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This study provides novel evidence on the magnitude of switching costs in auditing. Using a discrete choice approach, we infer switching costs from clients' audit firm choices. The demand estimation reveals that switching costs are significant and vary by direction, with the highest costs associated with switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 audit firms. Counterfactual analyses of forced switches suggest that switching costs are substantial, ranging from 0.7 billion U.S. dollars (14.2 percent of audit fees) to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (24.0 percent of audit fees) when aggregated across all clients. Counterfactual analyses of voluntary switching show that the audit market would become highly dynamic and more concentrated if switching costs were removed. Additionally, clients would gain consumer surplus of up to 306 million U.S. dollars (5.4 percent of audit fees) in such a scenario. Overall, our study documents the importance of switching costs for understanding audit market dynamics. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42; M48; L11; L84. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors' response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office has previously audited other similarly accused clients. Importantly, the resulting increase in auditors' effort partially negates the association between indiscretions and lower financial reporting quality. However, auditors are primarily reactive, rather than proactive, and their response is stronger when the accused client is less important economically. These results suggest that company leadership's off-the-clock indiscretions are signals to auditors of poor tone at the top, but the audit response is not uniform across all clients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a Supreme Court ruling that rejected the use of "bright-line" rules previously relied upon in evaluating materiality claims, this study examines how heightened materiality uncertainty impacts audit pricing. We expect the heightened uncertainty to make it more difficult for auditors and clients to assess materiality and to reach a consensus on materiality assessment, which increases audit effort and engagement risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with this prediction, we find that after the ruling, audit fees increase significantly for treatment firms in the circuits using bright-line rules in the pre-ruling period, relative to control firms not affected by the ruling. This effect is stronger when auditors have lower quality or lower industry expertise, and when investors have more diverse opinions. We also find that for firms audited by low-expertise auditors, auditor turnover due to auditor-client disagreement on materiality-related issues increases significantly for treatment firms relative to control firms. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K2; M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As audits of public companies are labor intensive, require a variety of team members, and involve year-round work, practitioners and academics have increasingly focused on identifying audit production factors that drive audit quality. Using proprietary data, we analyze the cost-benefit tradeoffs of two audit production characteristics, client expertise and the relative amount of auditing done during the early phases of the audit, and find that both are associated with more effective audits and higher fees. We analyze whether the influence of these characteristics varies across audit team members. We find that middle manager production characteristics explain audit effectiveness and higher fees and relatively more so than those of lead/review partners. These results extend the literature and practitioner discussions about drivers of audit quality by highlighting the importance of middle management, which, to our knowledge, has largely been overlooked by the archival audit literature and regulatory guidance on audit quality indicators. Data Availability: This paper exploits proprietary PCAOB data. Data descriptions are available in the text. JEL Classifications: D20; D22; J24; L23; M11; M4; M42; M48. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We exploit the technological closeness among clients of the same auditor to examine whether auditors accumulate knowledge from their clients' technological proximity. We find that a client firm's technological proximity to other clients of its audit office improves audit quality and results in an audit fee discount, even after controlling for the product similarity effect, auditors' overall technological expertise, and industry specialization. Both an increase in audit quality and a decrease in audit fees occur if a client firm exhibits greater technological similarity to clients of other audit offices within the same audit firm. Our findings suggest that the auditors' technological proximity knowledge enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of audit work at both the audit firm and audit office levels. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M49; O30. