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A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace. Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

As the activities of individuals, organizations, and nations increasingly occur in cyberspace, the security of those activities is becoming a growing concern. Political, economic and military leaders must manage and reduce the level of risk associated with threats from hostile states, malevolent nonstate actors such as organized terrorist groups or individual hackers, and high-tech accidents. The impact of the information technology revolution on warfare, global stability, governance, and even the meaning of existing security constructs like deterrence is significant. These essays examine the ways in which the information technology revolution has affected the logic of deterrence and crisis management, definitions of peace and war, democratic constraints on conflict, the conduct of and military organization for war, and the growing role of the private sector in providing security.