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Chinese diplomacy has been proactive under Xi Jinping and overseas Chinese are an important target. A better understanding of how overseas Chinese perceive Chinese diplomacy can increase our knowledge, but it is under‐studied in the literature. To fill part of this gap, this research focuses on the Pacific region where Chinaʼs activities have triggered growing geostrategic competition between traditional powers and China. Based on a survey of 182 ordinary overseas Chinese in Fiji and Tonga, this paper examines Chinese diasporaʼs perceptions of three aspects that are related to Chinaʼs diplomacy, including the Belt and Road Initiative, China‐Pacific bilateral relations, and old‐new Chinese issues. The survey reveals nuances in ordinary overseas Chinese views about Chinaʼs diplomacy, especially the concerns and apathy among some of them. It suggests that ordinary overseas Chinese support for Chinaʼs diplomacy is unlikely to grow substantially unless their views about this diplomacy become more positive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transboundary fine dust has been a leading cause of dispute between China and Korea since the mid‐2010s. This study observes that transboundary fine dust is not purely an environmental issue, but rather mixed with political and diplomatic challenges. Despite the emerging bilateral and multilateral efforts to tackle this issue, this research sheds light on how political and diplomatic factors have undermined the outcomes of environmental negotiations between China and Korea. We highlight three dimensions of policy‐based studies: scientific joint research on source‐receptor relationships, interstate environmental negotiations, and multilateral environmental institutions in Northeast Asia. This study argues that transboundary fine dust cooperation has been extensively entangled with national political interests and proceeded via diplomatic channels, leading to the current absence of binding agreements and policy commitments. Therefore, a steady process of de‐linking environmental cooperation and diplomatic fluctuations would be the best direction to proceed in a long‐term perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initiated in 2017 and formally established in 2020, the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF) is the latest addition to the development finance landscape in Asia. This article provides an in‐depth analysis of MCDFʼs potential to offer additionality in development finance and its political legitimacy by comparing it to 18 development finance and capacity‐building organisations. The article finds that while the MCDF contributes to closing the substantial infrastructure financing gap in Asia, it risks overlapping with existing initiatives to such a degree that it may become an inefficient use of resources while lacking legitimacy as a multilateral organisation due to its unclear relationship with Chinaʼs Belt and Road Initiative. From this outset, and given the climate mandates of its multilateral development bank members, this article finds that if the MCDF focuses specifically on green and climate finance, it could carve out an area where it can become a much‐needed new platform for project development and coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Communist Party is consolidating one party rule under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Beijing seeks to rule by central mandate while limiting local autonomy. The central government response to the COVID‐19 public health emergency reinforces this view. In January 2020 Beijing established the Central Epidemic Response Leading Group to mobilise a comprehensive nationwide policy effort to contain the virus. The exceptional nature of the COVID‐19 national emergency allows the central government to project power over local authorities and leverage over citizens, but we argue that this is a short‐term phenomenon because local disease control initiatives remain important, with local authorities adapting national policies to meet constituent needs. There are degrees of policy discretion and divergence at the subnational level that enable context‐specific responses to the virus within China's strict bureaucratic hierarchy. Primary data derives from interviews and observations in Nancun village, Hebei Province, conducted from January to April 2020. Evidence from Nancun explains how local authorities interpret the edicts and mandates of the central government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]