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Starting from the idea that every activity can be improved in order to facilitated the safest working places, an effective risk management process requires a structured and systematic analysis method involving the Identification, Assessment and Control of hazards. In the same way the Recovery from potential events should be investigated and recovery measures analysed and prepared. The Petromar offshore operations in the Black Sea of Romania are a significant part of Petrom E&P. There is no legal requirement in Romania to provide a HSE Case for offshore installation. According to OMV group (the owner of Petrom) standards the preparation and implementation of a HSE Case is necessary. A key deliverable of this HSE Case was the purpose to make it electronically available for all the platforms and operational people to facilitate consistent use in the ongoing operations. OMV Petrom is committed to on-going improvement in HSE management; therefore HSE-MS in Petromar is effectively implemented with a continuous improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects that could occur in the workplaces. According to the HSE Case standard used in OMV/Petrom, the scope of the HSE Case is to: Deliver an integrated HSE Case to modern standards as seen in the international oil and gas industryProvide a comprehensive qualitative assessment of the hazards and current risk levels;Identify where improvements in control measures are required and areas where additional control measures (risk reduction measures) could be practicably implemented;Provide a reference document that defines the current position with regard to hazard management against which improvement can be demonstrated; andTo bring the common offshore and onshore Petromar HSE issues together in one document. The implementation of all these aspects is facilitated through the use of an electronic tool. This tool shows all the important aspects of the HSE Case; it has a user friendly interface and is easy to use. The tool provide a comprehensive qualitative assessment of the hazards and current risk levels; it identified where improvements in control measures are required and areas where additional control measures (risk reduction measures) could be practicably implemented and bring common offshore and onshore HSE issues together in one tool.

This paper summarizes the findings of the SPE Forum held in September 2005 on "Making our Mature Fields Smarter". Participants in the Forum have granted permission to present this paper on the basis that the authors are neither representing the views of the SPE nor of the participants’ companies. We are delivering smarter fields in order to add value to our business - there are many facets to this value beyond reservoir, well, process and production management. What may not be so clear is how to apply these smart technologies to mature fields with a legacy infrastructure and long production history. Participants felt that maturity in itself made a challenge for deployment and enforces the need for effective Change Management. Deployment and Change Management are seen as the major challenges facing the creation of Smart Fields. During the Forum it became apparent that companies do not have a common vision of what a truly Smart Field will look like and this contributes to the difficulty of assigning a value to "Smartness". There is a tendency to assign value to discrete technologies as opposed to the holistic full project value associated with the business process that has been improved by the application of that technology. The essential foundations for a Smart Field are: People and Skills, effective Data Management and Industry Wide Standards, appropriate Hardware and Systems Architecture. High quality data is a fundamental building block of Smart Fields and it needs to be treated as an asset, managed effectively with staff assigned to ensure the integrity of the data management systems. The key processes are built on this foundation and deliver the business result. These processes are supported by detailed workflows with corresponding enabling technologies. The business processes and workflows required to manage a mature field appear to be similar for many operators. The majority of the technologies that we require to create Smart Fields are already in place although we did identify seven specific areas where technology advances are recommended. Collaboration and visualization technologies are enablers and are required in order to integrate across the core business processes and permit people working with these processes to assimilate the huge and diverse volumes of data and information.

