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We examined whether cats have a cross-modal representation of humans, using a cross-modal expectancy violation paradigm originally used with dogs by Adachi et al. (Anim Cogn 10:17–21, 2007). We compared cats living in houses and in cat cafés to assess the potential effect of postnatal experience. Cats were presented with the face of either their owner or a stranger on a laptop monitor after playing back the voice of one of two people calling the subject’s name. In half of the trials the voice and face were of the same person (congruent condition) whereas in the other half of trials the stimuli did not match (incongruent condition). The café cats paid attention to the monitor longer in incongruent than congruent conditions, showing an expectancy violation. By contrast, house cats showed no similar tendency. These results show that at least café cats can predict their owner’s face upon hearing the owner’s voice, suggesting possession of cross-modal representation of at least one human. There may be a minimal kind or amount of postnatal e

We examined whether cats have a cross-modal representation of humans, using a cross-modal expectancy violation paradigm originally used with dogs by Adachi et al. (Anim Cogn 10:17-21, 2007). We compared cats living in houses and in cat cafés to assess the potential effect of postnatal experience. Cats were presented with the face of either their owner or a stranger on a laptop monitor after playing back the voice of one of two people calling the subject's name. In half of the trials the voice and face were of the same person (congruent condition) whereas in the other half of trials the stimuli did not match (incongruent condition). The café cats paid attention to the monitor longer in incongruent than congruent conditions, showing an expectancy violation. By contrast, house cats showed no similar tendency. These results show that at least café cats can predict their owner's face upon hearing the owner's voice, suggesting possession of cross-modal representation of at least one human. There may be a minimal kind or amount of postnatal experiences that lead to formation of a cross-modal representation of a specific person.

Dogs and cats are sensitive to human social signals such as pointing, gazing and facial expressions. Previous studies have demonstrated that dogs show over-reliance on human actions in the presence of conflicting physical cues. However, it is still unclear whether this tendency is specific to dogs, or shared with other domesticated animals. Here, we compared the behavior of dogs and cats in a two-choice task after they saw a person taking and pretending to eat food from a baited container. After one experimenter showed the dogs (Experiment 1) or cats (Experiment 2) two opaque containers, each containing a piece of the food, another (the demonstrator) removed food from one container and ate it (Eating condition), or simply picked up the food and returned it to the container (Showing condition). We recorded which container the subjects approached first after the demonstration. Both dogs and cats were less likely to choose the container associated with the human in the Eating than the Showing condition, although choice for this container was above chance in both conditions. In Experiment 3, we confirmed that dogs and cats naturally chose a baited over an empty container. These results suggest that both species' reasoning abilities might be influenced by a bias for prioritizing specific human actions. Although dogs and cats have different domestication histories, their social awareness of humans appears similar, possibly because they both share their environment with humans.

Researchers have investigated to what extent non-human primates understand others' attentional states, as this ability is considered an important prerequisite for theory of mind. However, previous studies using food requesting tasks have failed to show that non-human primates attribute perception to others as a function of their attentional states. One possible reason is that food requesting tasks may require subjects not only to take into account an experimenter's attentional state but also to direct it toward the food. The present study tested tufted capuchin monkeys' (Cebus apella) understanding of others' attentional states in a food requesting task. In the first situation, monkeys were required only to attract an experimenter's attention. In the second situation, the monkeys were required to both attract the experimenter's attention and direct it toward food on a table. The results revealed that capuchin monkeys showed evidence of understanding the experimenter's attentional variations only in the former condition. This suggests that previous tasks, requiring referential gestures, lacking in most non-human primates, failed to reveal sensitivity to human attentional states because the subjects might not have understood the requesting situation. In conclusion, capuchin monkeys can understand variations in others' attentional states, although this ability appears limited compared to what is seen in humans.

