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Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais is the property of DADOS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The war in Ukraine has had an extensive impact upon societies not directly involved in the military fighting. Traditional and social media has been filled with references to the war and discussions concerning how individuals as well as society as a whole would cope if war were to erupt in Sweden. In this context, an often overlooked issue is the relationship between humans and animals. This article discusses challenges to the total defence system, brought on by the norms of the 2020s, concerning the social relationship between humans and animals. It presents a number of areas wherein the relation between humans and animals is likely to raise questions and invoke conflict with existing regulations of the total defence: views of security, laws and regulations for wartime and crisis situations, and the development of social relations between humans and animals. Finally, some ideas are presented regarding how a total defence including animals could be materialized, and which changes such ideas would pose to the present total defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Synthetic Environment (SE) takes the power of computing, digital processing, artificial intelligence, extended reality technology, and other advancements borrowed from the gaming industry to create a computer simulation with near-perfect levels of realism. Designed to enable connectivity across all domains and platforms, SE has the potential to dramatically improve military training, force development, situational awareness, and communications. Our article provides a technical overview of SE and offers a high-level analysis of its use in Canada, the US, UK, and Australia. Informed by dozens of interviews and a roundtable workshop held with experts from academia, industry, and government, this article relates SE to Canada's future defence policy. We argue that leveraging SE effectively will require that Canada commit to a long-term SE program, promote new government-industry partnerships, encourage top-down leadership from both civilian and military officials, and consolidate domestic skillsets and industry knowhow to maintain and retain Canadian sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A connected battlespace aims to enable seamless, real-time connectivity between various military assets across all domains of contemporary warfare. Such a program, however, cannot be accomplished without the use of space-based assets that are designed to store and transmit data; enable communications, surveillance, and imagery; and bolster interoperability between different military forces and services. Given recent technological advancements, coupled with international interest and the diminishing cost of launching satellites into low Earth orbit, this article explores the opportunities and drawbacks associated with the Canadian Armed Forces' embrace of novel space-based technologies. Following dozens of consultations and a stakeholder workshop held with academic, industry and policy experts, we argue that developing, procuring, and exploiting these capabilities is essential for Canada's future force development, augmenting situational awareness in a pan-domain environment, and retaining a degree of sovereignty in an era marked by disruptive technologies, strategic uncertainty and great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union may have altered the founding Cold War rationale for NATO, the fundamental principle of the transatlantic alliance has prevailed for 70 years: the collective defence of shared interests. In the face of Russian aggression, and uncertainty about US continued commitment to the alliance, reinforcing NATO has emerged as Canada's top expeditionary defence priority. Indeed, just before the NATO summit in July 2018, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau renewed Canada's commitment to the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) as the Framework Nation for Latvia for four years, and scaled up Canada's contribution to the allied battlegroup. This decision is as much a reflection of the eFP's immediate collective defence requirements in Latvia as it is of the extent to which the existential fate of Canada's most important defence asset hangs in the balance: the alliance, Canada's role in it, and the future of Canadian defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today Russia poses significant challenges that require sophisticated responses from both Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), yet more research is needed on almost all aspects of policy development. Academic experts on NATO and Russia could contribute significantly to this process. To this end, collaboration and engagement among those experts with each other's literature would be highly beneficial. Appropriate methodologies must be developed to answer questions about Russia's specific intentions, test the assumptions upon which NATO and Canada's policies are founded, and discover and respond to the root causes of Russia's discontent. Policy options should be based on detailed knowledge of global security dynamics, as well as high-quality analysis about Russia's rhetoric and its varied use of hard, soft, and sharp soft power in regional and global cases. A research network on these topics could help decision-makers respond to these complex developments by approaching them through "the eyes of our adversaries," clarifying the big picture of hybrid warfare and also the micro-level details. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Canada’s policies in the Middle East receive large amounts of media attention, but there is surprisingly little scholarly work about them. Of the few studies on the topic, moreover, most focus on analyzing past or current policies. This is certainly useful, but there is virtually no academic work focused on prescription. There is, as such, a need for theoretically informed studies laying out the rationale for a sound Canadian policy framework for the region. In this context, this paper proposes to look at Canada’s Middle East policies from a realist perspective. What are Canada’s interests? How should these translate into policy? The goal here is not to make specific prescriptions regarding each conflict or bilateral relation, but rather to propose a comprehensive framework to guide Ottawa’s broad approach to the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a field of study, Canadian Foreign Policy has undergone dramatic changes over the last three decades, becoming disconnected from debates about our identity and values and more focused on Canadian foreign and defence policy. This transition in Canadian