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In group decisions, two issues need to be tackled: weighting opinions of different decision-makers and aggregating their evaluations. Many group aggregation techniques analyse these issues. These approaches can be correctly applied only if the weights assigned to all decision-makers are available. Unfortunately, there are situations where such weights are unavailable or incomplete, the negotiation required to better define them is not possible or decision-makers are unwilling to revise their judgments. These situations could pose a critical problem for the correct application of aggregation procedures. This problem is exaggerated if there are more than one group of decision-makers. In this paper, we present a new algorithm based on the Frobenius norm that considers the choice of the weights in aggregating judgments in a non-negotiable multi-group problem. This approach facilitates the computation of several sets of weights simultaneously, showing the roles played by each decision-maker and by each group in defining the global priority. To illustrate the method, we apply it in designing a new curriculum in entrepreneurship based on an entrepreneurial learning approach informed by perceptions of three stakeholders: entrepreneurship educators, entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship students. Data is collected by pairwise comparison within the analytic hierarchy process and is aggregated using our proposed approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most entrepreneurs seek VC funding after the reward-based crowdfunding campaign succeeds, and venture capitalists (VCs) can contribute to the project in two aspects: investment and operational expertise. With a game-theoretical model, we find that entrepreneurs face twelve possible scenarios contingent on the mass market revenue and revenue share, including the six scenarios wherein neither side exerts effort to complete the project. To attract VC funding and ensure the project completion after a campaign success, entrepreneurs should set the funding goal above a certain threshold. Specifically, we identify three ranges of the revenue share and derive the lower bound for the funding goal in each range. However, we notice that entrepreneurs prefer a low funding goal to promise the campaign success and the optimal goal will be the lower bound in each range. Moreover, we show that the revenue share is decisive to the role of VCs in the project. If the entrepreneur's share exceeds a high threshold, the venture capitalist becomes a pure investor with no incentive to exert effort, similar to the role of banks; if the share is less than a low threshold, the entrepreneur won't follow up but transfers the project, and the VC investor will be a project owner; if the share stays medium, the VC investor acts as a partner and there may exist "free-riding". In the extension, we consider the revenue share an endogenous and analyse the role of VCs further. Interestingly, the VC investor prefers to own the project and occupy all revenue in mass market, while the entrepreneur treats the inefficient venture capitalist as a pure investor and the efficient one as a partner. In addition, when cooperating with efficient VCs, the entrepreneur is more likely to enlarge her share as the mass market revenue increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]