Many studies have used mirror-image stimulation in attempts to find self-recognition in monkeys. However, very few studies have presented monkeys with video images of themselves; the present study is the first to do so with capuchin monkeys. Six tufted capuchin monkeys were individually exposed to live face-on and side-on video images of themselves (experimental Phase 1). Both video screens initially elicited considerable interest. Two adult males looked preferentially at their face-on image, whereas two adult females looked preferentially at their side-on image; the latter elicited lateral movements and head-cocking. Only males showed communicative facial expressions, which were directed towards the face-on screen. In Phase 2 monkeys discriminated between real-time, face-on images and identical images delayed by 1 second, with the adult females especially preferring real-time images. In this phase both screens elicited facial expressions, shown by all monkeys. In Phase 3 there was no evidence of discrimination between previously recorded video images of self and similar images of a familiar conspecific. Although they showed no signs of explicit self-recognition, the monkeys’ behaviour strongly suggests recognition of the correspondence between kinaesthetic information and external visual effects. In species such as humans and great apes, this type of self-awareness feeds into a system that gives rise to explicit self-recognition.

We investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learn from others' mistakes. We prepared three kinds of transparent containers having the same appearance: one that could be opened by the lid, one that could be opened from the bottom, and one that could be opened either way. Using each of the first two one-way-open type containers, the monkeys were trained to copy the human demonstrator's action to open the container and obtain a piece of sweet potato contained therein. After this training, the demonstrator showed the monkeys an action that would open or fail to open the third, two-way-open type container. None of the monkeys reliably opened the container by spontaneously compensating for the demonstrator's failure (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, the same subjects were trained to correct their own mistakes immediately after failure, before we introduced the same test as in Experiment 1. This experience did not result in subjects using the demonstrator's failure to produce a successful action. In Experiment 3, we placed two monkeys face to face. In this situation, the second monkey was presented with the container after the first monkey failed to open it. As a result, two capuchin monkeys capitalized on the partner's failure to correctly guide his/her behavior. Thus, the monkeys monitored not only the outcome of the others' action, but also that action per se. This result suggests that not only humans and apes, but also monkeys may understand the meaning of others' actions in social learning.

Social evaluation during third-party interactions emerges early in human ontogeny, and it has been shown in adult capuchin monkeys who witness violations of reciprocity in object exchanges: Monkeys were less inclined to accept food from humans who refused to reciprocate with another human. A recent study reporting similar evidence in marmoset monkeys raised the possibility that such evaluations might be based on species' inherent cooperativeness. We tested a species not renowned for cooperativeness-squirrel monkeys-using the procedure used with marmosets and found a similar result. This finding rules out any crucial role for cooperative tendencies in monkeys' responses to unfair exchanges. We then tested squirrel monkeys using procedures more similar to those used in the original study with capuchins. Squirrel monkeys again accepted food less frequently from non-reciprocators, but unlike capuchins, they also strongly preferred reciprocators. We conclude that neither squirrel monkeys nor marmoset monkeys engaged in emotional bookkeeping of the type that probably underlies social evaluation in capuchin monkeys; instead, they employed one or more simple behavioral rules. Further comparative studies are required to clarify the mechanisms underlying social evaluation processes across species.

The present study asked whether capuchin monkeys recognize human attentional states. The monkeys requested food from the experimenter by extending an arm (pointing) toward the baited one of two transparent cups. On regular trials the experimenter gave the food immediately to the monkeys upon pointing but on randomly inserted test trials she ignored the pointing for 5 s during which she displayed different attentional states. The monkeys looked at the experimenter's face longer when she looked at the monkeys than when she looked at the ceiling in Experiment 1, and longer when she oriented her head midway between the two cups with eyes open than when she did so with eyes closed in Experiment 2. However, the monkeys showed no differential pointing in these conditions. These results suggest that capuchins are sensitive to eye direction but this sensitivity does not lead to differential pointing trained in laboratory experiments. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this is the first firm behavioral evidence that non-human primates attend to the subtle states of eyes in a food requesting task.

In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a "knower" who inspected a box for food, and a "guesser" who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.

