Search

The Internet of Things (IoT) technology trend is transforming business and society. This creates a need to understand strategic behavior in the consumer IoT, where firms tend to offer multiple platform devices, and new generations of devices are introduced frequently. We propose a novel analytical model that formalizes the concept of a multiplatform firm that offers a system of platforms, such as a smartphone, and a new platform device, such as a smartwatch, and orchestrates a multiplatform ecosystem. The analysis shows how a platform design decision, like offering a new standalone device, affects consumer choices and market outcomes. We identify two classes of new devices that matter, and show when a new platform device may disrupt the smartphone market. Moreover, we characterize conditions under which it is profitable for a vendor to make its new platform device look and feel more like its smartphone. Overall, we provide insights into how multiplatform firms differ from platform firms. We identify future research opportunities on the economics of consumer IoT and multiplatform ecosystems.

Policy Points Looking for a way to curtail market power abuses in health care and rein in prices, 20 states have restricted most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses in some health care contracts. Little is known as to whether restrictions on MFN clauses slow health care price growth. Banning MFN clauses between insurers and hospitals in highly concentrated insurer markets seems to improve competition and lead to lower hospital prices.ContextMost-favored-nation (MFN) contract clauses have recently garnered attention from both Congress and state legislatures looking for ways to curtail market power abuses in health care and rein in prices. In health care, a typical MFN contract clause is stipulated by the insurer and requires a health care provider to grant the insurer the lowest (i.e., the most-favored) price among the insurers it contracts with. As of August 2020, 20 states restrict the use of MFN clauses in health care contracts (19 states ban their use in at least some health care contracts), with 8 states prohibiting their use between 2010 and 2016.MethodsUsing event study and difference-in-differences research designs, we compared prices for a standardized hospital admission in states that banned MFN clauses between 2010 and 2016 with standardized hospital admission prices in states without MFN bans.FindingsOur results show that bans on MFN clauses reduced hospital price growth in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with highly concentrated insurer markets. Specifically, we found that mean hospital prices in MSAs with highly concentrated insurer markets would have been $472 (2.8%) lower in 2016 had the MSAs been in states that banned MFN clauses in 2010. In 2016, the population in our sample that resided in MSAs with highly concentrated insurer markets was just under 75 million (23% of the US population). Hence, banning MFN clauses in all MSAs in our sample with highly concentrated insurer markets in 2010 would have generated savings on hospital expenditures in the range of $2.4 billion per year.ConclusionsOur empirical findings suggest banning MFN clauses between insurers and providers in highly concentrated insurer markets would improve competition and lead to lower prices and expenditures.

We used 2010-16 Medicare Cost Reports for 10,737 freestanding home health agencies (HHAs) to examine the impact of home health (HH) and nursing home (NH) certificate-of-need (CON) laws on HHA caseload, total and per-patient variable costs. After adjusting for other HHA characteristics, total costs were higher in states with only HH CON laws ($2,975,698), only NH CON laws ($1,768,097), and both types of laws ($3,511,277), compared with no CON laws ($1,538,536). Higher costs were driven by caseloads, as CON reduced per-patient costs. Additional research is needed to distinguish whether this is due to skimping on quality vs. economies of scale.

This paper examines how health care providers respond to a reference pricing insurance program that increases consumer cost sharing when consumers choose high-priced surgical providers. We use geographic variation in the population covered by the program to estimate supply-side responses. We find limited evidence of market segmentation and price reductions for providers with baseline prices above the reference price. Finally, approximately 75% of the reduction in provider prices is in the form of a positive externality that benefits a population not subject to the program.

The Trump administration has prioritized economic policy—particularly trade with China. This emphasis is appropriate, given the extraordinary relative gains China has made in recent decades and the gigantic bilateral trade imbalance it has with the United States. Trade binds the two nations together. To some extent the imbalance reflects their complementarity, butit has also introduced unhealthy asymmetric financial dependencies. More fundamentally, it has enabled a steady transfer of knowledge that has allowedChina to substantially close the technology gap with the United States. Despite remaining much poorer overall, China is mobilizing its vast savings towards strategic projects. In some areas, it is now a near-peer rival. Advanced manufacturing is becoming a new theatre of superpower competition.

