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At the center of contentious debates concerning U.S. asylum policy are immigration judges, bureaucrats who decide life and death cases on a daily basis. Congress, the executive and the courts compete for influence over these key actors — administrative judges distinct from those examined in much of the bureaucratic control literature. They are hired, fired, promoted or demoted by executive officials; face congressional oversight; and must follow circuit law. We argue that, because of the fear of reversal, immigration judges will look most to the courts in the decision-making process. Our results support our theory. Examining over 900,000 immigration judges’ decisions, we find that, although IJs are influenced by a fear of pushback from the elected branches, the impact is conditional on circuit preferences. Our findings inform scholarly understanding of judicial behavior and bureaucratic accountability, and support the pursuit of judicial independence and due process in immigration courts.

Chief judges stand as visible leaders of their courts. Analyses of the Supreme Court focus on the role of the chief justice as an institution-builder seeking out public-facing consensus to protect Court legitimacy. Studying the powers of chief judges and political leadership in general is difficult. Analyzing all 50 states over 16 years we find no evidence that the identity of chief judges explains consensus behavior any better than random chance. This is true even among the subset of chief judges with additional institutional powers like opinion assignment. We show that court structures explain consensus, while leader features do not. Being chief judge correlates with an elevated likelihood of being in the majority, particularly in cases decided by one vote. These results add to our understanding of leadership on courts and imply that the office of chief judge at the state level is more symbolic than uniquely powerful.

We assess the influence professional background – specifically, having been a prosecutor or a public defender – exerts on decision making by federal district court judges. Focusing on search and seizure cases, we analyze nearly 1500 motions to suppress evidence from 2000 to 2022. In addition to controlling for judicial ideology and a judge’s prior experience as a prosecutor or public defender, we utilize matching to address endogeneity concerns related to one’s ability to self-select into one of these positions—which may itself be influenced by that individual’s ideological predispositions. We find that having been a former prosecutor, as well as the length of time that service spans, makes a judge significantly more likely to rule against a motion to suppress. Former public defenders are significantly more likely to grant that suppression motion, though their propensity to do so is not affected by the length of time served in that capacity.