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This article presents views on a paper presented by David F. Bradford and Wallace E. Oates during a panel discussion focused on the theorem that matching grants are more stimulative than lump-sum grants of equivalent amount. Charles J. Goetz suggested that from a methodological standpoint, the Bradford-Oates study did not imply excessive generality wherein it contradict the earlier Goetz-McKnew economic model. Thomas E. Borcherding examined the issues of fiscal decentralism wherein he criticized it on the following grounds: (1) the incorrect characterization of fiscal centralism; and (2) the total neglect of the mechanism linking the decisions of noncentral units with the central unit's decision as to the method of finance and dispersal of the grants-in-aid. Walter E. Williams examines the mathematical models of fiscal decentralization.

The purpose of the paper is to carry out a theoretical appraisal of a labor-managed economy of Yugoslav type. It is this type of economy that represents, by and large, the true aspirations of reformers in eastern Europe. The labor-managed economy will be producing the maximum producible output from given resources and the maximum social satisfaction for a prescribed distribution of income. These conclusions follow from the fact that competitive labor-managed firms equalize factor marginal products to factor returns for all factors including labor, from competition in nonlabor factor markets, free entry of firms and identical technologies. The most significant comparative advantage of the labor-managed oligopoly arises in connection with product differentiation and sales promotion. It can be shown that the labor-managed firm will in equilibrium produce less and engage in a less intensive advertising campaign than an equivalent capitalist firm as long as the latter makes positive profits, a condition which obtains virtually without exception.

There are still many open questions concerning the respective merits and deficiencies of different types of resource-allocation processes. The main purpose of this paper is to show some limitations of those types of centralized processes where a central agency determines either all commodity flows or the prices of all commodities. It does so by considering some problems of languages available for inter unit communication. Instead of the traditional assumption of a sufficiently detailed common language equally well understood by all participants in the process, it chooses a more realistic approach, viewing any common language as inevitably based on some agreement among the participants' individual classifications of economic states and events. This allows us to see other obstacles to centralization besides traditional difficulties with the speed and costs of centralized communication and computation. To avoid any misinterpretation of thearguments presented, two marginal remarks may be in order. First, arguments againstcentralization are by no means a defense of decentralization

The article discusses economic reforms in Hungary. According to the author, some knowledge of the background underlying Hungarian economic reforms of 1968 is essential to any consideration of their content and prospects. First, one must recall that partial decentralization was attempted a decade ago. Because measures of 1957 significantly increased the flexibility of the system but failed to change its fundamental characteristics, increased pressure on the economy in 1959-60 brought uncoordinated, piecemeal recentralization. Those lessons were clear to reformers of the mid-1960's, who had also benefited from experience with new techniques of economic management introduced in 1957. Second, reforms were carefully prepared. The Hungarian Central Committee decided in December 1964, to initiate full-scale discussions, but no significant changes were made until January 1968. During the intervening three years reformers tried to construct a complete and internally consistent "model." Their attention to detail is manifest in the immense corpus of official regulations in which, reforms are embodied, while their concern for coherence led them to introduce reforms en bloc in 1968, having taken only limited transitional measures in 1966-67.