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The possibility of a massive oil spill in the Red Sea is increasingly likely. The Safer, a deteriorating oil tanker containing 1.1 million barrels of oil, has been deserted near the coast of Yemen since 2015 and threatens environmental catastrophe to a country presently in a humanitarian crisis. Here, we model the immediate public health impacts of a simulated spill. We estimate that all of Yemen's imported fuel through its key Red Sea ports would be disrupted and that the anticipated spill could disrupt clean-water supply equivalent to the daily use of 9.0-9.9 million people, food supply for 5.7-8.4 million people and 93-100% of Yemen's Red Sea fisheries. We also estimate an increased risk of cardiovascular hospitalization from pollution ranging from 5.8 to 42.0% over the duration of the spill. The spill and its potentially disastrous impacts remain entirely preventable through offloading the oil. Our results stress the need for urgent action to avert this looming disaster.

Routine asymptomatic testing strategies for COVID-19 have been proposed to prevent outbreaks in high-risk healthcare environments. We used simulation modeling to evaluate the optimal frequency of viral testing. We found that routine testing substantially reduces risk of outbreaks, but may need to be as frequent as twice weekly.

BackgroundRoutine viral testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 infection might facilitate safe airline travel during the COVID-19 pandemic and mitigate global spread of the virus. However, the effectiveness of these test-and-travel strategies to reduce passenger risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection and population-level transmission remains unknown.MethodsIn this simulation study, we developed a microsimulation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a cohort of 100 000 US domestic airline travellers using publicly available data on COVID-19 clinical cases and published natural history parameters to assign individuals one of five health states of susceptible to infection, latent period, early infection, late infection, or recovered. We estimated a per-day risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 corresponding to a daily incidence of 150 infections per 100 000 people. We assessed five testing strategies: (1) anterior nasal PCR test within 3 days of departure, (2) PCR within 3 days of departure and 5 days after arrival, (3) rapid antigen test on the day of travel (assuming 90% of the sensitivity of PCR during active infection), (4) rapid antigen test on the day of travel and PCR test 5 days after arrival, and (5) PCR test 5 days after arrival. Strategies 2 and 4 included a 5-day quarantine after arrival. The travel period was defined as 3 days before travel to 2 weeks after travel. Under each scenario, individuals who tested positive before travel were not permitted to travel. The primary study outcome was cumulative number of infectious days in the cohort over the travel period without isolation or quarantine (population-level transmission risk), and the key secondary outcome was the number of infectious people detected on the day of travel (passenger risk of infection).FindingsWe estimated that in a cohort of 100 000 airline travellers, in a scenario with no testing or screening, there would be 8357 (95% uncertainty interval 6144-12831) infectious days with 649 (505-950) actively infectious passengers on the day of travel. The pre-travel PCR test reduced the number of infectious days from 8357 to 5401 (3917-8677), a reduction of 36% (29-41) compared with the base case, and identified 569 (88% [76-92]) of 649 actively infectious travellers on the day of flight; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 2520 days (1849-4158), a reduction of 70% (64-75) compared with the base case. The rapid antigen test on the day of travel reduced the number of infectious days to 5674 (4126-9081), a reduction of 32% (26-38) compared with the base case, and identified 560 (86% [83-89]) actively infectious travellers; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 3124 (2356-495), a reduction of 63% (58-66) compared with the base case. The post-travel PCR alone reduced the number of infectious days to 4851 (3714-7679), a reduction of 42% (35-49) compared with the base case.InterpretationRoutine asymptomatic testing for SARS-CoV-2 before travel can be an effective strategy to reduce passenger risk of infection during travel, although abbreviated quarantine with post-travel testing is probably needed to reduce population-level transmission due to importation of infection when travelling from a high to low incidence setting.FundingUniversity of California, San Francisco.

BackgroundRoutine viral testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 infection might facilitate safe airline travel during the COVID-19 pandemic and mitigate global spread of the virus. However, the effectiveness of these test-and-travel strategies to reduce passenger risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection and population-level transmission remains unknown.MethodsIn this simulation study, we developed a microsimulation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a cohort of 100 000 US domestic airline travellers using publicly available data on COVID-19 clinical cases and published natural history parameters to assign individuals one of five health states of susceptible to infection, latent period, early infection, late infection, or recovered. We estimated a per-day risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 corresponding to a daily incidence of 150 infections per 100 000 people. We assessed five testing strategies: (1) anterior nasal PCR test within 3 days of departure, (2) PCR within 3 days of departure and 5 days after arrival, (3) rapid antigen test on the day of travel (assuming 90% of the sensitivity of PCR during active infection), (4) rapid antigen test on the day of travel and PCR test 5 days after arrival, and (5) PCR test 5 days after arrival. Strategies 2 and 4 included a 5-day quarantine after arrival. The travel period was defined as 3 days before travel to 2 weeks after travel. Under each scenario, individuals who tested positive before travel were not permitted to travel. The primary study outcome was cumulative number of infectious days in the cohort over the travel period without isolation or quarantine (population-level transmission risk), and the key secondary outcome was the number of infectious people detected on the day of travel (passenger risk of infection).FindingsWe estimated that in a cohort of 100 000 airline travellers, in a scenario with no testing or screening, there would be 8357 (95% uncertainty interval 6144-12831) infectious days with 649 (505-950) actively infectious passengers on the day of travel. The pre-travel PCR test reduced the number of infectious days from 8357 to 5401 (3917-8677), a reduction of 36% (29-41) compared with the base case, and identified 569 (88% [76-92]) of 649 actively infectious travellers on the day of flight; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 2520 days (1849-4158), a reduction of 70% (64-75) compared with the base case. The rapid antigen test on the day of travel reduced the number of infectious days to 5674 (4126-9081), a reduction of 32% (26-38) compared with the base case, and identified 560 (86% [83-89]) actively infectious travellers; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 3124 (2356-495), a reduction of 63% (58-66) compared with the base case. The post-travel PCR alone reduced the number of infectious days to 4851 (3714-7679), a reduction of 42% (35-49) compared with the base case.InterpretationRoutine asymptomatic testing for SARS-CoV-2 before travel can be an effective strategy to reduce passenger risk of infection during travel, although abbreviated quarantine with post-travel testing is probably needed to reduce population-level transmission due to importation of infection when travelling from a high to low incidence setting.FundingUniversity of California, San Francisco.

Heart failure is a leading cause of mortality, yet our understanding of the genetic interactions underlying this disease remains incomplete. Here, we harvest 1352 healthy and failing human hearts directly from transplant center operating rooms, and obtain genome-wide genotyping and gene expression measurements for a subset of 313. We build failing and non-failing cardiac regulatory gene networks, revealing important regulators and cardiac expression quantitative trait loci (eQTLs). PPP1R3A emerges as a regulator whose network connectivity changes significantly between health and disease. RNA sequencing after PPP1R3A knockdown validates network-based predictions, and highlights metabolic pathway regulation associated with increased cardiomyocyte size and perturbed respiratory metabolism. Mice lacking PPP1R3A are protected against pressure-overload heart failure. We present a global gene interaction map of the human heart failure transition, identify previously unreported cardiac eQTLs, and demonstrate the discovery potential of disease-specific networks through the description of PPP1R3A as a central regulator in heart failure.