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Extant transitional justice literature examining processes and functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have traditionally looked at the output and outcomes from an institutional level of analysis and have neglected to examine how the witness feels about his or her own participation in the process. This project provides deeper perspective from the individual level of analysis based on sequential phases of the testimony process lifecycle: the reason the witness decided to participate with the tribunal, the psychological effect of the testimonial process, and the satisfaction the witness had about their own contribution to the ICTY. I expound upon existing findings and confirm survivors of sexual assault testify more from personal reasons than out of altruistic motivations. I further examine the two competing theories that dominate the discussion of how the testimonial process normatively effects a witness and find demonstrable evidence to confirm either. I create and confirm an explanatory theory that addresses patterns of emotional states both prior to and after completion of testifying, providing a theoretical explanation of negative emotions reported by witnesses both before and after testifying. I also confirm that witnesses who identified being motivated to testify out of an obligation reported a stronger belief that their testimony helped contribute to finding justice while witnesses who participated seeking internal or personal closure believed their participation helped the tribunal establish the truth about the wars in the former Yugoslavia. These findings and information can help to inform best practices for future tribunal services as well as assist victim and witness policies.

The Syrian Civil War is an interesting case in geopolitics if one looks at the evolution of foreign fighters. What began as a demonstration in a southern village of Syria transformed into one of the most devastating conflicts of the twenty-first century. The war brought new challenges to the world as a consequence of this now almost decade-long civil war. Myriad challenges are all too apparent: refugees, terrorism, and reconstruction, among them. The focus of this thesis is on foreign fighters, which I define as those involved in foreign terrorist organizations who continually challenge international law. Prior to the Syrian civil war, foreign fighters did not have extensive support. That came only with the temporary successes of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other radical extremists during their zenith from 2014 to 2016. Today, the problem that needs to be resolved worldwide is how to handle the return of every foreign fighter as they return to their original homes. No corner of the globe is exempt since recruitment of these foreign fighters reached throughout six continents. Thousands of men and women joined ISIS, and now many will return home following the failure of the self-proclaimed caliphate. ISIS declared its caliphate in 2014, but even before then it used horrendous tactics to recruit new members and seize territory and power; indeed, other Islamic extremist groups pursued similar activities. Many of the crimes committed during the Syrian civil war—rape, massacre, ethnic cleansing, and genocide—were carried out by members recruited into these groups. That begs the questions: Will the world bring justice to the victims of this war? Can anything be done? If there is no court to hold accountable these violators of international law and international human rights, what recourse is there for holding these fighters accountable for actions that have ravaged and prolonged a conflict resulting in millions of displaced people and more than a half a million dead? This thesis aims to answer the following question: What is the most viable option for holding foreign fighters accountable when it is determined that they violated international law during the Syrian civil war? My research suggests that a new international tribunal is required, one that can hold foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war accountable for their actions. Most domestic laws stop short, deciding instead to charge a foreign fighter with membership in a terrorism organization when he/she attempts to return home. Many entities and governments point to international courts as the most viable option for rendering judgment. However, I identify several hurdles in that path, which I discuss. In sum, my research efforts lead me to a more viable approach: establishing an international tribunal through the United National Security Council. To this end, I offer specific suggestions to bring this realistic option to fruition.

The Syrian Civil War is an interesting case in geopolitics if one looks at the evolution of foreign fighters. What began as a demonstration in a southern village of Syria transformed into one of the most devastating conflicts of the twenty-first century. The war brought new challenges to the world as a consequence of this now almost decade-long civil war. Myriad challenges are all too apparent: refugees, terrorism, and reconstruction, among them. The focus of this thesis is on foreign fighters, which I define as those involved in foreign terrorist organizations who continually challenge international law. Prior to the Syrian civil war, foreign fighters did not have extensive support. That came only with the temporary successes of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other radical extremists during their zenith from 2014 to 2016. Today, the problem that needs to be resolved worldwide is how to handle the return of every foreign fighter as they return to their original homes. No corner of the globe is exempt since recruitment of these foreign fighters reached throughout six continents. Thousands of men and women joined ISIS, and now many will return home following the failure of the self-proclaimed caliphate. ISIS declared its caliphate in 2014, but even before then it used horrendous tactics to recruit new members and seize territory and power; indeed, other Islamic extremist groups pursued similar activities. Many of the crimes committed during the Syrian civil war—rape, massacre, ethnic cleansing, and genocide—were carried out by members recruited into these groups. That begs the questions: Will the world bring justice to the victims of this war? Can anything be done? If there is no court to hold accountable these violators of international law and international human rights, what recourse is there for holding these fighters accountable for actions that have ravaged and prolonged a conflict resulting in millions of displaced people and more than a half a million dead? This thesis aims to answer the following question: What is the most viable option for holding foreign fighters accountable when it is determined that they violated international law during the Syrian civil war? My research suggests that a new international tribunal is required, one that can hold foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war accountable for their actions. Most domestic laws stop short, deciding instead to charge a foreign fighter with membership in a terrorism organization when he/she attempts to return home. Many entities and governments point to international courts as the most viable option for rendering judgment. However, I identify several hurdles in that path, which I discuss. In sum, my research efforts lead me to a more viable approach: establishing an international tribunal through the United National Security Council. To this end, I offer specific suggestions to bring this realistic option to fruition.

