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Public participation in the formulation of fiscal policy is particularly salient, since public finances is a topic relevant for the public in general, although it requires certain level of knowledge about fiscal matters. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level and the type of public interest in the area of fiscal policy, and to assess the influence of the interested public on the regulation of fiscal policy. In order to do so, authors analyze the implementation of electronic public consultations (e-consultations) in Croatia conducted by the Ministry of Finance in a three-year period. Research findings suggest that even though the level of participation in fiscal policy area does not significantly derogate from the average of e-consultations at the state level, public interest appears to be quite well organized and informed, which positively affects the level of administrative responsiveness in this policy area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Publicos is the property of Centro de Estudios Publicos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Mesovita Gradja is the property of Istorijski Institut and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Political science and public policy scholars have long emphasised the importance of understanding institutional change and policy entrepreneurship. This review article is a response to this call in the context of reform in macroeconomic bureaucracies. Adopting a 'systematic' approach to reviewing the literature, this paper investigates when, why and how institutional reform in key monetary and fiscal macroeconomic bureaucracies (i.e. central banks, treasuries, and ministries of finance) takes place. It reviews 29 selected articles on reforms in these bureaucracies published in Thomson & Reuters Web of Knowledge's Social Science Citation Index, JSTOR, Sage and Wiley databases from 1980 to 2015. It shows that the current state of knowledge about institutional change in key macroeconomic bureaucracies is characterised by a lack of sufficient bridge-building among variants of institutional approaches as well as between institutional theory and public policy theory, resulting in persistent knowledge gaps. Against this background, the present review contributes to the body of knowledge on this topic in two main areas. First, it reviews the literature systematically to provide an overview of the key theoretical and empirical characteristics of when, how and why institutional reform takes place in these bureaucracies. Second, it identifies gaps and future avenues of research to stimulate progress in this important area of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the accuracy of real GDP growth forecasts published in the period 1995- 2013 by two Czech institutions: the Ministry of Finance (MF) and the Czech National Bank (CNB). A two-stepped approach is adopted: first a battery of forecasting errors (MAE, RMSE, MASE) is calculated, complementary to evaluation papers already available. Then statistical analysis is carried out by comparing both MF and CNB forecasts with OECD, European Commission and consensus benchmarks (Kruskal-Wallis test), assessing the presence of systemic bias (Wilcoxon test) and determining their incremental improvement (Page trend test). The results show that although some error patterns might suggest performance deficiencies (i.e. during the recession periods), the accuracy of forecasts prepared by both the MF and CNB does not differ significantly from the benchmark forecasts; MF and CNB predictions do not contain systemic bias and their accuracy improves as the horizon shortens. The paper also highlights several methodological shortcomings in the internal evaluations conducted by both institutions, indicating a potential for further improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Entreprises et Histoire is the property of Editions ESKA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper provides a critical review of the Financial Services Agency (FSA) of Japan since its establishment in June 1998 (as the Financial Supervisory Agency) to June 2004. During the six year period, the FSA faced the challenge of addressing severe insolvency problems in banking as well as life insurance industries. The paper argues that the initial separation of the supervisory role (in the Financial Supervisory Agency and the Financial Reconstruction Commission) and the policy planning role (in the Ministry of Finance) was useful in the sense it allowed the FSA to have a firm stance on the insolvency problem that was partially created by the failure of the past financial regulatory policy. Even after the creation of the FSA, the Bank of Japan remained as another bank supervisor. This seems have made the central bank reluctant in relaxing monetary policy out of the fear that such loose monetary policy would actually discourage re-organization of banking industry. This suggests a problem of having the central bank as a bank supervisor. For the life insurance companies, the FSA (both old and new) has not been successful in intervening (using prompt corrective action) before the failures. Finally, the paper also points out the important role of the leadership at the FSA that shapes the financial regulation, and suggests a problem of appointing a politician to this role. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]