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the effects of a large number of clients in an audit office using the same enterprise-resource planning (ERP) system such as SAP or Oracle resulting in what we term "client accounting system homogeneity" on audit efficiency and effectiveness. Using a unique dataset of ERP system implementations, we find that accounting system homogeneity is positively associated with audit efficiency. Specifically, we find lower (higher) audit fees for clients using an ERP system from a vendor used by a higher (lower) proportion of clients in that office. We further document that accounting system homogeneity is associated with improved audit effectiveness as proxied by two accruals-based measures, incorrect internal control weakness reporting, and restatements. Our findings are reflective of a new form of knowledge spillover from repeated experiences auditing clients using similar accounting systems, resulting in audits that are not only less expensive but also of higher quality. Data Availability: Contact the authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses difference-in-differences (DiD) analyses to examine the consequences of adopting the U.S. critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure requirement for preparers and users of financial reports. The CAM requirement is one of the largest expansions of the U.S. audit report since the 1940s. We document significant changes to financial statement footnotes referenced by CAMs, which suggests an indirect consequence where management disclosure changes in areas that are expected to be scrutinized following auditor-provided disclosure. Results also suggest that, on average, CAM disclosures do not provide incremental information to the market. To further examine market reaction, we develop well-specified prediction models for the expected number and subject areas of CAMs. We find limited initial evidence that the market reacts negatively when unexpected CAMs are disclosed. Overall, our findings provide insights on the new CAM standard and particularly demonstrate its relevance to management disclosure decisions and to the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Audits of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) are typically "integrated" with the audit of the financial statements (FSs)—both audits are conducted by the same audit firm, which designs procedures to satisfy the objectives of both audits simultaneously. A common assumption is that integrating the two audits is more effective and efficient than performing them separately. However, this assumption has not been tested empirically. Using a sample of Chinese companies that employ different audit firms for their FS and ICFR audits (i.e., nonintegrated auditors), we find evidence that challenges this assumption. Specifically, we find ICFR audit quality is higher for nonintegrated audits compared to integrated audits. Moreover, total audit fees are lower for nonintegrated audits, despite higher ICFR audit fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the determinants of auditor industry specialization, the impact of specialization on fees and audit quality, and a regulator's optimal choice of audit standards in the presence of specialization. In industries with correlated firm values, a specialist auditor enjoys synergies from information spillovers between clients. These spillovers, however, only induce a specialist to decrease audit effort when the cost of effort and the prior precision of the firms' values are low. We derive empirical predictions about the determinants of specialization, and show that specialization benefits firms through lower expected fees and higher audit reporting quality, but only enhances the usefulness of reports to investors when the specialist exerts high audit effort. In a regulated setting, a stricter audit standard affects fees through its impact on specialization. We provide conditions under which standards that maximize firm value will be more strict and less strict when a regulator recognizes synergies. JEL Classifications: C72; D80; D83; L22; M42; M48. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the value of auditor industry specialization. In the first step, we use a discrete choice model to derive the first-order demand for auditor industry specialization. Our results reveal that clients have a general preference for auditor industry specialization, relating to both audit firm and audit office specialization. We observe that specializations at the audit firm and audit office level are substitutes. We also find that larger, more complex clients have a stronger demand for industry specialization at the audit office level. In the second step, we use the results from the discrete choice model to quantify the value of auditor industry specialists for clients. We find the overall value of industry specialization aggregated across all clients is 5.2 million USD (0.36 percent of audit fees) and that industry specialization at the firm (office) level is decisive for auditor choice in 4 percent (6 percent) of all cases. JEL Classifications: M42; M48; L11; L84. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data on corruption convictions from the U.S. Department of Justice, we find that auditors charge higher fees when a firm is headquartered in a more corrupt district. This result is robust to a wide range of time and location fixed effects, using capital city isolation as an instrument, and propensity score matching. We also find that, relative to those in non-corrupt districts, firms in corrupt districts are more likely to have weak internal controls and restate earnings, and that their auditors exert greater effort. This evidence suggests that auditing firms located in corrupt areas entails additional risk, which auditors price into fees. JEL Classifications: D73; G31; G34. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the costs and benefits of proactive financial reporting enforcement by the U.K. Financial Reporting Review Panel. Enforcement scrutiny is selective and varies by sector and over time, yet can be anticipated by auditors and companies. We find evidence that increased enforcement intensity leads to temporary increases in audit fees and more conservative accruals. However, cross-sectional analysis across market segments reveals that audit fees increase primarily in the less-regulated AIM segment, and especially those AIM companies with a higher likelihood of financial distress and less stringent governance. On the contrary, less reliable operating asset-related accruals are more conservative in the Main segment and, in particular, those Main companies with stronger incentives for higher financial reporting quality. Overall, our study indicates that financial reporting enforcement generates costs and benefits, but not