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This paper examines the creation of the Colombian Indigenista Institute, CII (1942), its institutional history, and its closure (1949). The CII, influenced by the Mexican indigenista movement, fought for indigenous peoples’ visibility for eight years. In the end, however, the CII failed due to a combination of internal factors such as ideological disagreements, and internal ones, including violence, scarce resources, and lack of awareness on the part of politicians and elites about the status, challenges, and even existence of Amerindian groups in Colombia. Three Colombian scholars created the CII. They attended the First Inter-American Indigenista Congress (Pátzcuaro 1940) where they got in touch with Manuel Gamio, then director of the Interamerican Indigenista Institute. Gamio´s ideas — that Indians have the right to govern themselves, to have tribal organizations, to elect their community leaders, and to maintain and assert their cultural identity — inspired the Colombians. In this paper, I trace the influences of the Mexican indigenista movement on Colombian indigenismo projects between 1940 and 1950. I draw on a variety of sources including Colombian newspapers and magazines, as well as letters of the indigenistas housed at the Colombian library Luis Ángel Arango in Bogotá and the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. I conclude by explaining why Colombian indigenismo of the decade between 1940 and 1950 ultimately failed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The acts of armed violence can pour a new sense over the spaces where a community build its social identity. In Nueva Venecia, a small pile-dwelling village in Magdalena (Colombia), three different armed actors (the guerrilla, the right-wing paramilitaries and the Public Force) gathered the local people, at three different times, on the same social space: the main square. In the first meeting, people was warned, by the first one of the three groups, about the possibility of a slaughter that could happen there. In the second occasion, local people was both victim and witness of the way that the second one carried it on. In the third meeting, the third group offered excuses for what happened. The paper analyses the way in which these three acts determined three marks of the continuum of violence over the local nodal space of memory. The article is organized around the last act, when national Army and Police representatives organized a public ceremony of forgiveness because of the paramilitary massacre. The study of such a ceremony shows it as a stage where agents of confronting memories are trying to achieve social legitimacy rather than a true act of symbolic reparation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]