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AbstractThe ‘Price of Anarchy’ states that the performance of multi-agent service systems degrades with the agents’ selfishness (anarchy). We investigate a service model in which both customers and the firm are strategic. We find that, for a Stackelberg game in which the server invests in capacity before customers decide whether or not to join, there can be a ‘Benefit of Anarchy’, that is, customers acting selfishly can have a greater overall utility than customers who are coordinated to maximize their overall utility. We also show that customer anarchy can be socially beneficial, resulting in a ‘Social Benefit of Anarchy’. We show that such phenomena are rather general and can arise in multiple settings (e.g. in both profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing firms, in both capacity-setting and price-setting firms, and in both observable and unobservable queues). However, the underlying mechanism leading to the Benefit of Anarchy can differ significantly from one setting to another.

In many service systems, customers acting to maximize their individual utility (selfish customers) will result in a policy that does not maximize their overall utility; this effect is known as the Price of Anarchy (PoA). More specifically, the PoA, defined to be the ratio of selfish utility (the overall average utility for selfish customers) to collective utility (the overall average utility if customers act to maximize their overall average utility) is generally less than one. Of course, when the environment is fixed, the best case PoA is one, by definition of the maximization problem. However, we show that in systems with feedback, where the environment may change depending on customer behavior, there can be a Benefit of Anarchy, i.e., we can have a PoA that is strictly larger than one. We give an example based on a Stackelberg game between a service provider and customers in a singleserver queue.

The case of a 62-year-old woman who developed squamous cell carcinoma of the bladder 16 years after a kidney transplant is reported here. After the transplant, immunosuppressive therapy was maintained with cyclosporin A (200 mg/day) and the patient's serum creatinine level was 0.9 mg/dL. She was diagnosed with squamous cell carcinoma of the bladder 16 years later and underwent radical cystectomy with an orthotopic ileal neobladder. The Studer technique was used and the afferent ileal loop was anastomosed to the graft ureter. The postoperative course was uneventful. At the 6-month follow-up visit, the patient showed no evidence of recurrence. Her serum creatinine level was 1.0 mg/dL. The patient was continent during the day and the night. This case shows that the construction of an orthotopic ileal neobladder after cystectomy is safe and feasible in kidney transplant recipients.

We consider several versions of the job assignment problem for an M/M/mqueue with servers of different speeds. When there are two classes of customers, primary and secondary, the number of secondary customers is infinite, and idling is not permitted, we develop an intuitive proof that the optimal policy that minimizes the mean waiting time has a threshold structure. That is, for each server, there is a server-dependent threshold such that a primary customer will be assigned to that server if and only if the queue length of primary customers meets or exceeds the threshold. Our key argument can be generalized to extend the structural result to models with impatient customers, discounted waiting time, batch arrivals and services, geometrically distributed service times, and a random environment. We show how to compute the optimal thresholds, and study the impact of heterogeneity in server speeds on mean waiting times. We also apply the same machinery to the classical slow-server problem without secondary customers, and obtain more general results for the two-server case and strengthen existing results for more than two servers.

We consider a multiclass make-to-stock system served by a single server with adjustable capacity (service rate). At any point in time, the decision-maker must determine the capacity level, make a production decision (i.e., whether to produce an item to stock or to satisfy a backorder), and make a rationing decision (i.e., whether to satisfy a new order from stock or place it on backorder). In this article we characterize the structure of optimal capacity adjustment, production, and stock rationing policy for both finite- and infinite-horizon problems. We show that an optimal policy is monotone in current inventory and backorder levels, and we characterize its properties. In a numerical study we compare the optimal policy with heuristic policies and show that the savings from using an optimal policy can be significant.

We study the problem of dynamically allocating flexible workers to stations in tandem or serial manufacturing systems. Workers are trained to do a subset of consecutive tasks. We show that the optimal policy is often LBFS (last buffer first-served) or FBFS (first buffer first-served). These results generalize earlier results on the optimality of the pick-and-run, expedite, and bucket brigade-type policies. We also show that, for exponential processing times and general manufacturing networks, the optimal policy will tend to have several workers assigned to the same station.

Consider ncells, of which some are target cells, and suppose that each cell has a weight. The cells are killed in a sequential manner, with each currently live cell being the next one killed with a probability proportional to its weight. We study the distribution of the number of cells that are alive at the moment when all the target cells have been killed.

We consider a two-station tandem queueing system where customers arrive according to a Poisson process and must receive service at both stations before leaving the system. Neither queue is equipped with dedicated servers. Instead, we consider three scenarios for the fluctuations of workforce level. In the first, a decision-maker can increase and decrease the capacity as is deemed appropriate; the unrestricted case. In the other two cases, workers arrive randomly and can be rejected or allocated to either station. In one case the number of workers can then be reduced (the controlled capacity reduction case). In the other they leave randomly (the uncontrolled capacity reduction case). All servers are capable of working collaboratively on a single job and can work at either station as long as they remain in the system. We show in each scenario that all workers should be allocated to one queue or the other (never split between queues) and that they should serve exhaustively at one of the queues depending on the direction of an inequality. This extends previous studies on flexible systems to the case where the capacity varies over time. We then show in the unrestricted case that the optimal number of workers to have in the system is non-decreasing in the number of customers in either queue.

We give a very general reformulation of multi-actor Markov decision processes and show that there is a tendency for the actors to take the same action whenever possible. This considerably reduces the complexity of the problem, either facilitating numerical computation of the optimal policy or providing a basis for a heuristic.

We consider the dynamic scheduling of a multiclass queueing system with two servers, one dedicated (server 1) and one flexible (server 2), with no arrivals. Server 1 is dedicated to processing type-1 jobs while server 2 is primarily responsible for processing type-2 jobs but can also aid server 1 with its work. We address when it is optimal for server 2 to aid server 1 with type-1 jobs rather than process type-2 jobs. The objective is to minimize the total holding costs incurred until all jobs in the system are processed and leave the system. We show that the optimal policy can exhibit one of three possible structures: (i) an exhaustive policy for type-2 jobs, (ii) a nonincreasing switching curve in the number of type-1 jobs and (iii) a nondecreasing switching curve in the number of type-1 jobs. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which each policy will be optimal. We also explore the use of the optimal policy for the problem with no arrivals as a heuristic for the problem with dynamic arrivals.

We consider the optimal control of two parallel servers in a two-stage tandem queuing system with two flexible servers. New jobs arrive at station 1, after which a series of two operations must be performed before they leave the system. Holding costs are incurred at rate h1 per unit time for each job at station 1 and at rate h2 per unit time for each job at station 2. The system is considered under two scenarios; the collaborative case and the noncollaborative case. In the prior, the servers can collaborate to work on the same job, whereas in the latter, each server can work on a unique job although they can work on separate jobs at the same station. We provide simple conditions under which it is optimal to allocate both servers to station 1 or 2 in the collaborative case. In the noncollaborative case, we show that the same condition as in the collaborative case guarantees the existence of an optimal policy that is exhaustive at station 1. However, the condition for exhaustive service at station 2 to be optimal does not carry over. This case is examined via a numerical study.

We consider the optimal stochastic scheduling of a two-stage tandem queue with two parallel servers. The servers can serve either queue at any point in time and the objective is to minimize the total holding costs incurred until all jobs leave the system. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions under which it is optimal to allocate both servers to the upstream or downstream queue. We then conduct a numerical study to investigate whether the results shown for the static case also hold for the dynamic case. Finally, we provide a numerical study that explores the benefits of having two flexible parallel servers which can work at either queue versus servers dedicated to each queue. We discuss the results' implications for cross-training workers to perform multiple tasks.