Well A (offshore field) was drilled in June 2002 to provide horizontal drainage point on the reservoir. It was completed as a Single String Single (SSS) Producer with 3 ½" tubing string. The sand face was completed with 5 ½" slotted liner (SL) with screen size of 300μm for sand control across 1, 505ft horizontal drain hole since the reservoir is unconsolidated. The interval started production in May 2003 and was closed-in for about a year for pipeline changeout due to pressure integrity before it was shut-in for security concerns. Thereafter the well produced uneventfully until sand production in excess of 10pptb (Pounds per thousand barrel) was observed. Various mitigation efforts were deployed however, all proved abortive. The platform tripped due to the rupture of the well choke body and this was traced to be caused by excessive sand production. The interval was subsequently closed in due to high sand production. Various options were looked into to determine the best solution that could be used to eliminate the sand production challenges, this ranged from insitu reservoir sand consolidation, horizontal gravel packing, rig re-entry to workover the completion and Thru-Tubing Sand Screen Insert to restore the completion integrity. However after various review sessions, Thru-Tubing Sand Screen Insert was recommended as the best option for the well because it was the most cost effective option, there are good premium screens and in-house expertise exists to aid its deployment. This was followed up with detailed sieve analysis of the produced formation sand and ditch cuttings for proper screen design. Furthermore, well modelling was done to predict the new well potential after the screen insert and was estimated at 2, 250bopd. In this paper, we present the technique utilized for rejuvenating a horizontal completion in July 2013. 500ft Techdaer-ENFORCER Premium Screens (230micron) was successfully spaced out with 900ft blank tubing and installed inside the top section of the 5 ½" SL and hung off on the production tubing with the Paragon Packer. This was achieved using a Coil Tubing mounted on an offshore Self Elevation Workover Platform (SEWOP) after the well was cleaned up and killed, making it a first in Shell Nigeria. Thereafter, production was restored at low sand cut of < 2pptb, at an average oil rate of 2, 400bopd since August 2013 till date, thereby safe guarding 2.5MMbbls of reserves and 2, 400bopd potential at acceptable sand production. Using a conservative oil price of $85/bbl, the total project cost which was $1.8Mln was recovered in 9days. So far the well has been on production since August 2013 with a cumulative oil production of 0.6MMbbl to date.

Abstract Thunder Horse is the largest production semisubmersible in the Gulf of Mexico with a displacement of 130,000 mT, while Atlantis is also a large semisubmersible with an 88,600 mT displacement. Both platforms are equipped with instrumentation to measure metocean and platform/riser response. This paper presents measured metocean data with comparisons to hindcast predictions. The measured platform and riser responses are also compared to analysis results using the measured metocean conditions. Both environmental and platform response (including mooring and riser systems) measurements have been recorded from the Thunder Horse PDQ and Atlantis PQ semisubmersibles. Several major hurricanes passed close to these two platforms since they were installed. This paper summarizes some of the key data measured in these extreme events. Data recording significant wave heights exceeding 40 ft and associated responses are included. Thunder Horse was installed in 2005 and thus was exposed to Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav along with several other hurricanes that did not pass as close. Atlantis was installed in 2006 and experienced extreme conditions in Hurricane Ike. Thunder Horse saw hurricane wave heights and current speeds exceeding the original 100-year design conditions with wind speeds just below 100-year design values in Gustav. It also experienced a severe post-storm inertial current for several days following Gustav. Atlantis similarly saw over 100-year wave heights and just below 100-year winds during Ike. Even though the metocean conditions exceeded the design values, no major hull, mooring or riser damage resulted. Comparison of platform response to numerical analysis shows that generally the actual response is less than the original predictions. It is not common to record real data in extreme storms. Valuable insight can be gained into the design assumptions and methodologies when comparing the actual response to design predictions. The results can determine how much conservatism is in the original design and can also have an impact on future FPS and riser designs. Such information can also be used to help assess the condition of the platform and post-storm inspection requirements. Introduction Both Thunder Horse and Atlantis experienced severe hurricanes in 2008. Hurricane Gustav passed 33 miles southwest of Thunder Horse and 79 miles northeast of Atlantis on August 31 - September 1, 2008. Hurricane Ike passed 66 miles southwest of Atlantis and 169 miles southwest from Thunder Horse on September 11 -12, 2008. The path of these two hurricanes relative to all seven of BP's floating production systems is illustrated in Figure 1. Due to the paths, Gustav was a more severe storm at Thunder Horse, while Ike was more severe at Atlantis.

No matter where an asset sits in the plant, the need to understand its health on a real time basis has become increasingly vital mainly because of growing need to focus on HSE commitments, intense global marketplace and high energy costs, safer and greener work environment. While most facilities continuously monitor their critical machinery and asset, their less-critical assets - often called "essential assets" - cannot typically justify the expense of a traditional continuous monitoring system due to the installation costs of running wires and sensors. Today there is a growing proliferation of wireless devices for many industrial and commercial applications - for security, safety, surveillance and machinery condition monitoring. Wireless technology innovations promise to open up a wide range of plant floor applications where cabling is either difficult to install or prohibitively expensive.