always for the same companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the demand- and supply-side factors associated with audit partner selection and assignment in the United States. First, we examine whether audit partner gender and experience are associated with board and management gender and experience. Second, we investigate whether engagement audit quality varies with audit partner gender and experience, controlling for selection effects. The results indicate that companies with more gender-diverse boards of directors and top management teams are more likely to have a female lead audit partner. In addition, the experience of the client's board is positively associated with the experience of the lead audit partner. In terms of audit quality, we find that higher audit fees are positively associated with female and more experienced audit partners. Our results shed light on the important role that partner characteristics play in the demand and supply sides of audit quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A correction is presented for the article "Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees" which was published in a previous issue of the journal.

Practice and research recognize the importance of extensive knowledge of accounting and financial reporting experience for generating reliable financial statements. However, we consider the possibility that such knowledge and experience increase the likelihood of material misstatement when executives have incentives to misreport. We use executives' prior experience as an audit manager or partner as a measure of extensive accounting and financial reporting competence. We find that the interaction of this measure and compensation-based incentives increases the likelihood of misstatements. Further, auditors discount the audit fee premium associated with compensation-based incentives when executives have accounting competence. Together, our results suggest that a dark side of accounting competence emerges in the presence of certain incentives, but auditors view accounting competence favorably despite the heightened risk. In further analyses, we demonstrate that executives' aggressive attitude toward reporting exacerbates the effect of accounting competence and compensation-based incentives on misstatements, but not on audit fees. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine how CEO succession and succession planning affect perceptions of financial reporting risk among stakeholders who are responsible for and oversee firms' financial reporting (e.g., auditors, management, and audit committees). Management succession introduces uncertainty about firms' future operations, financial policies, and potential motivation for earnings management, which we predict elevates the perceived risk of financial reporting improprieties. Consistent with this prediction, we find that audit fees are higher for firms with new CEOs. Importantly, however, we note that careful CEO succession planning (i.e., promoting an "heir apparent") attenuates perceptions of higher risk, as evidenced by a lack of an audit pricing adjustment. These results are robust to several alternative specifications and analyses designed to mitigate the concern that the association between audit fees and CEO succession and succession planning is driven by factors leading to the CEO change. We also show that audit fee increases dissipate over time as the new, non-heir CEO stays longer at the firm, reinforcing the inference that audit fees increase in response to the uncertainty surrounding a new CEO. Additionally, we do not find evidence of a deterioration in audit quality with new CEOs, independent of the succession plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as "an association"). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company sizematched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines local characteristics associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and the impact of non-Big 4 local market leadership on competition. We identify non-Big 4 local market leaders by collecting accounting firm rankings from business publications for 46 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas from 2005- 2010. These rankings are based on the number of local office employees and provide a more holistic measure of office size than measures based on public company audit fees. We find local supply and demand factors are significantly associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and that non-Big 4 leadership is associated with lower overall audit fees in the local market. We also find that non-Big 4 leaders earn a fee premium over other non-Big 4 auditors. Our results imply that non-Big 4 leaders increase local market competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine efficiency improvement associated with audit firm mergers. Our analysis is made possible by a unique dataset of audit hours in China. We find a significant reduction in audit hours, unaccompanied by a deterioration in audit quality, of merged audit firms. Further, we find a larger reduction in audit hours when acquirers are Chinese domestic Big 10 audit firms and when client firms are more complex. These results are consistent with the notion of economies of scale arising from horizontal mergers. However, enhanced efficiency does not necessarily reduce audit fees. Instead, we find an increase in audit fees when acquirers are international Big 4 audit firms even when we control for possible changes in market power. This premium is at least partially due to the certification effect of international Big 4 audit firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower fees, issue fewer going concern opinions, and resign less frequently, consistent with more conservative clients imposing less engagement risk on their auditors. Using path analysis, we find evidence that both inherent risk and auditor business risk explain these associations. Also consistent with conservatism reducing