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The article aims to show how intellectualists can resist objections by contesting the idea that practical knowledge is difficult to transmit via testimony. It outlines examples which suggest that the practical knowledge attributed by knowledge-how-to ascriptions is difficult to relay through testimony. The difference between practical knowledge and knowledge-that is explained.

We all learn about the mistake of treating ‘nothing’ as if it were a term standing for something; but is it a mistake to treat it as an empty term, denoting nothing? We argue not, and we introduce ‘zilch’, defined as ‘the non-self-identical thing’, as a term which is empty as a matter of logical necessity. We contrast its behaviour with that of the quantifier ‘nothing’, and illustrate its uses. We use the same idea to vindicate Locke’s, Descartes’ and Hume’s handling of ‘nothing’, and we show how Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts nichtet’ comes out as logically true. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses the two approaches to the paradox of knowability or the Church-Fitch argument, including denying that knowledge distributes over conjunction and moving to a typed logic. He argues that neither of the approaches works. He further argues that a Church-Fitch argument can be run with an assumption weaker than distribution of knowledge over conjunction. He adds that a modified Church-Fitch argument can be constructed in a typed logic.

The article discusses the concept behind knowledge from falsehood (KFF). It cites the examples given by author T. Warfield on inferential knowledge based on falsehood. Warfield argues that the resistance strategies considered in KFF cases will not succeed. The author argues that an inferential knowledge is counterfactually dependent on the falsity of a relevant premise.

The article presents the authors' views on David Rosenthal's concept of mental ownership. Rosenthal has argued that the proper way to characterize mental ownership is being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. It details Rosenthal's objection to the authors' distinction between conscious presence and mental ownership.

Examines a case wherein there are beings whose mental capacities are infinite in two respects. Ability of the beings to be able to bear in mind infinitely long linguistic items and to hold infinitely many linguistic items before their minds; Argument that in combining the abilities, they are capable of reasoning with infinitely many, infinitely long linguistic items.

Studies J. Stanley and T. Williamson's argument that the all know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Argument that Stanley and Williamson's paper is a defense of Intellectualism, which is a well-entrenched framework for the study of mind, especially in linguistics and developmental psychology; Suggestion that Intellectualism was and is a response to Behaviorism; Stanley and Williamson's reevaluation of G. Ryle's attack on what he called "the intellectualist legend".