Abstract BP's Thunder Horse and Atlantis completions are some of the most complex in the world. This complexity is both a basic requirement of the environment and a result of the desire to achieve as much functionality from a wellbore as practical. This paper will address the approach BP has taken to ensure " completions excellence?? on both the completion design and installation, but will not cover the design details of the completions themselves. Completions Excellence is a mindset of continuous improvement in organizational capability, planning, execution, and learning. Introduction Thunder Horse and Atlantis are two of BP's premiere deepwater (DW) fields in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). These fields are in water depths of 5,500 ft to 7,000 ft and cover a number of OCS blocks each, so multiple drill centers and the use of state of the art dynamically positioned drilling/completion rigs is required. Well depths are in the range of 19,000 ft to 28,000 ft MD. Reliable, high-rate well completions are critical for the success of these fields. Complex reservoirs with multiple stacked pay sands result in wells that typically require multi-zone sand control completions. A typical Thunder Horse or Atlantis completion may cost tens of millions of dollars and the completion itself will account for one-half to two-thirds of total well cost. Production from such wells may be over 50 thousand barrels per day. Initial completion designs were single and stacked cased and perforated or frac packed completions, but in order to improve capital efficiency, downhole flow control was added to better manage the reservoirs and minimize future interventions (Figure 1). The complexity of even the simplest DW GoM completions mean that any engineering or installation errors can cost tens of millions of dollars to fix, and that major workovers can be even more expensive. Despite all the complexity, most of the problems encountered in delivering these wells have involved getting the seemingly minute, simple details right. Things like O-rings, metallurgy and unforeseen sources of debris have led to some of the biggest challenges. A successful completion is the culmination of getting thousands of small details right the first time through a system of checking and re-checking during design, manufacturing and assembly in the shop; and again in the field prior to and during installation. There is no doubt that to achieve completions excellence " the devil is in the details!??

Abstract Start-up and superior operational performance of the Atlantis and Thunder Horse deepwater developments represent historic achievements for BP's Exploration & Production business. This success is manifested in the plant operational reliability demonstrated and expanded upon within the scope of this paper. The Atlantis and Thunder Horse teams attribute this accomplishment to the factors within the following broad categories: Major Project Integration, Operational Readiness and Start-up and Overcoming Adversity. As of end 2009, Atlantis delivered an operational reliability of over 98% and Thunder Horse delivered about 96%. Perhaps the greatest benefit is that all the concepts outlined in this work can be applied to future developments throughout the oil and gas industry. Introduction The successful development and production start-up of each of the Atlantis and Thunder Horse projects represent historic achievements for BP's Exploration & Production business. The two ultradeepwater semi-submersible facilities stand as groundbreaking megaproject deliverables in the industry given the size, scale and technological frontiers surpassed in their successful handover to operation. Even more impressive, though, has been their performance since that handover and the first oil dates (October 6, 2007 and June 14, 2008, respectively), ramping-up to today's production rates where they are safely and reliably delivering over 350 MBOE cumulatively to market every day. Plant operational reliability is the specific measure of success which the Atlantis and Thunder Horse organizations utilize when considering the efforts in the lead-up to first oil. Industry definitions of operational reliability can vary. Both Atlantis and Thunder Horse utilize the definition offered by the BP Production Efficiency Improvement (PEI) Common Process to continuously review plant performance. PEI is a common BP operations framework; one of its outputs is a quantification of Plant Operational Reliability. This reliability value is calculated using the following formula:Equation * IPC: Installed Production Capacity; Total production capacity that the combination of available wells, subsea, topsides and export systems are able to deliver to sales at any point in time. Atlantis and Thunder Horse have achieved greater than 95% reliability (using the above definition) since each delivered first oil. This fact has been a product of a number of notable endeavors which commenced from project inception and onwards through to execution and operation. These range from the areas of major project integration, preservation, operational readiness planning, start-up execution and systematic day-to-day operations from " Day One.?? The success was also a product of the way in which Atlantis and Thunder Horse responded to adversity and technology challenges posed by these frontier developments, creating valuable industry experiences through the lead-up to first oil, start-up, ramp-up and normal operations to date.