This research project consists of four studies that examined the immediate effects and long-term implications of Western foreign policy strategies in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The crisis in SFRY in the early 1990’s began with secessionist groups conducting small-scale attacks on military and civilian infrastructures, yet it was the coercive threats of the U.S. and other western powers that escalated the violence. Although there were numerous factors that led to civil war enveloping Yugoslavia, only one causal factor of the war was a necessary condition. Study 1 is a case study analyzing the processes and effects of U.S. (as well as E.C.) foreign policy during the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis; focusing on one causal factor – the West’s strategy of coercion from 1990-91. Counterfactual theory of causation, as well as counterfactual analysis, with an emphasis on historical and logical consistency, and necessary and sufficient conditions, were utilized to support the hypothesis that the coercive strategy implemented by Western powers in the Balkans from 1990-91 was the cause of the war. The methodology used in this study is frequently utilized in case studies analyzing causes of war (as well as peace), however it has not yet been utilized to analyze the cause of the Yugoslav civil war. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on counterfactual analysis, as well as on the Yugoslav conflicts and U.S. foreign policy more broadly. Study 2 examines possible bias by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Scholars have long debated the impartiality of this institute. Some argue that the Tribunal is biased while others argue that it fairly and impartially seeks justice for all the victims of the war. The present study offers a narrower approach to the question of possible bias by examining whether certain case variables were associated with case outcomes. The results show strong evidence of an association between the ethnicity of the accused (and of the victims) and the verdict and years sentenced, which calls into question the Tribunal’s impartiality. Nonetheless, the main goal of this study was not to question or dispute its decisions but to assess the validity of certain grievances against the Tribunal. For instance, the Serbs feel the Tribunal has not delivered justice for their victims and –as a result– their ‘collective suffering’ has been disavowed by the other communities in the region as well as by the West. Western political elites have largely rejected the validity of the Serbs’ claim and have attributed their belief to a denial by the Serbs of their role in the war. Unfortunately, the contentious nature of this debate has contributed to the lack of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in the region. Study 3 extends on the issue of bias by examining the messages disseminated by the ICTY. Previous studies have demonstrated that Tribunal has made prosecutorial decisions and reached judgments based on ethnicity. Furthermore, some scholars argue that the workings of the Tribunal have aggravated tensions in the region and are the primary cause for the negative perceptions of the ICTY by many communities in the Balkans. In response, the Tribunal has largely blamed the regional media and ‘nationalist politicians’ for spreading ‘gross distortions and blatant falsehoods’ about its work. Subsequently, it created an outreach program to try to change its image in the Balkans. Using thematic analysis, this study examined the way the Tribunal has framed the Yugoslav conflicts. The results show that the Tribunal’s frame of the conflicts mirrors that of the U.S. government and Western mainstream media, indicating ethnic bias by the Tribunal. Overall, this study supports findings of framing studies, as well as empirical and critical studies on the ICTY. Finally, Study 4 examines the effects of the ongoing media demonization/dehumanization on the target group that began at the onset of the crisis in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. Recent empirical research has shown that dehumanization can have severely negative consequences. Few studies, however, have focused on the target group and those that have were experimental. To fill this void, this study focuses on the effects of dehumanization from the perspective of the target group through a real-world experience of dehumanization. Serbians and Serbian-Americans were recruited to participate in a series of focus groups and one-on-one, semi-structured interviews via Skype. The results show effects that include feelings of numbness, lethargy, a reduced tendency towards action, and lack of self-assertion; responses that are defense mechanisms against emotional distress. These results support previous studies on dehumanization. However, the most dominant themes were motivations to take action and ‘fight back,’ mainly through political engagement and mobilization. The results can essentially be boiled down to responses of ‘fight or flight,’ with the former as the most dominant. This study, therefore, adds a novel insight into the effects of dehumanization.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been both contentious and successful. By examining the ICTY from a Levinasian ethical standpoint, we might be able to understand how the court uses language to enforce ethical and moral standards upon post-war societies. Using linguistic methods of analysis combined with traditional data about the ICTY, I empirically examine the court using ordinary least squares (OLS) in order to show the impact that language has upon the court's decision making process. I hypothesize that the court is an ethical entity, and therefore we should not see any evidence of bias against Serbs and that language will provide a robust view of the court as an ethical mechanism.

