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This research note discusses the 2009 Defence White Paper, particularly its focus on the potential threat the Chinese military might pose to the security of the Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future. It also examines Chinese responses to the White Paper's main theses. It concludes that the White Paper marked a departure from the Howard government's policy of de-emphasising differences in Canberra's dialogue with Beijing and, by re-affirming commitment to the alliance with the United States (US), delineated the limits of Australia's partnership with China. However, its poorly substantiated predictions regarding the rise of China's power, the US economic and military decline and Beijing's geostrategic objectives raise doubts about the Rudd government's capacity to formulate a coherent vision for the future of Australia's relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia faces a complex set of dilemmas in foreign, defence, and economic policy. Australian governments have traditionally relied on the United States to underwrite the country's defence policies, and have regularly demonstrated loyalty to the bilateral strategic alliance. Yet, Australia's economic security has become more dependent on China, a country with which the US has a competitive relationship. This article first reviews theories of competition among great powers. It then analyses key factors that are shaping the region and the Australian policy environment. It is argued that Australia may have much to gain from acting collaboratively with other middle powers within multilateral institutions. In this context, Australia may also benefit from a more robust recognition of its own distinctive national interest. 澳大利亚面临外交、防务、经济政策上一系列的复杂难题。澳政府以往一直是依赖美国为澳国的防务政策签字画押，而且一直对双边战略联盟忠诚不二。但澳大利亚的经济安全却更依赖同美国有着竞争关系的中国。本文梳理了有关大国竞争关系的各种理论，分析了构成地区以及澳大利亚政策环境的诸多因素。作者认为，与中等强国进行多边体制内的合作，会让澳大利益受益非强。坚定不移的强调自己的国家利益，对澳大利亚也是有益的。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the 1990s, Australia has become increasingly concerned about a perceived incongruence between its booming economic relationship with China and its security alliance with the US. There have been dire warnings that the future will be marked by an inevitable increase in tensions between China and the US as the former threatens to overtake and surpass the latter in aggregate GDP and in military force projection capability. This combination of bilateral tensions and concomitant pressures from each side for Australia’s support could force Canberra into a difficult choice: renounce its economic relationship with China to side with an economically moribund West, or betray old alliance commitments in pursuit of a lucrative relationship with a rising but ideologically alien new hegemon. What should Australia do? That is not a question that can be answered scientifically, but the framework provided here can perhaps elucidate the stakes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 1997 Australia changed its human rights policy regarding China from its support for resolutions on China at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to the adoption of the bilateral human rights dialogue process. From 1991 to 1997 the UNCHR process had greatly contributed to the Chinese government making human rights concessions such that China could be considered to be in phase three (tactical concessions) of the spiral model of Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. To progress to phase four (prescriptive status), continued pressures by international and domestic actors are needed so that support and protection is provided to domestic human rights activists. The annual Australia–China bilateral dialogue meetings do not appear to be contributing to those pressures. However, in a limited way given its small scale, the Australia–China Technical Cooperation Program may help to bring about further human rights improvements in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]