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This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The key to understanding civil--military relations in polities such as Russia and the United States is military culture. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics or norms of behavior. Some such as executive leadership, respect for military expertise, and a clear chain of command are critical and exist in both the American and Russian militaries. Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin and George Bush II, and Putin and George Bush I), this article maintains that in those instances when military culture was ignored in either country (e.g., a lack of executive leadership, little respect for military expertise, and lack of a clear chain of command), conflict not only existed but also was acerbated. Conversely, in cases where the civilians were firmly in charge but respected military culture, conflict was minimized. Senior military officers felt free to express their opinions and had the perception that their views were always taken seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is the military so popular in Turkish society? By using World Values Survey data, this study explores the impact of several political, social, and personal factors on societal confidence in the military. Empirical results indicate that there is a significant variance in confidence in the military across certain political groups. Although the military's popularity is high among nationalists, it is rather limited among pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups. Interestingly, however, religion cuts both ways in the formation of confidence in the military. Pro-Islamic groups do not have much confidence in the strictly secular military, but being a devout Muslim does not reduce the military's popularity. Another interesting finding is that trust in civilians and support for democracy do not necessarily reduce military's popularity. A brief discussion of some implications of these findings for the civil--military relations and prospects for the consolidation of democracy in the Turkish Republic is also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe is the region of the world where the network of security institutions is the densest. Yet, these institutions did not erase differences about conceptions of force employment among European countries and between European countries and the United States. Why have concepts of military power and force employment remained distinct and varied in Europe, and yet, what facilitates their convergence at the European Union level into the ambiguous notion of crisis management? We argue that an important answer to these questions is endogenous to the military: both role conceptions and organizational frames of military institutions are key underlying aspects of the differences at the national level and of the common ground at the European Union level. We examine and compare empirically the role conceptions and organizational frames of the armed forces in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom since the early 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the arrival of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the discourse of American military strategy has been framed around a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This article takes up the question of whether the RMA discourse represents a real strategic shift through an examination of the distribution of Defense Department spending on procurement across economic sectors and geographical space for the period 1990 to 2004. Detailed analysis of procurement data shows that the RMA builds on an earlier transformation in the United States' defense posture around the post-cold war disarmament rather than signal a new era for the military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India finalized its nuclear command structure and formalized its nuclear doctrine in January 2003, nearly five years after coming out of the nuclear closet and openly declaring itself as a nuclear-weapon state. While a clearly enunciated nuclear doctrine and command structure are seen by some as essential in enhancing regional stability and assuaging the concerns of the international community, its implications for the civil-military relations in India remain far from clear. Strategic imperatives and political pressures concerning civil-military relations seem to be pulling Indian nuclear policy in opposite directions. This article examines Indian nuclear doctrine and command structure with an attempt to decipher its implications for the future of civil-military relations in India with respect to the management of its nuclear arsenal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines patterns of continuity and change in Israeli military thinking over time, as reflected in Ma'arachot articles. The main questions addressed are: First, do Ma'arachot pieces reflect an intellectual focus, that is, a theoretically and historically based thinking? Second, given the fact that in modern times war has receded from the actual battlefield, do Ma'arachot pieces reflect a modern focus? In other words, do they address war in a comprehensive, multilevel, and multidimensional manner? The findings of the survey refute the claim that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is ignorant or anti-intellectual. However, the results portray an army which puts application before study, and which has a lot of catching up to do where a deep understanding of central aspects of modern war is concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the military perceptions and attitudes regarding nationalism and national security in contemporary Brazil. The investigation of the Brazilian military perceptions of the new, military attitudes, emerging international order and the ongoing modification of military doctrine, appears to establish introductory view that the recent Brazilian Policy for National Defense hides more than it reveals regarding crucial ongoing processes in the military establishment. Threats of perception, which have been underscored are not the only causal factors in conditioning strategic planning.