auditor business risk, we find that client conservatism is associated with fewer lawsuits against auditors and with fewer client restatements. Taken together, our results are consistent with auditors viewing client conservatism as an important determinant of engagement risk that, in turn, affects auditor-client contracting decisions. Our findings should be of interest to auditors who actively manage client risk and to standard-setters who recently dropped conservatism as a desired attribute of financial reporting quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risk-taking incentives in the fees they charge for their services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the audit pricing effects when auditors specialize in industries conducive to transferable audit processes. Our results indicate that industry specialists charge incrementally lower fees in industries with homogenous operations, and particularly in industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices. Moreover, we discover that audit quality is no lower for clients audited by these specialists offering fee discounts, consistent with a conclusion that the reduction in fees indicates cost efficiencies rather than lower-quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the shared economies of scale only occur in a subsample of client firms with relatively high bargaining power. When considered in conjunction with prior research using a survivorship approach, our study provides evidence that certain industries lend themselves to specialization because auditors generate cost-based competitive advantages without compromising service quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issues related to low-balling of initial year audit fees and the resultant impact on audit quality have received significant attention from regulators in many countries. Using 9,684 observations from China during the years 2002–2011, we find that there is a significant initial year audit fee discount following an audit firm change when both of the signing audit partners are different from the prior year. The evidence is mixed if one or both of the signing partners from the prior year also moves with the client to the new audit firm. We find evidence of audit fee discounting in our analysis of fee levels, but not in our analysis of changes in audit fees from the prior year. Sanctions for problem audits and greater earnings management are more likely when there is an audit firm change that involves two new signing partners together with initial year audit fee discounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether China’s weak institutional environment results in lower-quality audits by the Big 4 firms. We find that the Big 4 assign their less experienced partners to companies that are listed only in China compared with clients cross-listed in Hong Kong. The Big 4 are less likely to issue modified audit reports, and they charge lower audit fees for clients that are listed only in China. Finally, companies listed only in China have larger signed abnormal accruals than do companies cross-listed in Hong Kong. Overall, we conclude that the weak institutional environment in China results in the Big 4 firms providing lower-quality audits to companies that are listed only in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees. We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees. Social capital measures the level of mutual trust in a region. Our results suggest that auditors judge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a premium when they trust the firm less. The basis of our results is the examination of more than 28,000 audit fees for more than 5,000 firms spanning the period of 2000 to 2009. The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects on audit quality and audit fees of requiring the engagement partner to sign the audit report in the United Kingdom (U.K.). The effect of requiring the engagement partner to sign the audit report is timely since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering mandating a similar requirement in the United States (U.S.). In the first year after the introduction of the signature requirement, we find a significant decline in abnormal accruals and the propensity to meet an earnings threshold, and we find a significant increase in the incidence of qualified audit reports and in earnings informativeness. In addition, audit fees are significantly higher in the post-signature period than in the pre-signature period. Moreover, we compare U.K. firms with a matched sample of U.S. firms and firms in other European countries in periods both before and after the U.K. adopted a signature requirement. Our results are generally consistent with the argument of improved audit quality in U.K. firms after the signature requirement is adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides evidence of a directly observable and significant cost of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption, by examining the fees incurred by firms for the statutory audit of their financial statements at the time of transition. Using a comprehensive dataset of all publicly traded Australian companies, we quantify an economy-wide increase in the mean level of audit costs of 23 percent in the year of IFRS transition. We estimate an abnormal IFRS-related increase in audit costs in excess of 8 percent, beyond the normal yearly fee increases in the pre-IFRS period. Further analysis provides evidence that small firms incur disproportionately higher IFRS-related audit fees. We then survey auditors to construct a firm-specific measure of IFRS audit complexity. Empirical findings suggest that firms with greater exposure to audit complexity exhibit greater increases in compliance costs for the transition to IFRS. Given the renewed debate about whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should mandate IFRS for U.S. firms, our results are of timely importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]