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Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.

Using a random sample of US companies affected by a regulatory experiment (i.e. the Regulation SHO adopted by the SEC in 2004), this thesis examines whether the removal of short-selling constraints affects corporate payout decisions. We find that companies pay higher cash dividends but do not repurchase more shares in response to the relaxation of short-selling constraints. The response of increased cash dividends is concentrated in small firms. Our finding is consistent with the literature that paying cash dividends can be used to deter short-selling activities as a more costly and hence a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchases. Our result shows that short-selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.

This study assesses distorting effect of financial constraints on the inverse relationship between internal and external finance by examining impact of an exogenous financing shock (i.e. a regulation released in China in 2008) on dividend policies in a quasi-natural experimental setting. Our result shows that in the absence of the regulation, the inverse relationship holds. However, the relation is twisted by the 2008 regulation. Compared with unconstrained firms, financially constrained firms are more willing to pay dividends and are more restrained to reduce cash dividends after the regulation, despite the fact that their external financing capacities are further constrained.

This paper examines two arguments presented in Gray and Hall (2006). First, that the generally used estimate of 0.06 for the market risk premium within the Officer version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the generally used estimate of 0.50 for the parameter ‘gamma’ within the Officer framework are jointly inconsistent with evidence concerning the market risk premium in the standard version of the CAPM. Second, that the first two of these parameter estimates are also jointly inconsistent with the observed cash dividend yield on the Australian market. To resolve these problems, Gray and Hall recommend setting gamma to zero. The present paper shows that the first argument does not account for the fact that imputation induces a reduction in the market risk premium as defined in the standard version of the CAPM. The present paper also shows that both arguments identify a problem that characterizes only parts of the Officer framework, and these parts are not generally used in Australia. Therefore, rather than suggesting that gamma should be zero, Gray and Hall's analysis identifies parts of the Officer framework that should be avoided.