Search

An enhanced active interrogation system has been developed that integrates a transportable Idaho National Laboratory (INL) photonuclear inspection system, using a pulsed bremsstrahlung source and a reconfigurable neutron detection system, with a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) list-mode data acquisition system. A series of active interrogation experiments using various nuclear materials have shown enhanced nuclear material detection and identification utilizing pulsed photofission-induced, neutron coincidence/multiplicity counting between pulses of an electron accelerator operating at energies up to 10 MeV. This paper describes the integrated inspection system and presents some key shielded and unshielded nuclear material inspection results. The enhanced inspection methodology has applicability to homeland security and possible nuclear weapon dismantlement treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Access to special nuclear material (SNM), such as enriched uranium or plutonium, is critical to the experimental validation of measurement techniques for nuclear nonproliferation applications. It is especially important that useful quantities be available for measurements in the field. However, security and safety requirements have made such access nearly impossible at many U.S. facilities. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has provided up to kilogram quantities of SNM for measurements in a variety of experimental conditions such as laboratories, outdoor facilities, and transfer to and from appropriate customer facilities. The INL expects to be working in the near future to make SNM more widely accessible for measurements by nuclear nonproliferation projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mission of radiological dispersal device (RDD) nuclear forensics is to identify the provenance of nuclear and radiological materials used in RDDs and to aid law enforcement in tracking nuclear materials and routes. The application of databases to radiological forensics is to match RDD source material to a source model in the database, provide guidance regarding a possible second device, and aid the FBI by providing a short list of manufacturers and distributors, and ultimately to the last legal owner of the source. The Argonne/Idaho National Laboratory RDD attribution database is a powerful technical tool in radiological forensics. The database (1267 unique vendors) includes all sealed sources and devices registered in the U.S., is complemented by data from the IAEA Catalogue, and is supported by rigorous in-lab characterization of selected sealed sources regarding physical form, radiochemical composition, and age-dating profiles. Close working relationships with global partners in the commercial sealed sources industry provide invaluable technical information and expertise in the development of signature profiles. These profiles are critical to the down-selection of potential candidates in either pre- or post- event RDD attribution. The down-selection process includes a match between an interdicted (or detonated) source and a model in the database linked to one or more manufacturers and distributors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Results are presented on the ability to perform neutron energy spectroscopy with standard organic scintillation detectors. Well-established pulse-shape discrimination techniques are used to reject the detectors' gamma-ray signal and produce neutron pulse-height distributions. These distributions are 'unfolded' using a detector-specific response matrix to obtain the incident neutron energy spectrum. Unfolding results are introduced for the measurements and characterization of mixed-oxide fuel pins. The robust measurement system used to perform these measurements included four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors with a 250-MHz, 12-bit waveform digitizer. The MCNP-PoliMi Monte Carlo particle transport code was used to build the mixed-oxide fuel source and develop an anticipated neutron energy distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008 a joint team from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) consisting of specialists in training of IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. In support of this activity, LANL summer interns provided open source information analysis to the BNL-LANL mock inspection team. They were a part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's (NGSI) summer intern program aimed at producing the next generation of safeguards specialists. This paper describes how they used open source information to support the BNL-LANL team's effort to construct meaningful Additional Protocol Complementary Access training scenarios for each of the three DOE laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Los Alamos National Laboratory has constructed a demonstration enterprise system model for the production of low-enriched uranium (LEU) research-reactor fuel for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) NA-21 Reactor Convert Program. The model includes all major processes shown in the fabrication flowsheet proposed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) at the macroscopic process level (e.g., casting, coating, bonding) and includes sample material reject rates and amounts. The model is to be used to demonstrate capability to examine equipment requirements, equipment failure effects, and process reject-rate effects. The model is an original model constructed using the recently released ExtendSim™ version 7 using existing modeling concepts and using previous process evaluation work as the basis for data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator's declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a number of years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been preparing for the entry into force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP). These preparations included attending training, participating in tabletop exercises, preparing draft declarations, developing INL-specific guidance documents, preparing for and hosting a mock complementary access visit, and preparing declarations for official submittal. All of these activities, the training materials, and software developed by other U.S. DOE national laboratories (PNNL, ORNL, LANL, and BNL) were very helpful in preparing for the entry into force of the AP. As with any endeavor of this size and complexity, however, there are always instances where even the best preparations and advanced planning do not anticipate every challenge. As the DOE's lead nuclear energy research and development facility, the INL faced many unique challenges. The majority of research conducted at the INL is nuclear fuel cycle related, most of which is not exempted by the National Security Exclusion. This paper describes the lessons learned from the INL's experience of preparing for the entry into force of the AP, specifically how translating and implementing general principles into actual activities proved to be one of many challenges, and provides general suggestions on how to respond effectively and efficiently to routine annual data calls and other AP requests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the new scheme that will comply with the Human Reliability Program (HRP), a personnel security program set up by the U.S. Department of Energy to ensure the trustiness of employees. The scheme called hourglass sampling, developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is used in selecting certified HRP employees for Drug and Alcohol (D&A) testing. It is also slated to be an effective method for integrating the features of finite sampling techniques.

