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The paper is a critical reaction to a research paper that appeared in Argumentation. It suggests that Goodman's delineation of the concept of argument for purposes of disciplines like logic is unsatisfactory in several respects. Identifying arguments as (unstructured) sets of propositions is highly problematic. Moreover, Goodman's delineation is excessively vague and it may commit us to the claim that sequences of sentences which are commonly treated as expressing arguments do not, in fact, represent arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful-an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]