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Perceived threats to sovereignty stemming from trade exposure to China have led to calls for the Australian government to embrace the concept of 'trusted trade'. This involves using policy levers to drive trade towards markets that have capitals more geopolitically aligned with Canberra and finds practical expression in forms such as 'friend-shored' supply chains. A theme of 'trusted trade' advocacy is the conscription of existing security-oriented partnerships, including the ANZUS alliance, the Quad grouping and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, to take on economic dimensions. While holding superficial appeal, this paper details why pursuing this policy path would be to learn the wrong lessons from Beijing's campaign of trade disruption that began in May 2020, and make Australia both poorer and less secure. Three key data points are highlighted that collectively support an assessment that the Australian government's traditional trade policy approach, emphasising open regionalism, remains overwhelmingly fit for purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in the economic relation between Australia and Japan. The organization was formed in 1962 and its goals were properly discussed in September of 1964 during the meeting of the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee (AJBCC) in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. Among the goals formulated are the fortification of AJBCC, attracting foreign leaders, and to include the trade union representatives and the state as members of the committee.

In its 50 years, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs (and later Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) has become a great department of state. Foreign is an important conglomerate, doing diplomacy, trade, aid, and spying. In the Canberra system, though, Foreign has an 'anaemia' problem caused by chronic underfunding. Measured as a proportion of the Commonwealth budget, spending on diplomacy is halving in only three decades. Anaemia is the effect; the causes are a formidable set of forces pressing against the department over those 50 years: the evolution and empowerment of Australia's presidential prime minister; the birth of ministerial minders; public service managerialism; Canberra's national security system—and mindset—in the twenty-first century; globalisation and the digital era: every government department has its own bit of foreign policy; political choices: Australia's two parties of government— Liberal and Labor—often buy something other than good foreign policy. Plus, important bits of the Liberal Party see DFAT as ideologically tainted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]