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a campaign in which fifty nine cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. The neptunium campaign was divided into two parts: Part 1 which consisted of oxide made from H-Canyon neptunium solution which did not require any processing prior to conversion into an oxide, and Part 2 which consisted of oxide made from additional H-Canyon neptunium solutions which required processing to purify the solution prior to conversion into an oxide. The neptunium was received as a nitrate solution and converted to oxide through ion-exchange column extraction, precipitation, and calcination. Numerous processing challenges were encountered in order make a final neptunium oxide product that could be shipped in a 9975 shipping container. Among the challenges overcome was the issue of scale: translating lab scale production into full facility production. The balance between processing efficiency and product quality assurance was addressed during this campaign. Lessons learned from these challenges are applicable to other processing projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dispatching of robots into mission critical environments is becoming more and more commonplace as hardware evolves to a level of ruggedness demanded in these scenarios. Researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have been working to bridge the gap between current robotic hardware readiness and its lack of efficient system deployment and usability. In 2007 the INL successfully deployed commercial off the shelf (COTS) robots targeted to Military and Hazmat Team usage outfitted with an intelligence payload in a series of chemical, biological, radiologic, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE) detection exercises. This paper examines the primitive behaviors that comprise the intelligent navigation payload used in the exercises, and discusses the experiments and the results. It also discusses how these technologies can be applied to the nuclear safeguards mission for the verification of facility floor plans and the cataloguing of sensor built maps for historical comparisons and analysis of chemical and nuclear facility activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has become a center of excellence for critical infrastructure protection, particularly in the field of cyber security. It is one of only a few national laboratories that have enhanced the nation's cyber security posture by performing industrial control system (ICS) vendor assessments as well as user on-site assessments. Not only are vulnerabilities discovered, but described actions for enhancing security are suggested - both on a system-specific basis and from a general perspective of identifying common weaknesses and their corresponding corrective actions. These cyber security programs have performed over 40 assessments to date which have led to more robust, secure, and resilient monitoring and control systems for the US electrical grid, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, and many other sectors. In addition to cyber assessments themselves, the INL has been engaged in outreach to the ICS community through vendor forums, technical conferences, vendor user groups, and other special engagements as requested. Training programs have been created to help educate all levels of management and worker alike with an emphasis towards real everyday cyber hacking methods and techniques including typical exploits that are used. The asset owner or end user has many products available for its use created from these programs. One outstanding product is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems document that provides insight to the user when specifying a new monitoring and control system, particularly concerning security requirements. Employing some of the top cyber researchers in the nation, the INL can leverage this talent towards many applications other than critical infrastructure. Monitoring and control systems are used throughout the world to perform simple tasks such as cooking in a microwave to complex ones such as the monitoring and control of the next generation fighter jets or nuclear material safeguards systems in complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is the intent of this paper to describe the cyber security programs that are currently in place, the experiences and successes achieved in industry including outreach and training, and suggestions about how other sectors and organizations can leverage this national expertise to help their monitoring and control systems become more secure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A measurement plan and preliminary Monte Carlo simulations are presented for the investigation of well-defined mixed-oxide fuel pins. Measurement analysis including pulse-height distributions and time-dependent cross-correlation functions will be performed separately for neutrons and gamma rays. The utilization of Monte Carlo particle transport codes, specifically MCNP-PoliMi, is discussed in conjunction with the anticipated measurements. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline, optimized pulse-shape discrimination method will be used to prove the dependency of pulse-height distributions, cross-correlation functions, and material multiplicities upon fuel pin composition, fuel pin quantity, and detector geometry. The objective of the measurements and simulations is to identify novel methods for describing mixed-oxide fuel samples by relating measured quantities to fuel characteristics such as criticality, mass quantity, and material composition. This research has applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution researchers; (3) openness to and ease of access by international users working through U.S. government sponsoring agencies; and (4) the availability of requisite infrastructure to support research, testing and demonstration. While there is still work to do in closing the gap between material accessibility and demand, the steps taken by INL to date begin to address this important challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]