Policymakers are increasingly interested in reducing healthcare costs and inefficiencies through innovative payment strategies. These strategies may have heterogeneous impacts across geographic areas, potentially reducing or exacerbating geographic variation in healthcare spending. In this paper, we exploit a major payment reform for home health care to examine whether reductions in reimbursement lead to differential changes in treatment intensity and provider costs depending on the level of competition in a market. Using Medicare claims, we find that while providers in more competitive markets had higher average costs in the pre-reform period, these markets experienced larger proportional reductions in treatment intensity and costs after the reform relative to less competitive markets. This led to a convergence in spending across geographic areas. We find that much of the reduction in provider costs is driven by greater exit of "high-cost" providers in more competitive markets.

In the 1980s, Chile adopted a mixed (public and private) model for health insurance coverage similar to the one recently outlined by the Affordable Care Act in the United States (US). In such a system, a mix of public and private health plans offer nearly universal coverage using a combined approach of managed competition and subsidies for low-income individuals. This paper uses a "most different" case study design to compare policies implemented in Chile and the US to address self-selection into private insurance. We argue that the implementation of a mixed health insurance system in Chile without the appropriate regulations was complex, and it generated a series of inequities and perverse incentives. The comparison of Chile and the US healthcare reforms examines the different approaches that both countries have used to manage economic competition, address health insurance self-selection and promote solidarity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In the 1980s, Chile adopted a mixed (public and private) model for health insurance coverage similar to the one recently outlined by the Affordable Care Act in the United States (US). In such a system, a mix of public and private health plans offer nearly universal coverage using a combined approach of managed competition and subsidies for low-income individuals. This paper uses a "most different" case study design to compare policies implemented in Chile and the US to address self-selection into private insurance. We argue that the implementation of a mixed health insurance system in Chile without the appropriate regulations was complex, and it generated a series of inequities and perverse incentives. The comparison of Chile and the US healthcare reforms examines the different approaches that both countries have used to manage economic competition, address health insurance self-selection and promote solidarity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recent increases in market concentration among health plans, hospitals, and medical groups raise questions about what impact such mergers are having on costs to consumers. We examined the impact of market concentration on the growth of health insurance premiums between 2014 and 2015 in two Affordable Care Act state-based Marketplaces: Covered California and NY State of Health. We measured health plan, hospital, and medical group market concentration using the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and used a multivariate regression model to relate these measures to premium growth. Both states exhibited a positive association between hospital concentration and premium growth and a positive (but not statistically significant) association between medical group concentration and premium growth. Our results for health plan concentration differed between the two states: It was positively associated with premium growth in New York but negatively associated with premium growth in California. The health plan concentration finding in Covered California may be the result of its selectively contracting with health plans.

Recent increases in market concentration among health plans, hospitals, and medical groups raise questions about what impact such mergers are having on costs to consumers. We examined the impact of market concentration on the growth of health insurance premiums between 2014 and 2015 in two Affordable Care Act state-based Marketplaces: Covered California and NY State of Health. We measured health plan, hospital, and medical group market concentration using the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and used a multivariate regression model to relate these measures to premium growth. Both states exhibited a positive association between hospital concentration and premium growth and a positive (but not statistically significant) association between medical group concentration and premium growth. Our results for health plan concentration differed between the two states: It was positively associated with premium growth in New York but negatively associated with premium growth in California. The health plan concentration finding in Covered California may be the result of its selectively contracting with health plans.

Accountable care organizations (ACOs), one of the most recent and promising health care delivery innovations, encourage care coordination among providers. While ACOs hold promise for decreasing costs by reducing unnecessary procedures, improving resource use as a result of economies of scale and scope, ACOs also raise concerns about provider market power. This study examines the market-level competition factors that are associated with ACO participation and the number of ACOs. Using data from California, we find that higher levels of preexisting managed care leads to higher ACO entry and enrollment growth, while hospital concentration leads to fewer ACOs and lower enrollment. We find interesting results for physician market power - markets with concentrated physician markets have a smaller share of individuals in commercial ACOs but a larger number of commercial ACO organizations. This finding implies smaller ACOs in these markets.

