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This paper investigates whether there has been an improvement in and convergence of productive efficiency across European banking markets since the creation of the Single Internal Market. Using efficiency measures derived from DEA estimation, the determinants of European bank efficiency are evaluated using the Tobit regression model approach. The established literature on modelling the determinants of bank efficiency is then extended by recognizing the problem of the inherent dependency of DEA efficiency scores when used in regression analysis. To overcome the dependency problem, a bootstrapping technique is applied. Overall, the results suggest that since the EU's Single Market Programme there has been a small improvement in bank efficiency levels, although there is little evidence to suggest that these have converged. The results also suggest that inference on the determinants of bank efficiency drawn from non-bootstrapped regression analysis may be biased and misleading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a peculiar feature of European banking markets that, in almost every country, a handful of large banks tend to emerge over time, whether through government encouragement, or the workings of the market mechanism. From a general perspective, however, it is difficult to evaluate the competitive implications of increased concentration. The traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm would suggest that increased concentration fosters collusion and anti-competitive practices whereas the efficiency hypothesis suggests otherwise. This paper presents tests of the two hypotheses with respect to the European banking industry using pooled and annual data for the period 1986 to 1989. The results generally support the traditional SCP paradigm as an explanation for the market behaviour of European banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The banking sector and the stock market in Europe have been adversely impacted by a series of global financial crises over the last two decades. Major financial reforms were implemented to enhance the stability and competition within the banking sector. Measures were also implemented to create a vibrant stock market in Europe to stimulate economic growth in Europe. This study examines the interactions between stock market development, banking competition, and banking stability in European countries from 1996 to 2016. The purpose of the study is to understand the inter-linkages between these variables to ascertain the spillover impact of policy reforms in the banking sector on the stock market and vice-versa. Using a vector error-correction model, the study finds long-run and short-run inter-linkages between banking competition, banking stability, and stock market development in European countries. The study's most robust result is that banking competition and banking stability stimulate stock market development in the long run. There is also some evidence that healthy competition in the banking sector and stock market development instils greater stability in the banking sector. The results suggest that policy measures put in place to create a vibrant stock market must include elevating banking competition and banking stability, with policymakers being cognizant that causality may be bidirectional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented expansion of sovereign balance sheets since the beginning of the global crisis has given a new meaning to the termsovereign risk. Developments in Europe since early 2010 revealed new challenges for the functioning of private banks in an environment of heightened sovereign risk and may have contributed to deleveraging. The article uses an innovative way of measuring the perception of sovereign risk and its impact. Using an extension of a common market discipline framework, it shows that exposure to sovereign risk may have limited the ability of banks in Europe to collect deposits. Potential identification issues between deposits and bank efficiency are controlled by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results are robust to inclusion of conventional measures of bank performance and the sector-wide holdings of foreign sovereign debt. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We use an integrated approach to analyse the reasons behind the discount on the balance-sheet fair value of illiquid financial instruments held by European banks and classified into the Level 3 Fair Value hierarchy under IFRS 7. We believe that the potential sources of misalignment are (1) the lack of disclosure, (2) earnings management, and (3) the lack of liquidity. We show that the discount implicit in market values is linked to the lack of mandatory additional disclosure required by IFRS 7 and that this result supports the strong enforcement activity made by national authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Motivated by the theoretical prediction of the opportunistic behaviour of large banks that face expected public intervention, we test a full and a partial form of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) hypothesis. The full form of the hypothesis implies the increase in the risk undertakings and profitability of banks that exceed a certain dimension; the partial form of the hypothesis implies only an augmented risk appetite of large banks compared to their smaller counterparts. The examined area is the European banking industry, whose behaviour is observed over the first wave of the present financial crisis (2007/09). The estimation of a quadratic fit that links change in a bank’s credit risk profile and profitability retention rates with a bank’s size suggests the existence of a partial form of the TBTF hypothesis. However, a more precise, local rolling windows estimation of the size sensitivities reveals that large banks – those whose liabilities exceed approximately 2% of the country of origin’s GDP (15% of our sample) – show an increase in credit risk profile and a superior capability of retaining higher ROA scores,vis-à-vis their smaller counterparts. With the caveats of our investigation, we interpret these results as evidence of a full form of the TBTF hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We use financial information on banks from Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania to examine the role of wholesale funding on the transmission of financial crises to bank lending, as well as to study the response of financial institutions in different regions during the crises. We consider the role of wholesale funding during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Our results suggest that during the GFC, wholesale funding dependence had a negative effect on loans growth across regions, but with substantial regional heterogeneity. The growth of loans from financial institutions in Asia and Europe was consistently sensitive to wholesale funding dependence. Although wholesale funding did not play a significant role in the transmission mechanism of the AFC, a subsample of financial institutions in Asia, who depended more heavily on wholesale funding, experienced a faster loan growth and may have been able to better withstand the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk-taking behaviour from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes depend on banks’ex anteregulatory capital position. Second, we consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks’ risk changes. We find that, for highly capitalized, adequately capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase in equity or in subordinated debt positively affects risk. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital or subordinated debt. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by euro area banks to loans during the period 1994–2004, using a novel measure of competition called the Boone indicator. We find evidence that stronger competition implies significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan market products, in line with expectations. This result implies that stronger competition causes both lower bank interest rates and a stronger pass-through of market rate changes into bank rates. Evidence of the latter is also presented by our Error Correction Model (ECM) for bank rates. Further, banks compensate income losses from increased loan market competition by offering lower deposit rates. Our findings with respect to the loan market rates have important monetary policy implications, as they suggest that measures to promote competition in the European banking sector are likely to render the monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is the first that applies a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the banking industry. This approach is able to measure competition of bank market segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of competition can consider the entire banking market only. Like most other model-based measures, this approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We measure competition on the lending markets in the five major EU countries as well as, for comparison, the UK, the US and Japan. Our findings indicate that over the period 1994-2004 the US had the most competitive loan market, whereas overall loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in the EU. The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position, whereas in Italy competition declined significantly over time. The French, Japanese and UK loan markets were generally less competitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study branching costs and competitiveness of European banks are measured by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a representative sample drawn from nine EEC banking industries in the period from 1990 to 1996. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically the size of their branching network anticipating the degree of competition faced on interest rates. From the structural equations of the model an econometric test is derived in order to measure branching costs and degree of competition in banking services. The empirical analysis captures their changing over time together with the impact of various European directives aiming at deregulating the banking industry. Furthermore the study shows persistence of segmentation acoss EEC banking industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]