Anticipating another’s actions is an important ability in social animals. Recent research suggests that in human adults and infants one’s own action experience facilitates understanding and anticipation of others’ actions. We investigated the link between first-person experience and perception of another’s action in adult tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella spp., formerly Cebus apella spp.). In Experiment 1, the monkeys observed a familiar human (actor) trying to open a container using either a familiar or an unfamiliar action. They looked for longer when the actor tried to open the container using a familiar action. In Experiment 2, the actor performed two novel actions on a new container. The monkeys looked equally at the two actions. In Experiment 3, the monkeys were trained to open the container using one of the novel actions in Experiment 2. After training, we repeated the same procedure as in Experiment 2. The monkeys looked for longer when the actor manipulated the container using the action they had practiced than when she used the unfamiliar action. These results show that knowledge derived from one’s own experience impacts perception of another’s action in these New World monkeys.

The ability of four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to recognize the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were trained to follow a suggestion about the location of hidden food provided by a trainer who knew where the food was (the knower) in preference to a trainer who did not (the guesser). The experimenter baited one of three opaque containers behind a cardboard screen so that the subjects could not see which of the containers hid the reward. In experiment 1, the knower appeared first in front of the apparatus and looked into each container; next, the guesser appeared but did not look into any containers. Then the knower touched the correct cup while the guesser touched one of the three randomly. The capuchin monkeys gradually learned to reach toward the cup that the knower suggested. In experiment 2, the subjects adapted to a novel variant of the task, in which the guesser touched but did not look into any of the containers. In experiment 3, the monkeys adapted again when the knower and the guesser appeared in a random order. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys can learn to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.

A new laboratory procedure which allows the study of deceptive behavior in nonhuman primates is described. Pairs of tufted capuchin monkeys faced each other in a food-competition contest. Two feeder boxes were placed between the monkeys. A piece of food was placed in one of the boxes. The subordinate individual was able to see the food and to open the box to obtain the bait. A dominant male was unable to see the food or to open the box but was able to take the food once the box was opened by the subordinate. In experiment 1, two of four subordinate monkeys spontaneously started to open the unbaited box first with increasing frequency. Experiment 2 confirmed that this "deceptive" act was not due to a drop in the rate of reinforcement caused by the usurping dominant male, under the situation in which food sometimes automatically dropped from the opened box. In experiment 3, two subordinate monkeys were rerun in the same situation as experiment 1. One of them showed some recovery of the "deceptive" act but the other did not; instead the latter tended to position himself on the side where there was no food before he started to open the box. Although the results do not clearly indicate spontaneous deception, we suggest that operationally defined spontaneous deceptive behaviors in monkeys can be analyzed with experimental procedures such as those used here.

The issue whether non-human primates have other-regarding preference and/or inequity aversion has been under debate. We investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others’ reward in various experimental food sharing settings. Two monkeys faced each other. The operator monkey chose one of two food containers placed between the participants, each containing a food item for him/herself and another for the recipient. The recipient passively received either high- or low-value food depending on the operator’s choice, whereas the operator obtained the same food regardless of his/her choice. The recipients were either the highest- or lowest-ranking member of the group, and the operators were middle-ranking. In Experiment 1, the operators chose the high-value food for the subordinate recipient more frequently than when there was no recipient, whereas they were indifferent in their choice for the dominant. This differentiated behavior could have been because the dominant recipient frequently ate the low-value food. In Experiment 2, we increased the difference in the value of the two food items so that both recipients would reject the low-value food. The results were the same as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we placed an opaque screen in front of the recipient to examine effects of visual contact between the participants. The operators’ food choice generally shifted toward providing the low-value food for the recipient. These results suggest that capuchins are clearly sensitive to others’ reward and that they show other-regarding preference or a form of inequity aversion depending upon the recipients and the presence of visual contact.

Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested using an expectancy violation procedure to assess whether they use an actor’s gaze direction, signaled by congruent head and eye orientation, to predict subsequent behavior. The monkeys visually habituated to a repeated sequence in which the actor (a familiar human or a puppet) looked at an object and then picked it up, but they did not react strongly when the actor looked at an object but then picked up another object. Capuchin monkeys’ responses in the puppet condition were slightly more suggestive of expectancy. There was no differential responding to congruent versus incongruent look–touch sequences when familiarization trials were omitted. The weak findings contrast with a strongly positive result previously reported for tamarin monkeys. Additional evidence is required before concluding that behavior prediction based on gaze cues typifies primates; other approaches for studying how they process attention cues are indicated.