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We look at business survey data on Italian internationalized firms’ characteristics and performances since the outbreak of the crisis until 2012. Among Italian firms with 20 employees or more, an increasing share (from 7.1 to 13.2% between 2006 and 2011) owns a foreign productive unit. Nearly half of such units were located in developing countries. The main reason for locating units in advanced countries is to be close to outlet markets, this remains true for internationalization in developing countries even though in this case the search for lower costs becomes more important. In line with empirical research based on data from several countries, Italian multinationals are on average more productive and profitable, even when compared to exporting firms not operating abroad. More specifically, the productivity gap compared to these latter firms is 15 percent, closely aligned with that measured by Helpman at al. (2004) on a sample of US firms. In the years 2007-2012, internationalized firms’ operating profit, as well as their labor utilization in Italy, were above both the general average and that of other exporting firms. In firms’ opinion, the support by Italian public institutions to expand their foreign activity is generally not effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an exploratory agent-based model of a real time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system. Banks are represented as agents who exchange payment requests, which are then settled according to a set of simple rules. The model features the main elements of a real-life system, including a central bank acting as liquidity provider, and a simplified money market. A simulation exercise using synthetic data of BI-REL (the Italian RTGS) predicts the macroscopic impact of a disruptive event on the flow of interbank payments. In our reduced-scale system, three hypothetical distinct phases emerge after the disruptive event: 1) a liquidity sink effect is generated and the participants' liquidity expectations turn out to be excessive; 2) an illusory thickening of the money market follows, along with increased payment delays; and, finally 3) defaulted obligations dramatically rise. The banks cannot staunch the losses accruing on defaults, even after they become fully aware of the critical event, and a scenario emerges in which it might be necessary for the central bank to step in as liquidity provider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]