Safety culture is now recognized as being a significant influencer of safety outcomes within the workplace. However positively changing safety culture has proven to be a bigger challenge than expected in many organisations. If current strategies and initiative have failed to have the impact that was desired, perhaps it is time to discard them and explore other options. Using a traditional safety model where the physical environment, systems of work, and personal behavior all interact to impact on safety outcomes, this paper takes a a unique approach to revamp and reorganize this model in a pway which identifies the key drivers and outputs required. What emerges is a very practical and logical model that clearly shows the various strategies that should be focused on in the areas of safety control (safe environment), safety management (systems of work) and safety leadership (safe behaviours). With reference then to safety culture being an influencer of safety in general, and safety culture being directly affected by the safety attitudes of personnel, then safety leadership becomes the key driver for change. Safety leadership is something that everyone already does. Effective and positive safety leadership on the other hand requires a safety thinking mindset, and then the application of leadership skills such as leading safe behaviours, coaching safety thinking and rewarding positive safety behaviors. In addition, some strategies that appear to be safety focused may in fact be harming safety culture. These include the recording and measurement of incident data, the use of safety slogans, and in particular the use of "zero harm" terminology. Organisation should consider discarding these strategies.

This manuscript is submitted as an addendum to SPE/IADC 797971, which discussed emerging successes using a new fixed cutter bit to drill hard rock applications conventionally drilled with roller cone bits. The new bit design using thermostable polycrystalline (TSP) diamond cutters and stability enhancing features has produced results, particularly in the Carthage field in Panola County, which are revolutionizing hard rock drilling in several areas of East Texas. The paper focuses on how teamwork, selective testing programs, and product improvements have combined to create step change improvements in hard-rock drilling capabilities. The paper discusses new information on optimal operating parameters and includes case history examples.

ABSTRACT This review paper describes the status of developments towards a complete set of international standards for the oil and natural gas industry. It builds on papers describing the intent of the program me presented at the 1992 OTC by Thomas, Thorp and Denham; Wilson; and Arney (Refs. 1, 2, and 3)(Available in full paper). These papers state the objectives of developing a set of ISO standards predominantly within lSO/lC67. This paper places the development of the set of standards for the oil and natural gas industry in the context of the need for, and use of, standards by the industry. It describes the main standards organizations including their structure, procedures and relationships. it identifies lSO/TC67 as the key international standards committee for "materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum and natural gas industries", and details its role and current work programme. It concludes with a summary of the achievements to date. Significance: Common international standards should enable all stakeholders involved (users/ suppliers/ regulatory bodies) to conduct their business efficiently (Iifecycle cost) with enhanced safety/integrity. INTRODUCTION Standards are generated and maintained with the specific aim of providing a means to:enhance technical integritytransfer knowledge, andcarry out business efficiently and cost effectively. With a system of standards in place which clearly and transparently specifies common essential requirements it is possible for a company to practice "Variety Control": i.e. restricting the number of types and vendors of equipment and services meeting the requirements (Figure 1)(Available in full paper). Several oil companies have developed standardization policies aiming to (Ref. 4):maximise the use of external standards;minimise additional requirements in company standards;ensure variations are justified for both technical and commercial reasons;ensure the continuous improvement of company standards by feedback from users of the standards; andpositively influence external standards bodies to increase the number and quality of external standards applicable for company use. (Note: In this paper company standards include company specifications). Typically, the following headings need to be addressed in order to successfully create and maintain a company standards system: steering committee; transparent standards structure; company standards development; external standards participation; enhanced use of information technology; variety control; and training. A transparent standards structure is illustrated in Figure 2. This reflects the policy statement, for a large organization, and recognizes the principle that operating company variations and project variations to the company and/or external standard exist and may be required. Inherent in the transparent standards structure is an enhanced commitment to external, preferably international, standards. BACKGROUND The oil and natural gas industry is international in its operation, with many large oil companies and their suppliers operating all over the globe. The oil and natural gas industry uses a great number of standards developed by a range of organizations including industry associations, and national, regional and international standardization bodies.