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Some externalists have recently argued that the unity of theoretical and practical reason implies that epistemic justification is factive. It is argued that arguments for the factivity of epistemic justification either (i) equate two actions that are in fact different, or (ii) make the unwarranted assumption that the by-relation transmits justification. The unity of reason does not imply that epistemic justification is factive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the logic of obligations and necessities, highlighting the relationship between them. It discusses how the logic of necessity, as well as the standard theory of deontic modals, can be used to analyze obligations in natural language. The article also addresses challenges related to expressing the onus to act in 'ought'-statements and raises questions about how the standard theory captures the nuances of obligations.

The article explores the concept of paternalism and the commonly held notion that it involves an assumption of superiority on the part of the paternalizing agent. This assumption is questioned, and the author argues that not all cases of paternalism necessarily entail an assumption of superiority. The article provides counterexamples and discusses the implications of this perspective on the understanding of paternalism and its justification.

According to an influential recent view, S is propositionally justified in believing p iff S is in no position to know that S is in no position to know p. I argue that this view faces compelling counterexamples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on hypothesis about the connection between epistemic justification and reflection reflection as reaching equilibrium or stability using a less flattering term such as self-satisfaction.

Barnett (2019) provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one's credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we switch to using Odds or (better) Log-Odds, the misleading appearance that there is only 'a little room' for one's credences to increase evaporates. Moreover, there are familiar, independent reasons for taking the Log-Odds scale to provide a clearer picture of the confirmatory effect of evidence. Thus the Dogmatist can after all escape the charge of diachronic irrationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses transmission views of testimony which claim that epistemic states can be transmitted between agents. It highlights the general notion that epistemic states are transmitted from speaker to hearer. It mentions the core idea of the transmission hypothesis that in various cases of testimonial knowledge or justification, the audience receives the speaker's knowledge or justification. Arguments against transmission are outlined.

Ernest Sosa has recently argued that the knowledge we get from instruments and the knowledge we get from testimony is similar in important ways. Most importantly, the justification that supports it is similar in kind – both instrumental justification and justification from testimony is to be understood in terms of reliability. I argue that Sosa’s theory is problematic. Specifically, I argue that we can take certain attitudes towards people that we cannot coherently take towards instruments. This, I argue, grounds a distinction between the kind of justification that testimony can make available and the kind of justification that instruments can make available. The result is that reliability cannot provide a complete explanation of the justification that testimony makes available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, does not generate the paradox. The solution generalizes to formulations of the paradox in terms of rational acceptability and doxastic rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on a study conducted by Joshua Knobe that found an asymmetry in the way people ascribe intentional action. It explores the idea of violation of a norm. It provides justification to the claim that to intentionally violate a norm all one needs to do is to knowingly violate it; whereas to intentionally conform to a norm one needs to be counterfactually guided by it.

The article aims to refute the views of G. E. Moore on the assertions of the form Q, and Gareth Evan's asserting Q involves justification to assert the belief in Q. It discusses the paradox of Moore called Moorean assertions, the principles of Evan, and the propositional attitudes of Ellie. It states that Ellie's view strongly supports the absence of propositional attitudes and beliefs, thus does not believe anything, called eliminativism.

Focuses on the role of counter-evidence in epistemic justification. Types of duties serving as basis for epistemic justification; Reflection of epistemic duty in an individual's belief; Evidentialist notion of justification; Dependence of the epistemic right to remain in doubt on the distinction between epistemic and other types of duties.

The article discusses the attempt of Kihyeon Kim to rescue the conception of epistemic justification from William Alston's advanced criticism. The conception suggests that justification is understood as a matter of being epistemically responsible. An overview of Alston's argument is given. Kim's response to Alston's argument points out that doxastic voluntarism is not implausible with respect to critical reflection upon one's belief, although it may be implausible with formation of beliefs.

The article discusses the Moore's paradox that is focused on the concept of justification. It cites the solution of J. N. Williams on the paradox based on justification, in which he claimed that anything that justifies a person in believing that something is the case makes him/her unjustified in believing that it is not the case. It also employs the Evans's Principle (EP) in examining the paradox.