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[Display omitted] • A model is proposed to maximize market performance including tradable certificates. • The long-term impacts of regulations on market are discussed by fine and subsidy. • Three important objectives for government are investigated under four scenarios. • The obtained results are validated by Turkey's energy data as a real case study. • Fine policy is more effective than a subsidy to empower renewable electricity. In the last decades, due to the increasing environmental concerns such as energy-resource depletion and global warming, energy efficiency instruments and renewable energy production has been promoted more than ever. This paper investigates a comprehensive comparison between two energy markets, i.e., the tradable white certificate (TWC) market and the tradable green certificate (TGC) market. How to coordinate the two energy markets and what the coordination impacts become the main issues under a reward-penalty mechanism. This multi-agent problem is discussed in an electricity supply chain consisting of two populations of traditional energy suppliers who want to decide about using one of them under government intervention. In this regard, the behavior of the suppliers is analyzed under three different Scenarios, including traditional power generation, energy efficiency program (EEP), and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs). An evolutionary game is applied to formulate the problem. The results show that a mandatory fine policy is more useful than an energy-saving subsidy to motivate the traditional suppliers to move toward sustainable energy generation. This policy also helps governments to meet their sustainable-oriented goals, as we discussed in this work. The findings can be applied to extend sustainable-based energy projects in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

[Display omitted] • We simulate renewables pathways under different support phase-out scenarios. • We extend an investment algorithm by preferences and calibrated returns. • Our improved algorithm incorporates more heterogeneity resulting in stronger effects. • Further auction support is necessary for most capacity targets in the case countries. • Countries should coordinate policy changes due to cross-border effects. Support schemes have been central to the expansion of renewable electricity globally and in the European Union. As technologies mature, individual member states may decide to phase out these policies. While previous research has shown that such policy changes affect investors' decisions, we investigate how they affect pathways and electricity prices by simulating investment decisions in an agent-based model in two case countries. This paper contributes and applies an adapted investment decision algorithm that incorporates empirically observed technology and return preferences and is calibrated by return observations. The new algorithm yields more refined and stronger effects compared to its predecessor. Results show that the phase-out of auctions in Germany and the Netherlands slows down their deployment of renewable capacity by up to ∼60% and ∼35%, respectively. With the exception of photovoltaics and onshore wind projects in the Netherlands, the targeted capacities can only be reached by continuing support in both countries. Furthermore, ending support in a large country like Germany leads to higher electricity prices and fosters a market-driven but insufficient capacity expansion in smaller neighbours like the Netherlands. As the electricity grids in many countries are strongly interconnected, such cross-border effects are of international relevance. Our findings suggest that continued auctions may be necessary and that countries should coordinate policy changes to stay on track for meeting their renewables targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]