Accountable care organizations (ACOs), one of the most recent and promising health care delivery innovations, encourage care coordination among providers. While ACOs hold promise for decreasing costs by reducing unnecessary procedures, improving resource use as a result of economies of scale and scope, ACOs also raise concerns about provider market power. This study examines the market-level competition factors that are associated with ACO participation and the number of ACOs. Using data from California, we find that higher levels of preexisting managed care leads to higher ACO entry and enrollment growth, while hospital concentration leads to fewer ACOs and lower enrollment. We find interesting results for physician market power - markets with concentrated physician markets have a smaller share of individuals in commercial ACOs but a larger number of commercial ACO organizations. This finding implies smaller ACOs in these markets.

There have been large structural changes in the US heroin market over the past 20 years. Colombian-sourced heroin entered the market in the mid-1990s, followed by a large fall in the price per pure gram and the exit of Asian heroin. By the 2000s, Colombian-sourced heroin had become a monopoly on the east coast and Mexican-sourced heroin a monopoly on the west coast with competition between the two in the middle. We estimate the relationship between these changes in competitive market structure on retail-level heroin price and purity. We find that the entry of Colombian-sourced heroin is associated with less competition and a lower price per pure gram of heroin at the national level. However, there is wide variation in changes in market concentration across the US. Controlling for the national fall in the heroin price, more competition in a region or city is associated with a lower price per pure gram.

The for-profit conversion of Empire Blue Cross in New York challenges the case law and conventional policy wisdom that financial assets from formerly nonprofit organizations should be used to endow independent charitable foundations. The appropriation of Empire's assets by state government itself, and their subsequent deployment to subsidize health care institutions and repay political obligations, changes the conversion process from one that pits nonprofits against for-profits to one that pits private, nonprofit organizations against public-sector programs in the competition for new financial resources.

BackgroundA variety of approaches have been used to contain escalating hospital costs. One approach is intensifying price competition. The increase in price based competition, which changes the incentives hospitals face, coupled with the fact that consumers can more easily evaluate the quality of hotel services compared with the quality of clinical care, may lead hospitals to allocate more resources into hotel rather than clinical services.MethodsTo test this hypothesis we studied hospitals in California in 1982 and 1989, comparing resource allocations prior to and following selective contracting, a period during which the focus of competition changed from quality to price. We estimated the relationship between clinical outcomes, measured as risk-adjusted-mortality rates, and resources.ResultsIn 1989, higher competition was associated with lower clinical expenditures levels compared with 1982. The trend was stronger for non-profit hospitals. Lower clinical resource use was associated with worse risk adjusted mortality outcomes.ConclusionsThis study raises concerns that cost reductions may be associated with increased mortality.

BackgroundA variety of approaches have been used to contain escalating hospital costs. One approach is intensifying price competition. The increase in price based competition, which changes the incentives hospitals face, coupled with the fact that consumers can more easily evaluate the quality of hotel services compared with the quality of clinical care, may lead hospitals to allocate more resources into hotel rather than clinical services.MethodsTo test this hypothesis we studied hospitals in California in 1982 and 1989, comparing resource allocations prior to and following selective contracting, a period during which the focus of competition changed from quality to price. We estimated the relationship between clinical outcomes, measured as risk-adjusted-mortality rates, and resources.ResultsIn 1989, higher competition was associated with lower clinical expenditures levels compared with 1982. The trend was stronger for non-profit hospitals. Lower clinical resource use was associated with worse risk adjusted mortality outcomes.ConclusionsThis study raises concerns that cost reductions may be associated with increased mortality.

