1. Self-Covariant and Consistent Solutions of Transferable Utility Cooperative Games.
- Author
-
Yanovskaya, E. B.
- Subjects
COOPERATIVE game theory ,ANALYSIS of covariance ,NUMERICAL analysis ,ALGORITHMS ,SUPERADDITIVITY ,GAME theory - Abstract
This paper defines the self-covariance property for the solutions of transferable utility cooperative games (TU-games) as a weakening of their covariance. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance so that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors themselves and their multipliers. A description of all non-empty, single-valued, efficient, anonymous, weakly and self-covariant solutions in the class of twoplayer TU-games is given. As demonstrated below, among them there exist just three solutions admitting consistent extensions in the Davis-Maschler sense. They are the equal share solution, the standard solution, and the constrained egalitarian solution for superadditive two-player TUgames. For the third solution mentioned, characterizations of some consistent extensions to the class of all TU-games are given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
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