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Foreign investors are drawn abroad by the lure of profits, but they also face significant risks. Standing Guard examines how investors coped with these risks and protected their capital abroad in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Toward the end of the twentieth century, less-developed countries, determined to control their own economic development, nationalized their most lucrative oil fields and mineral concessions and regulated all forms of foreign investment. While some firms were hard hit, many others adapted profitably to this new political environment. They rearranged their assets for self-protection and took full advantage of the tax breaks, low wages, and other incentives that attract capital to less-developed countries. At stake were not only corporate profits but also the character of national economic development and the global pattern of property rights. Charles Lispon traces these evolving issues from the days of gunboat diplomacy to modern corporate negotiations, showing how investors have tried to minimize their vulnerability to economic nationalism. Standing Guard analyzes the shifting corporate strategies and shows how they have affected U.S. foreign policy, providing a thorough, clearly reasoned, and insightful analysis of the long-term changes in investment security. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

Democracies often go to war but almost never against each other. Indeed,'the democratic peace'has become a catchphrase among scholars and even U.S. Presidents. But why do democracies avoid fighting each other? Reliable Partners offers the first systematic and definitive explanation. Examining decades of research and speculation on the subject and testing this against the history of relations between democracies over the last two centuries, Charles Lipson concludes that constitutional democracies have a'contracting advantage'--a unique ability to settle conflicts with each other by durable agreements. In so doing he forcefully counters realist claims that a regime's character is irrelevant to war and peace. Lipson argues that because democracies are confident their bargains will stick, they can negotiate effective settlements with each other rather than incur the great costs of war. Why are democracies more reliable partners? Because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments. They cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks. While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible--and more durable, for democracies are generally stable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states. Setting rigorous analysis in friendly, vigorous prose, Reliable Partners resolves longstanding questions about the democratic peace and highlights important new findings about democracies in world politics, from rivalries to alliances. Above all, it shows conclusively that democracies are uniquely adapted to seal enduring bargains with each other and thus avoid the blight of war.

The senior thesis is the capstone of a college education, but writing one can be a daunting prospect. Students need to choose their own topic and select the right adviser. Then they need to work steadily for several months as they research, write, and manage a major independent project. Now there's a mentor to help. How to Write a BA Thesis is a practical, friendly guide written by Charles Lipson, an experienced professor who has guided hundreds of students through the thesis-writing process. This book offers step-by-step advice on how to turn a vague idea into a clearly defined proposal, then a draft paper, and, ultimately, a polished thesis. Lipson also tackles issues beyond the classroom-from good work habits to coping with personal problems that interfere with research and writing. Filled with examples and easy-to-use highlighted tips, the book also includes handy time schedules that show when to begin various tasks and how much time to spend on each. Convenient checklists remind students which steps need special attention, and a detailed appendix, filled with examples, shows how to use the three main citation systems in the humanities and social sciences: MLA, APA, and Chicago. How to Write a BA Thesis will help students work more comfortably and effectively-on their own and with their advisers. Its clear guidelines and sensible advice make it the perfect text for thesis workshops. Students and their advisers will refer again and again to this invaluable resource. From choosing a topic to preparing the final paper, How to Write a BA Thesis helps students turn a daunting prospect into a remarkable achievement.

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.

This is the first of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Contending Theoretical Perspectives, International Regimes, Multilateralism and International Leadership, and International Economy and Domestic Politics.

This is the second of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Trade, Multinational Firms and Globalization, Money and Finance, and Emerging Issues.