Search

It is routine for growth economists to appeal to the British industrial revolution as motivation for their papers. This overview draws implications from this important experience for how economists think about growth, empirical growth economics, and policy based on recent historical research. The update it provides may also help to improve the plausibility of future economic interpretations of early industrialization. Technological change is, of course, central to the years 1760-1830, a period to which economist Thomas Ashton attached the label first industrial revolution. Thus, it is not surprising that new growth models of the endogenous-innovation variety are much more helpful for the analysis of this period than those that envisage endogenous growth without explicit reference to total-factor-productivity growth. It follows that it is important to consider Great Britain's social capability for growth that is the impact of institutions and policy choices on TFP growth, rather than simply focusing on investment in human and physical capital. Data for the measurement of key economic characteristics and, especially, for the estimation of growth rates are highly imperfect.

The article presents comments on the problems of international economic policy by providing various discussions from specialized conferences. There are two persistent enemies of international commerce. The one is restrictionism, the other discrimination. Great Britain and the United States alike have tried to compromise with both. Neither American protectionism, even as modified by the Hull agreements, nor the system of preferential tariffs, as exemplified in trade treaties among Great Britain and the Dominions, is consistent with international prosperity nor with international friendship. According to one of the economists, for the European continent foreign trade is simply vital for maintaining of decent living possibilities, it is not a question of a degree of economic stability but of the whole economic structure. The postwar balance of trade may be unfavorably affected by the structural changes in the British balance of payments, as Great Britain has been a big surplus importer from the European Continent, supplying it with dollars and other overseas exchanges.

The article presents the author's reply pertaining to capital supply and national well-being. Referring to Mr. Keirstead's questions, Snyder remarks that they are derived from a widespread belief that Great Britain's "periodic break-downs" are "inherent" in the present capitalistic system. So the evidence that has been building up in the last 15 years seems to portray an inherent stability and persistence of industrial growth unimagined by most economic and socialistic writers. The forces "inherent" in industry seem admirably adapted to maintain such an equilibrium as Professor Cannon depicts in the human body. It seems only when the body economic is invaded by "infection," such as credit inflation, speculation and booms, that breakdowns occur. Snyder adds that in another 10 or 20 years it is possible that the Soviet experiment will reveal much. But it still may remain open whether the drastic methods it has employed would be feasible in a highly developed industrialized system like in the United States or Great Britain. The capitalistic system has been in a continuous process of transformation and development, pretty much ever since its latest phase began 150 years ago with the introduction of the steam engine and the coming of the Power Age. Snyder predicts that cooperative kind of socialism would be perhaps far more efficient and beneficent than most of its critics can believe.

The article presents an analysis of the relevance of classical and contemporary theories of growth to economic development. Great Britain's economic development has often been discussed in terms of the classical theories of economic growth. What marks off the economic history of Great Britain in the earlier period, 1550-1780, from that of her continental neighbors is both the extent of general economic development, with much investment in "social" capital, and the difference in the kind of industry, such as engineering, which developed. The problem of newly developing countries are now being posed in terms of the contemporary theories. But for many countries key problems of economic development are inextricably linked with the performance of the major industrial nations, performance which in itself is related to the nature of their past economic growth. However, some of the important propositions of the classical and contemporary theories apply to past experience and to prove this point this article provides a brief presentation of some of the salient elements in the economic development of Great Britain, Western Europe, and the U.S. Afterwards it appraises the relevance of the theories in terms of the present-day complex of economic development.

To make an appraisal, it is first necessary to have some standard by which an evaluation can be made; in this case a satisfactory definition of economic progress. Beyond the definition of a standard, an appraisal involves the application of yardsticks which can be used to measure achievement or lack of achievement in terms of the accepted standard. Progress means movement toward some particular goal or objective. The difficulty comes in the selection of the goal. Goals are determined by philosophical and ethical considerations and in the final analysis are based upon group or individual preferences. There is no appeal beyond the point of the statement of such preferences. No one can prove by an appeal to logic the superiority of one preference over another. For one thing, a failure to understand the relative nature of individual and social goals accounts for a considerable amount of confusion which arises over the meaning and content of progress. As the attitude of many Americans toward the economic depression in Great Britain demonstrates, there can be sharp differences in the interpretation of progress and the means of obtaining it even between two countries that share a common cultural heritage.