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The action-specific account of perception suggests that our perceptual system is influenced by information about our ability to act in our environment and, thus, affects our perception. However, the specific information about action that is influential for perception is still largely unknown. For example, if a goal is achieved through automation rather than action, is perception influenced because the goal was achieved or is perception immune because the act was automated rather than performed by the observer? In four experiments, we examined whether automating a paddle to block a moving ball in a computer game similar to Pong affects perception of the ball's speed. Results indicate that the automation used here did not affect speed perception of the target. Whereas tools such as reach-extending sticks and various-sized paddles are both incorporated into one's body schema and also influence spatial perception, automation, our results imply that automation is not incorporated into one's body schema and does not affect spatial perception. The dissociation in how the mind treats tools versus automation could have several implications as automation becomes more prevalent in daily life.

According to the action-specific account of perception, a perceiver's ability to act influences how the environment is perceived. For example, in a computer-based task, participants perceive fish as moving faster when they use a smaller net, and are thus less effective at catching the fish (Witt & Sugovic, 2013a). Here, we examined the degree to which attention may influence perceptual judgments by requiring participants to engage in a secondary task that directed their attention either toward (Exp. 1) or away from (Exp. 2) the to-be-caught fish. Though perceived fish speed was influenced by participants' catching performance-replicating previous results-attentional allocation did not impact this relationship between catching performance and perceived fish speed. The present results suggest that action directly influences spatial perception, rather than exerting indirect effects via attentional processes.

The action-specific perception hypothesis (Witt, Current Directions in Psychological Science 20: 201-206, 2011) claims that the environment is represented with respect to potential interactions for objects present within said environment. This investigation sought to extend the hypothesis beyond perceptual mechanisms and assess whether action-specific potential could alter attentional allocation. To do so, we examined a well-replicated attention bias in the weapon focus effect (Loftus, Loftus,Messo, Law and Human Behaviour 1, 55-62, 1987), which represents the tendency for observers to attend more to weapons than to neutral objects. Our key manipulation altered the anticipated action-specific potential of observers by providing them a firearm while they freely viewed scenes with and without weapons present. We replicated the original weapon focus effect using modern eye tracking and confirmed that the increase in time looking at weapons comes at a cost of less time spent looking at faces. Additionally, observers who held firearms while viewing the various scenes showed a general bias to look at faces over objects, but only if the firearm was in a readily usable position (i.e., pointed at the scenes rather than holstered at one's side). These two effects, weapon focus and the newly found bias to look more at faces when armed, canceled out one another without interacting. This evidence confirms that the action capabilities of the observer alter more than just perceptual mechanisms and that holding a weapon can change attentional priorities. Theoretical and real-world implications are discussed.