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The article presents a reply to an argument by W. Roche and E. Sober for the view that a hypothesis is not confirmed by what its capacity to explain. It shows that the Bayesian account of confirmation has no evidential role for explanatoriness to play. The article offers three objections to Roche and Sober's approach on the hypothesis.

The article discusses the standard formulations of non-deductive inference in a hypothesis. It examines the explanatory virtues of probabilistic reasoning that assign subjective probabilities to hypotheses. It also cites the paradigmatic instances of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) in inferring a hypothesis.

The article reports on the use of intuitions by philosophers as evidence for testing philosophical theories however. According to experimental philosophy one cannot rely on intuitions. It states that intuitions are never used by the philosophers as evidence and mentions that there has been increase in the literature of intuitions and experimental philosophy in recent past.

An essay is presented on the rules of inference and the meanings of logical constants. The author mentions the theory of meaning, truth-conditional theories, expression, and the theory of truth. The author also mentions the distinction between substantial theories and minimalist or deflationist views.

An essay is presented on profiling interest relativity and on the interest-relative theory of vagueness. The philosopher Jason Stanley and his work involving modal and epistemological profiles of interest-relative propositions are mentioned. The author discusses property as being interest relative. Terms and concepts including temporal-profile, practical discrimination, and semantic analysis are used.

This paper offers the author's response to a critique by philosopher Antony Eagle over the author's attempt to prove that counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism are incompatible. The author discusses why he believes he was correct in asserting his argument in the first place, restating his discussion of eternalism, and provides additional evidence to support his philosophical theory.

The article focuses on propositions and counterpart theory in philosophy. David Lewis was a leading advocate of the view that propositions are sets of possible worlds. His advocacy was not unqualified: he was willing to recognize alternative versions of the "proposition role," played not by sets of possible worlds but by more complicated set-theoretic constructions out of "possibilia." According to counterpart theory, for it to be the case that an object could have been a certain way is for that object to have a counterpart that is that way.

Examines the principles in the contractualist moral theory of philosopher T.M. Scanlon. Representation of the Kamm-Scanlon argument for saving the greater number of person's life; Natural interpretation of the phrase `the claims of groups of individuals'; Accounts on the Balancing Argument in a conflict.

Examines the theories proposed to explain the semantic function of chained pronouns, the pronouns that appear in chains. Referring expression theory; Versions of the syntactic transformation theory; Semantic theory and the truth value of each sentence in chain.