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A Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (SORTE) was introduced in: "Systemic optimal risk transfer equilibrium", Mathematics and Financial Economics (2021), for the analysis of the equilibrium among financial institutions or in insurance-reinsurance markets. A SORTE conjugates the classical Bühlmann's notion of a risk exchange equilibrium with a capital allocation principle based on systemic expected utility optimization. In this paper we extend such a notion to the case when the value function to be optimized is multivariate in a general sense, and it is not simply given by the sum of univariate utility functions. This takes into account the fact that preferences of single agents might depend on the actions of other participants in the game. Technically, the extension of SORTE to the new setup requires developing a theory for multivariate utility functions and selecting at the same time a suitable framework for the duality theory. Conceptually, this more general framework allows us to introduce and study a Nash Equilibrium property of the optimizer. We prove existence, uniqueness, and the Nash Equilibrium property of the newly defined Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The business activity is inseparable from the support of documental information flow. In the past, the commercial documents needed a lot of time to get to the point-to-point, which could lead to problems, such as insecurity or the relatively long time. With the emergence of new technologies, it is possible to change this information transmission method to enable fast and accurate dissemination. For considering the possibility of technology adoption, this study investigates the role of blockchain service in term of market size and file circulation time. Specifically, we construct a game-theoretic model to find the equilibrium strategy from a manufacturer and two competing retailers. From the perspective of equilibrium, we investigate the results for market effects, economic effects, service effects, and service efficiency, respectively. Moreover, we also analyze the service strategy of retailers providing service by manufacturer, time sensitivity, and competitive intensity, respectively. Based on the above analysis, this study has obtained an equilibrium to support the commercial practice. In summary, this study has two contributions. On the one hand, we analyze the impact of the technological investment in blockchain service on asymmetric market scale competition. This result extends the application scope of blockchain service in the market. On the other hand, this study discusses the impact of time value on technology investment in blockchain service. Therefore, through the discussion of our study, the results show the value of blockchain service in information exchanges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today's Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies the term structure of interest rates imposed by equilibrium in a production economy consisting of participants with heterogeneous preferences with information costs and short selling constraints. Our model accounts explicitly and simultaneously for information costs and short sales in the pricing of assets in the economy. Consumption is continuous. The paper contains an exact solution to market equilibrium. It provides an explicit constructive solution for determining the state-price density process. Interest rates and their behaviors are a function of economic variables with information costs and short selling constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]