultural evolution generate richness and diversity in music, but neither address this question in a focused way. We sketch one way to proceed – and hence suggest how the target articles differ not only in empirical claims, but also in their tacit, prior assumptions about the relationship between cognition and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my response to the commentaries from a collection of esteemed researchers, I reassess and eventually find largely intact my claim that human tool use evidences higher social and non-social cognitive ability. Nonetheless, I concede that my examination of individual-level cognitive traits does not offer a full explanation of cumulative culture yet. For that, one needs to incorporate them into population-dynamic models of cultural evolution. I briefly describe my current and future work on this. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When instrumental inference hides behind seemingly arbitrary conventions - CORRIGENDUM Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, e256. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22001340 2 Jagiello, R., Heyes, C. & Whitehouse, H. (2022). Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France In the commentary by Dubourg et al. ([1]) on the target article by Jagiello et al. ([2]), the affiliation for all three authors was incorrectly listed as follows: Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure-PSL, 75005 Paris, France It should be listed as above as follows: Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France. [Extracted from the article]

It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a "moving target" both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG - the mesh between learners and languages - arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent "organism," which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his theory of evolution, Darwin recognized that the conditions of life play a role in the generation of hereditary variations, as well as in their selection. However, as evolutionary theory was developed further, heredity became identified with genetics, and variation was seen in terms of combinations of randomly generated gene mutations. We argue that this view is now changing, because it is clear that a notion of hereditary variation that is based solely on randomly varying genes that are unaffected by developmental conditions is an inadequate basis for evolutionary theories. Such a view not only fails to provide satisfying explanations of many evolutionary phenomena, it also makes assumptions that are not consistent with the data that are emerging from disciplines ranging from molecular biology to cultural studies. These data show that the genome is far more responsive to the environment than previously thought, and that not all transmissible variation is underlain by genetic differences. In Evolution in Four Dimensions (2005) we identify four types of inheritance (genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbol-based), each of which can provide variations on which natural selection will act. Some of these variations arise in response to developmental conditions, so there are Lamarckian aspects to evolution. We argue that a better insight into evolutionary processes will result from recognizing that transmitted variations that are not based on DNA differences have played a role. This is particularly true for understanding the evolution of human behavior, where all four dimensions of heredity have been important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they become capable of modeling all aspects of decision making, including those normally considered ‘psychological,’ ‘sociological,’ or ‘anthropological.’ The mind as a decision-making organ then becomes the organizing principle of psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Demonstrating that FEP or TTOM can integrate these models will require a bit more math. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentaries are a promising sign that a research programme on the cognitive science of souls will continue to move toward empirical and theoretical rigor. Most of the commentators agree that beliefs in personal immortality, in the intelligent design of souls, and in the symbolic meaning of natural events can provide new insight into human social evolution. In this response I clarify and extend the evolutionary model, further emphasizing the adaptiveness of the cognitive system that underlies these beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We suggest that human culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary properties, and argue that the structure of a science of cultural evolution should share fundamental features with the structure of the science of biological evolution. This latter claim is tested by outlining the methods and approaches employed by the principal subdisciplines of evolutionary biology and assessing whether there is an existing or potential corresponding approach to the study of cultural evolution. Existing approaches within anthropology and archaeology demonstrate a good match with the macroevolutionary methods of systematics, paleobiology, and biogeography, whereas mathematical models derived from population genetics have been successfully developed to study cultural microevolution. Much potential exists for experimental simulations and field studies of cultural microevolution, where there are opportunities to borrow further methods and hypotheses from biology. Potential also exists for the cultural equivalent of molecular genetics in ‘social cognitive neuroscience,’ although many fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. It is argued that studying culture within a unifying evolutionary framework has the potential to integrate a number of separate disciplines within the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking an evolutionary perspective on human nature is highly commendable when the purpose is to improve society. Changing the course of human evolution is more questionable – in the biological sense of the term. The “science of intentional change” should preferably have a terminology that distinguishes between genetic changes and cultural transformation, and it needs a direction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]