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Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self--a self-experience--whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called mineness, for-me-ness, pre-reflective self-awareness and subjective character, among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a'sense of self'might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones.

J.S. Mill famously equated physical things with'permanent possibilities of sensation.'This view, known as phenomenalism, holds that a rock is a tendency for experiences to occur as they do when people perceive a rock, and similarly for all other physical things. In Phenomenalism, Michael Pelczar develops Mill's theory in detail, defends it against the objections responsible for its current unpopularity, and uses it to shed light on important questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. Identifying physical things with possibilities of sensation establishes a transparent connection between the world of physics and the world of sense, provides an attractive alternative to currently fashionable structuralist and panpsychist metaphysics, offers a fresh perspective on the problem of consciousness, and yields a satisfying theory of perception, all by taking two things notoriously resistant to reduction, chance and experience, and constructing everything else out of them.

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that things are a particular way gives one prima facie justification for believing that they are that way) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is immune to some of these problems, but not all. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one's evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.

Vor dem Hintergrund der Diskussion um Anthropozän und Klimawandel zeichnet der Band die historische Veränderung atmosphärischer Erscheinungen im Bezug auf sich wandelnde Erkenntnisverfahren nach. Die Beiträge des Bandes konfrontieren die wissenschaftliche Erforschung atmosphärischer Phänomene mit ihren ästhetischen Wahrnehmungsweisen und fragen dabei nach dem spezifischen Wissen der Literatur. Während der erste Teil des Bandes eine Vielfalt disziplinärer Zugänge zur Atmosphäre – von der Architektur über das Militärwesen bis hin zur Ökonomie – vereint, fokussiert der zweite Teil konkrete Phänomene wie Wolken, Nebel und Schnee.

The main aims of this book are to establish that it is rational to believe that God exists; to show how God relates to morality; and to show how God is causally connected to his creation. Dore defends a version of the ontological argument and refutes the atheistic argument from suffering. He argues that only God can account for the overridingness of morality. He also treats ethical supernaturalism as a type of ethical attitude theory, showing how it is related to secular theories which base valid judgments of moral goodness and evil on pro and con attitudes. He illlustrates precisely how, given scientific explanation, theistic explanation of the empirical universe can get a foothold. His method is to adopt and defend a version of theistic (Berkeley-like) phenomenalism and, in that connection, a pragmatic-instrumentalist interpretation of scientific theories.

Der Inhalt des Buches beschäftigt sich mit dem Konstrukt der Hochsensibilität, die sich bei Personen wie folgt zeigt: gehemmtes Verhalten vor allem in neuartigen Situationen, eine offenere und subtilere Wahrnehmung, die in reizintensiven Situationen leicht zu Übererregung führen kann, eine intensivere zentralnervöse Verarbeitung von inneren und äußeren Reizen sowie damit einhergehende stärkere emotionale Reaktionen. In der Studie wurde überprüft, inwieweit Ängstlichkeit, Depression, Stress, Alter und Geschlecht die Hochsensibilität vorhersagen. Psychophysiologisch wurde getestet, ob hochsensible Personen eine stärkere Stressreaktivität und eine präzisere Herzwahrnehmungsfähigkeit aufweisen. Die ProbandInnen wurden mittels einer ins Deutsche übersetzten Version der Highly Sensitive Person Scale, TICS, Trait-Skala des STAI, BAI und BDI-II untersucht. Psychophysiologische Maße wurden im Rahmen eines EKGs mit dem Herzwahrnehmungstest und einem stressinduzierenden Reaktionstest erhoben. Die Ergebnisse lassen die Annahme zu, dass Hochsensibilität zwar ein mehrdimensionales, möglicherweise aber primär psychologisches Phänomen ist, das erst sekundär physiologische Wirkungen generiert.

In »Sein und Zeit« interpretiert Heidegger den Begriff Dasein als das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein um sein Sein geht, in Bezug auf seine Seinsart. Als endlich Existierendes ist das Dasein in die Welt geworfen und entwirft die Möglichkeit seines Seins. Diese Bewegung bezeichnet Heidegger als Zeitlichkeit, in deren Struktur sich die Existenz des Daseins enthüllt. Wie die Struktur der Zeitlichkeit zur Erscheinung kommt, ist eine hermeneutische Frage, die sich auf die Phänomenologie als Methode der Ontologie des Daseins bezieht. Ein Leitfaden für eine neue Interpretation der Daseinsphänomenologie besteht darin, dass Heidegger die Existenz des Daseins als Geschehen bezeichnet. Das Sein des jeweiligen Daseins als seine eigene Geschichte soll erzählt werden, damit das Dasein als Individuum seine Existenz als sein faktisch lebendes Sein offenbaren kann.

Being Shaken is a multifaceted meditation by leading philosophers from Europe and North America on ways in which events disrupt the complacency of the ontological paradigm at the personal, ethical, theological, aesthetic, and political levels.

Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles'dog-wise arranged'explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to'explain away'familiar objects project downwards, onto the tiny entities, structures and features of familiar objects themselves. He contends that sceptical metaphysicians are thus employing shadows of familiar objects, while denying that the entities which cast those shadows really exist. He argues that the shadows are indeed really there, because their sources - familiar objects - are mind-independently real.

Was sind naturwissenschaftliche Phänomene und inwiefern kann die Beantwortung dieser Frage zu einer besseren philosophischen Einschätzung der wissenschaftlichen Praxis beitragen? Dieses Buch untersucht die wissenschaftstheoretische Unterscheidung zwischen Daten und Phänomenen, um ihre Bedeutung für die Debatte um den Wissenschaftlichen Realismus zu klären. Ausgehend von einer Analyse des Phänomenbegriffs werden sowohl realistische als auch antirealistische Anwendungen der Unterscheidung auf ihre Überzeugungskraft geprüft. Auf Grundlage der Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung wird für ein realistisches Phänomenverständnis plädiert und erörtert, wie exakt Wissenschaftstheoretiker die wissenschaftliche Praxis beschreiben müssen, um zutreffende philosophische Schlussfolgerungen ziehen zu können.

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion.

Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.

ゲーテやカンディンスキーの色彩論がもつ哲学的可能性とは何か。現象学の方法と、脳科学・生命科学の新たな知見を交差させつつ、色彩の豊かな多様性＝多次元性を記述しうる生態学的現象を構想する。一つの生活世界論の試み。

Translation of: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution / von Edmund Husserl. The Hague, The Netherlands : Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.

Includes indexes.