This study examines risk selection among nine health plans competing for 16,182 employees of one large firm in 1989: one conventional fee-for-service plan, one group-model health maintenance organization (HMO), and seven network and independent practice model HMOs. We develop and compare measures of risk using weights based on HMO and fee-for-service expenditure data, respectively. We use a multiequation statistical model to develop two sets of utilization and expenditure weights for enrollees in each plan. One set of weights, based on discharge abstracts and outpatient records from the large group-model HMO, measures how much each of the nine groups of employees and dependents would have spent, had they been enrolled in a stringently managed plan with no consumer cost sharing. The other set of weights, based on fee-for-service claims data, measures how much each group would have spent, had it been enrolled in an unmanaged health plan with significant coinsurance and deductibles. Predicted annual expenditures per enrollee exhibit a 23% range from lowest (favorable selection) to highest (adverse selection) risk plans using the HMO weights and a 17% range using fee-for-service weights. The fee-for-service plan and group-model HMO with large enrollments have risk mixes near the center of the spectrum. Smaller HMOs exhibit the extreme forms of both favorable and adverse selection. The statistical methods adopted in this study can be used to risk-adjust capitation payments to competing health plans. As mergers among HMOs and group purchasing arrangements among employers increase the average enrollment in each plan from each payor, however, risk differences among plans will be attenuated and the need to risk-adjust payments will be less severe. Key words: health insurance; adverse selection; managed competition; health maintenance organization.

The American hospital faces two different possible futures. In one, the hospital continues to expand into outpatient, home health, and long-term-care services and remains the center of the changing health care system. In the other, competition in each of these domains from independent health plans, which do not have to contend with the high wages, technological imperatives, and bureaucratic inertia of large hospital organizations, pushes the hospital to a peripheral role as provider of ever-diminishing acute inpatient services. The choice between these two futures will be made based on the efficiencies of vertical integration relative to market contracting. Transactions cost economics is used to analyze the changing boundaries of the hospital organization, particularly with respect to outpatient diagnostic and surgical clinics, home health agencies, and long-term-care facilities.

A variety of recent proposals rely heavily on market forces as a means of controlling hospital cost inflation. Sceptics argue, however, that increased competition might lead to cost-increasing acquisitions of specialized clinical services and other forms of non-price competition as means of attracting physicians and patients. Using data from hospitals in 1972 we analyzed the impact of market structure on average hospital costs, measured in terms of both cost per patient and cost per patient day. Under the retrospective reimbursement system in place at the time, hospitals in more competitive environments exhibited significantly higher costs of production than did those in less competitive environments.

The hypothesis that competitive pressures encourage hospitals to accommodate patient and physician preferences for longer lengths of stay was tested. Seven hundred forty-seven nonfederal short-term hospitals were divided in terms of the number of neighboring hospitals within a 24-km radius, and this measure of hospital concentration and competition was measured against length of stay for ten surgical procedures, using 1982 data on 498454 patient discharges. Patient, physician, and hospital characteristics associated with length of stay were controlled for. Competition-related percentage increases in length of stay were identified for all procedures, including total hip replacement (14.8%), transurethral prostatectomy (13.9%), intestinal operations (14.0%), stomach operations (14.7%), hysterectomy (6.9%), cholecystectomy (9.1%), hernia repair (10.5%), appendectomy (8.4%), cardiac catheterization (22.9%), and coronary artery bypass graft surgery (21.2%). It was concluded that there is a strong association between the number of hospital competitors in the local market and the average length of stay in US hospitals.

We used data on 5490 nonfederal, short-term general hospitals to evaluate the relative effectiveness of regulatory and market-oriented cost-control policies on hospital cost inflation between 1982 and 1986. All-payer rate-regulation programs reduced inflation rates by 16.3% in Massachusetts, 15.4% in Maryland, and 6.3% in New York, compared with the control hospitals in 43 states with neither all-payer rate regulation nor an aggressive market-oriented strategy. New Jersey hospitals experienced a rate of cost inflation similar to the control hospitals. Given the effectiveness of its regulatory program in the 1970s, however, New Jersey began and ended the period from 1982 to 1986 with the lowest costs, controlling for wages and patient mix. California's market-oriented cost-control policy reduced inflation rates by 10.1%. Hospitals with large percentages of patients insured by Medicare's prospective payment system experienced cost inflation rates 16.1% lower than hospitals with small percentages of Medicare patients. Investor-owned hospitals experienced rates of cost increase 11.6% higher than private nonprofit hospitals and 15.0% higher than public hospitals.