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This study delves into the relationship between individual vaccination aspirations and their repercussions within the SEIRS epidemic framework, exploring effects on vaccination behavior, infection dynamics, and societal outcomes through the Vaccination Game concept. The co-evolution of epidemic dynamics and individual decision-making is examined, utilizing the social efficiency deficit (SED) to quantify a social dilemma. A novel aspiration-based model is compared with the conventional cost-based model. Higher aspiration levels correspond to increased vaccination rates, reducing overall infections. Contrary to assumptions favoring natural infection in low transmission scenarios, vaccination proves pivotal even in such contexts. Elevated transmission and immunity waning rates necessitate intensified vaccination for effective infection control, thereby reducing social dilemmas. Low vaccine efficiency coupled with high transmission rates escalates SED, but a specific vaccine efficacy threshold notably diminishes SED. Lower aspiration levels contribute to vaccine hesitancy, elevating SED, and infection rates. Surpassing an aspiration threshold redirects preferences towards vaccination, aligning with socially optimal scenarios and alleviating social dilemmas. The comparative analysis underscores the aspiration-driven approach outperforms in reducing SED, establishing its reliability in mitigating societal disease impact over the cost-based approach, but the optimal choice depends on specific epidemic conditions

In this study, an epidemiological model with the provaccination and antivaccination susceptible groups is proposed, and the social dilemma of the model is analyzed. During a pandemic, such as the current COVID-19, many individuals get confused to choose the option of adopting a provaccination or antivaccination strategy based on the number of infected people and the payoff of being infected. In the proposed model, people can obtain immunity either through vaccination or by getting infected with the disease which is known as natural immunity. In addition, increasing the waning immunity influences the choice of adopting the provaccination or antivaccination strategy. We used the behavior model to analyze the choice of the two strategies, where any individual can choose a strategy based on the number of infected individuals from each group. Moreover, individuals who are already infected can choose their strategy based on the payoff of their disease cost or vaccination cost. Our results show that, at Nash equilibrium, individuals in both groups behave the same. Further, from our numerical results, increasing the number of vaccinations can reduce the social dilemma whereas an increase in the waning immunity rate increases the social dilemma.