Foreign Policy reflects the changing priorities of successive Canadian governments and structural shifts in Canadian academia. Yet, such change has unfolded gradually and incrementally, such that key challenges remain for scholars interested in working, presenting, and publishing in Canadian Foreign Policy. Using my own experiences as a student and teacher of foreign policy in Canada, I reflect on these transformations within Canadian Foreign Policy and their implications, beginning with the “golden age” of Canadian Foreign Policy during the 1990s to its decline under the Harper government and, finally, to our current climate of fragmented academic and professional research. In the current climate, participating in traditional and “new” social media places professional incentives (namely, tenure and promotion via peer-reviewed outlets) in tension with emerging opportunities to engage in more open critical analysis of Canadian Foreign Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians have focused on anxiety over the rise of Asia and concern over imperial rivalries as motivating factors in stimulating the development of Australian defence policy in the post-Federation period. Yet these factors cannot entirely explain the imperatives that shaped Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s statement on defence policy in December 1907, and the key proposals Deakin outlined in his speech – to create an Australian naval squadron and the introduction of compulsory military training. Deakin’s defence statement responded to the accelerating global dynamics offin de siècleindustrial modernity, into which tensions of race and imperialism had been swept. This article has been peer reviewed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How did the Canadian news media cover the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter purchase, proposed by the Harper government in mid-2010? Under what conditions did the media tend to index government talking points as opposed to providing space to oppositional voices and viewpoints? Content analysis of headlines and full text transcripts in five mainstream newspapers revealed news coverage that was mostly negative and that it became more negative as consensus within official decision circles dissipated. Overall, the findings fit most closely with the predictions of the cascading activation model of government–media relations, while also underscoring the importance of factors specific to the Canadian context.Comment est-ce que les médias canadiens ont couvert l'achat du F-35 Joint Strike Fighter proposait par le gouvernement Harper en mi-2010? Sous quelles conditions les médias ont-ils tendance a indexé les points de discussion gouvernementale au lieu de prêter d'espace pour les voix et points de vues de l'opposition? L'analyse de contenu des titres et transcriptions de texte en plein de cinq journaux courant dominant a révélé le reportage qui était surtout négatif et qu'il est devenu plus négatif quand le consensus au sein des cercles de décision officielle dissipait. Globalement, les résultats correspondent plus étroitement avec les prédictions du modèle d'activation en cascade des relations médias-gouvernemental, ainsi que soulignant l'importance des facteurs spécifiques au contexte canadien [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 21st century, we are living a new age of international community where different allies are playing a fundamental role in the international equilibrium. The young CSDP in Europe has to mediate and rise in this new scenario where NATO has traditionally been the big defence leader in the European community. In fact CSDP has found different issues over which to provide security to Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cyberspace is a new and evolving realm of human interaction with specific security and defence concerns. Threats to commercial and government interests are being identified and many nations have accepted cyberspace as a domain of military of operations. While governments are investing in the development of military cyber capabilities, there are few examples of military cyber operations from which military doctrine can be developed. In order to bridge the gap between speculation and experience, the principles related to land, sea, and air forces can be used to provide a helpful reference for the cyber domain. The adoption of cyberspace as a domain has more to do with marketing than doctrinal consistency with physical domains. Until some future military cyber operations are categorized as armed attacks, there is insufficient cause to categorize cyberspace as a distinct domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara Review of European Studies (ARES) / Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi (AAÇD) is the property of Ankara University European Union Research Centre and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of UNISCI Discussion Papers is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad is the property of Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Defense & Strategy / Obrana a strategie is the property of Institute for Strategic Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The existence of transnational security threats and the reluctance of the United Nations to get involved in peacekeeping activities in Africa, have necessitated South Africa's participation in peacekeeping services to African states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Sudan. A shift in defence policy is necessary to accommodate an expanded mandate as well as requirements of deployment to make provision for peacekeeping missions. There is also the notion that Africa needs to rely on its own resources to resolve conflicts, and it is therefore increasingly found that African states, such as South Africa, mediate between opposition parties, in addition to sending troops to enforce and consolidate peace to ensure collective security in African states. The threat of regional insecurities and conflict spilling over into South Africa should be countered for the sake of national interest. In the light of the New Partnership for African Development, as well as the Millennium Development Goals, peacekeeping is seen as a fitting means to assist other African countries in peace-building, maintaining order and stability, poverty alleviation and sustainable social development. Humanitarian missions now reflect human security principles, which are entrenched in domestic and foreign policies. However, lack of consistency between policy regulations and practices is a phenomenon demanding explication. The aim of this article is to focus on African peacekeeping based on human security principles and to pinpoint the inconsistencies between policy and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]