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Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the distinctive character of musical experiences? An answer: musical experience is distinctive because it is of music. I argue, however, that the difference between musical and nonmusical experience cannot be explained with an ontological account of music per se. Instead, we have musical experiences of sounds whenever we listen and attend to sounds in a particular kind of way. I call this special kind of attention “musical listening.” One can explain why musical experiences are distinctive by explaining what makes musical listening distinctive. This account of musical listening suggests an anti-realist stance towards music; there is no kind of thing “music” and no musical works that are its instances. Ultimately, I give a kind of account of music as a function of an activity of listening that more fully explains our lives with music and sound than do accounts that focus on describing the ontological status of music. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The significance of Adornos concepts regarding the aesthetic and analytic descriptions of musical self-reflection in nineteenth-century works remain in their reception ambiguous. The article discusses various options to clarify his notion of a "second reflection" within this frame of reference and develops a model of musical self-reflection as "gestellter Stil" and "stille Stelle In an analysis of Schubert's Piano Trio in E-Flat Major, D. 929, these terms are developed further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discurso is the property of Universidade Aberta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Traditional aesthetic theory has posited an account of music, and the other arts, as autonomous of social meanings, relevance, and conditions. In the case of music, "absolute music" is sequestered from social and other roots that bring music into being in the first place. The typical claim, thus, is that classical music is music for its own sake, divorced from the many and highly evident social dimensions that it serves. It ignores all other genres of music, most of which are more appreciated than can be accounted for by the theory of autonomania. This aesthetic theory of music, one of many theories, is unconvincing in history, and discourse of the broader philosophy of music, and a praxial theory of music is offered here in contradiction. The implications for music education should be clear, that the autonomy of music and music education from society is a troublesome and misleading contention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is written in memory of Morten Eide Pedersen, the author's former teacher in composition, who passed away unexpectedly in October 2014. A musical composition can sometimes be full of «emphatic meaning,» which is incurred through an affirmative and style-centered musical language. At other times music subtly calls on us to relinquish the interpreting distance, to embrace unestablished new paths. The latter approach will be portrayed as «composition in essay form,» in response to the concept of the «essay» as presented by Theodor W. Adorno. An essayist composition necessarily lacks an affirmative voice. It is a vulnerable and honest music which is not inclined to seek reconciliation within an institutionalized, fixed musical syntax, and suggests the dangerous and incomprehensible «Other.». [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wittgenstein's remarks about music have motivated philosophers to build a comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music, concentrating on the central issues of musical meaning. It is often claimed that, according to Wittgenstein, understanding music consist in grasping the internal relationships between musical events. Musical practice, however, is naturally saturated with what philosophers often call extra-musical meanings. The present study, by considering a musical issue in Haydn's instrumental music, attempts to show that musical language games in the Wittgensteinian sense involve explanations of music that enhance the listener's ability to understand music by broadening his musical competence. Nevertheless, constituting understanding of music, these explanations might use professional musical terms as well as non-musical terms, comparisons, gestures and so on. Thus, though music does not goes beyond itself in the sense of being understood through correlations between purely musical "concepts" and extra-musical contents, it does go beyond itself in musical practice, which involves understanding music through explanations and descriptions of music using various kinds of terms and images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]