Dauber approaches the question of civil-military relations from the perspective of argument studies. Viewed as an argument formation, the Weinberger Doctrine functions as a template that privileges technical argumentation in considerations of possible uses of force. As a result, public forms of argument, centered more on the value of the potential intervention than the methodology, becomes more difficult. The acceptance of the Weinberger Doctrine in the public forum, therefore, independent of whether or not the various services officially subscribe to the doctrine, produces a situation where civil-military relations are distorted. The military side of the ledger, determining the possible cost of an intervention, trumps the civil side, determining whether the cost is worthwhile. The result is an argument within which it is almost impossible to successfully defend interventions on purely humanitarian grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is no "crisis" in U.S. post-Cold War civil-military relations, it seems clear that the United States is now experiencing a weakening in civilian control of the military, at least compared with the Cold War. In a previous article, I argued that militaries with primarily external missions were more amenable to civilian control than militaries with internal missions. This article looks in more detail at how variation in international and domestic threats affects the strength of civilian control of the military relations as well as the role that military doctrine plays in strengthening or weakening civilian control in structurally indeterminate threat environments. My argument is that in structurally indeterminate threat environments, externally oriented military doctrines are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for civilian control of the military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Pentagon's reluctance to use force in recent conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda stems ultimately from the organizational trauma the U.S. military suffered in Vietnam. The near total disintegration of the military in the early 1970s created an organizational survival imperative that produced the military's lessons of Vietnam and its doctrine on the proper use of force. This Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, despite frequent criticism, has steadily gained legitimacy over the years since Vietnam and is preeminent today in the American foreign policy community. Military leaders, by applying the doctrine, have succeeded in avoiding new Vietnam-type quagmires by constraining the imperial impulses of the presidency, but the inherent ambiguity of international conflict in the post-Cold War era will make it more difficult for the promulgators of this doctrine to continue to negotiate the fine line between quagmires and appeasement in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Clinton Administration has developed and applied a fairly detailed set of guidelines on the use of force. The Clinton criteria are derived in large measure from official military doctrine promulgated by Gen. Colin Powell, but they have been modified particularly in light of U.S. experience in Somalia. The current consensus doctrine calls for overwhelming force in defense of vital national interests in order to achieve a quick, decisive victory with low U.S. casualties. When important but not vital interests are involved, and costs and risks are commensurate with those interests, limited military means may be used for limited political objectives. In all cases, military operations should have clearly defined and achievable missions, with measurable milestones and an exit strategy to guard against mission creep. Public and congressional support is deemed advisable but not necessary. This article illustrates the application of this doctrine in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After nine years of inconclusive combat, the Soviet Union has finally begun withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan. Their lack of military success initially forced them to adopt tactics that were not part of standard Soviet military doctrine and, ultimately, to disengage their forces. In an attempt to discover a more effective counterguerrila strategy, the Soviets began to re-examine their experiences in crushing the Basmachi revolt, the Central Asian insurgency that lasted from 1918 to 1929. That conflict has been considered by some Soviet military analysts as a good example of how indigenous guerrilla forces could be defeated. However, unlike their campaign in Central Asia (which equally emphasized political, socioeconomic, and military policy tools), the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan emphasized primarily, although not exclusively, a military solution. Operationally, Soviet tactics were predicated upon the use of high-technology weapons (such as helicopter gunships and tactical aircraft) to give them mobility and firepower. In one of numerous parallels to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the Soviet military discovered that superior technology has only limited application in a counterinsurgency campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. and Soviet strategic command, control, and communications are "survivably inter-dependent." Neither country can credibly deter nor plausibly fight wars involving the threat or use of nuclear forces without observing "rules of the road" about C³. These rules include clarification of their intentions during a crisis: exchange of information and persons to preserve crisis stability; and tacit agreement about not attacking the "brain" or "central nervous systems" of the opponent early in war. Command reciprocity does not automatically guarantee equal superpower awareness of that fact, or equivalent willingness to incorporate it into U.S. and USSR military doctrine. Thus, U.S. forces and C³ must be planned with the recognition that command reciprocity may not withstand the early phases of war. The impact of proposed new technologies such as the Strategic Defense Initiative on U.S.-Soviet strategic command reciprocity is also acknowledged, although the details are not now foreseeable. Command reciprocity will continue whether the "defensive transition" in U.S.-Soviet strategic forces occurs at a rapid or incremental rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has long been accepted that military personnel share a set of beliefs, sometimes characterized as promilitary values, which are distinctive from those of civilians. This report focuses on whether such differences arise because of socialization processes involved in military training and service, or because of prior differences in values and beliefs among those who select to enter military service. Data from large-scale questionnaire surveys of high school seniors in 10 classes (1976-85) clearly support the self-selection interpretation; those expecting to serve—and especially those expecting military careers—were consistently more promilitary than their classmates. The largest differences involved perceptions of military job opportunities; views on military supremacy, intervention, and obedience also differed, but less sharply. These findings among seniors closely replicate earlier research comparing soldiers, sailors, and civilians; taken together. the data suggest that self-selection is the dominant factor and that actual service may not substantially enhance prior attitude differences. The paper briefly explores implications for a "separate military ethos," given an all-volunteer force containing growing numbers of careerists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the extending adaptation of the all volunteer force (AVF) and presents a comprehensive overview of the recruitment and retention of enlistees and officers during the initial phase of the AVF. The connection of the social demography of enlisted recruits and officer personnel which reflects the response of young men and women to the economic rewards and institutional values of military services that includes the important variables like family status and military experience of the recruit's family and the impact of military experience that focuses on variables like job satisfaction, response to the military mission and perceptions of military-civilian pay differentials presents a more comprehensive view and explanation of the existing and emerging personnel pattern.

The article outlines the historical continuity of major aspects of the military structure in the U.S. It provides information on the military strategy of the country from its English antecedents to the present and also relates to post-World War II policy proposals for major restructuring of the reserves. According to the author, the American military reserve regulations and the attitudes have raised locally and commanded by the local nobility and the leadership role is a direct result of feudal relationships and responsibilities.

The article focuses on the changes in the armed forces in Australia. According to the author, the Liberal-Country party governments recognized the changes occurred in the country's international position when it became clear that Great Britain would withdraw from East of Suez and that the U.S. would also withdraw from the defense of Southeast Asia. In 1972-1975, the changes in the armed forces were established, in which irreversible was acknowledged by the Liberal-Country party government. Moreover, the labor government quickened the country's adjustment to the changed circumstances by withdrawing the remaining land forces.