International criminal tribunals rely on international support. However, in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR, international support has been uneven. I argue that this uneven support is related to the post-atrocity status of the domestic governing authority. In cases where the governing authority retains the status of victim, as in Rwanda following the 1994 Tutsi genocide, the international community has been reluctant to back the ICTR in its attempts to prosecute all participants of the 1994 genocide. In cases where the governing authority retains the status of perpetrator, as in Serbia following the Bosnian genocide of the 1990s, the international community has been more supportive of the ICTY. In cases where the post-atrocity status is mixed, as in Croatia, the backing of the international community of the ICTY has been similarly mixed.

The development of joint criminal enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been controversial since the doctrine was first created in 1997. For the judgments rendered by the ICTY to be perceived as legitimate, the doctrines used to bring charges against defendants must also be perceived as legitimate. The purpose of my thesis is to study the application of joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY and examine how the doctrine has influenced the length of sentences given. I find that joint criminal enterprise may be influencing longer sentences and the three categories of joint criminal enterprise are being used differently on defendants of different power levels. By empirically analyzing the patterns developing at the ICTY, I can see how joint criminal enterprise is influencing sentencing and the fairness of trials.

Drazen Erdemovic. The name may be unfamiliar to many outside the former Yugoslavia. The name will surely be unknown by most people outside the international community and those committed to the universal protection of human rights through criminal prosecution. Drazen Erdemovic is a confessed killer. Drazen Erdemovic has confessed to killing somewhere between seventy and one hundred unarmed Muslims in a mass execution as a member of the Bosnian Serb army in July 1995. In this regard, he is the first convicted defendant to stem from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the United Nations in 1993. He is also the first ICTY defendant to have appealed his conviction and to have received a final judgment and sentence from the Tribunal.Beyond his gruesome biography developed at Srebrenicia, Mr. Erdemovic will also be remembered for his role as a catalyst. On March 5, 1998, the ICTY sentenced Drazen Erdemovic to five years in prison for committing war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. This judgment was truly monumental as the ICTY would have to consider for the first time since its inception precisely where it would send a prisoner to serve his final sentence. Such decision had not been contemplated by an international tribunal since the vanquished defendants of World War II were housed in the Spandau and Sugamo prison facilities located in the home countries of each of the World War II defendants. In fact, at the time Drazen Erdemovic was sentenced, only two countries (Italy and Finland) had reached agreement with the Tribunal enabling ICTY prisoners to be incarcerated outside the detention facilities of the Hague. Thereafter, Norway and Sweden, in April 1998, and February 1999, respectively, joined Italy and Finland as possible hosts for ICTY prisoners.In the pages that follow, the question of detention as it relates to the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") and the forthcoming International Criminal Court ("ICC") will be addressed. As these tribunals continue to hand down guilty verdicts and accompanying sentences, the issue of detention can no longer be avoided or delayed. To date, the ICTY has issued twenty-five public indictments implicating sixty-six individual defendants, supervised the arrest and detention of forty individuals, and convicted seven men with potential sentences ranging from two and one half to forty years. Likewise, twenty-eight public indictments have been issued by the ICTR against forty-eight individuals. As of December, 1999, thirty-eight individuals remain in ICTR custody at the temporary United Nations detention facility in the Arusha prison. 20 And, the ICTR has issued guilty verdicts against five separate defendants with pronounced sentences ranging from fifteen years to life imprisonment.Through sheer necessity - the impetus having been provided by Erdemovic: the international community that has maintained and supported these war crimes Tribunals must now come together to determine where these individuals will serve their respective sentences once convicted. The legitimacy of the ICTY and ICTR requires that the issue of detention be as fully considered and as fairly implemented as every other procedural and evidentiary issue previously addressed by these Tribunals. Their much-anticipated successor institution, the ICC, will be waiting, watching and looking for guidance. Their predecessors, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials are but a distant memory - still plaguing the international community with claims of "victors' justice," imperfect sentencing and partisan politics.The time has come for detention decisions in international criminal law. We are on the verge of a new millennium. Finally, the world community has concrete plans for a permanent international criminal court. And yet, we have no idea, no plans and certainly no existing blueprint for precisely where we intend to incarcerate the individuals that we, as an international community, convict. Drazen Erdemovic, a name unfortunately relegated to historic significance, has forced the issue.