Search

Resumo: O objetivo central deste artigo é propor a inclusão da expertise de um agente prudente no procedimento do equilíbrio reflexivo, adicionando uma disposição para identificar crenças razoáveis que seriam vistas como o ponto de partida do método, o que poderia evitar as críticas de conservadorismo e subjetivismo. Para tanto, inicia-se pela análise das características centrais do método e suas principais fraquezas. Após, investigam-se as características da prudência como uma disposição para identificar os meios adequados para realizar um fim bom. De posse disso, aplica-se a prudência no procedimento, de forma que ele será executado por um agente que bem delibera, identificando crenças morais razoáveis e, depois, deve-se justificá-las com base em sua coerência com os princípios éticos e com as crenças factuais de teorias científicas relevantes. Por fim, defende-se que esse processo deliberativo é consistente com o pluralismo ético e com a democracia, podendo ser tomado como um tipo de conhecimento moral. Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent in the reflective equilibrium procedure, adding a disposition to identify reasonable beliefs that would be seen as the starting point of the method, which could avoid the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. To do so, I will begin by analyzing the central characteristics of the method and its main faults. Afterwards, I will investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition to identify the adequate means to achieve a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure, so that it will be carried out by an agent who deliberates well, identifying reasonable moral beliefs and, then, we must justify them based on their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be taken as a kind of moral knowledge.

The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential principle for making decisions when facing uncertain, but potentially severe, harm. However, there is a persistent disagreement about what the principle entails, exactly. It exists in a multitude of formulations and has potentially conflicting ideas associated with it. Is there even such a thing as ‘the precautionary principle’? This paper analyses the debate between unificationists and pluralists about ‘the PP’, arguing that the debate is hindered by neglecting the question of justification. It introduces reflective equilibrium as a method of justification, and sketches how it could be applied to justify a PP.

This thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.

Mexico is the country with the highest mortality due to ST-elevation acute myocardial infarction (STEMI), and the IMSS has therefore developed the protocol of care for emergency departments called Código Infarto (Infarction Code). In this article, aspects of translational medicine are discussed with a bioethical and comprehensive perspective.To analyze the Código Infarto protocol from the perspective of translational bioethics.A problem-centered approach was carried out through reflective equilibrium (or Rawls' method), as well as by applying the integral method for ethical discernment.The protocol of care for emergency services Código Infarto is governed by evidence-based medicine and value-based medicine; it is guided by a principle of integrity that considers six dimensions of quality for the care of patients with STEMI.The protocol overcomes some adverse social determinants that affect STEMI medical care, reduces mortality and global economic disease burden, and develops medicine of excellence with high social reach.México es el país con mayor mortalidad por infarto agudo de miocardio con elevación del segmento ST (IAM CEST), por lo que el Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social desarrolló el protocolo de atención para los servicios de urgencias denominado Código Infarto. En este artículo se discuten aspectos de la medicina traslacional con una perspectiva bioética e integral.Analizar el protocolo Código Infarto desde la perspectiva de la bioética traslacional.Se realizó una aproximación centrada en el problema a través del equilibrio reflexivo, así como la aplicación del método integral para el discernimiento ético.El protocolo de atención para los servicios de urgencias Código Infarto se rige por la medicina basada en la evidencia y la medicina basada en valores; se orienta por el principio de integridad que considera las seis dimensiones de la calidad para la atención de pacientes con IAM CEST.El protocolo supera algunos determinantes sociales adversos que afectan la atención médica del IAM CEST, disminuye la mortalidad, la carga económica global de la enfermedad y desarrolla una medicina de excelencia de alto alcance social.

It is undeniable that people have beliefs about what actions are morally right. These beliefs play an important role in guiding moral action. Is it possible however to justify beliefs about what actions are morally right? How can beliefs of this sort be justified? Sinnott-Armstrong has advanced an epistemic regress argument against the justification of moral beliefs with the consequence that moral beliefs cannot be justified. This essay addresses the issue of the justification of moral beliefs to answer the question about how moral beliefs can be justified in response to Sinnott-Armstrong’s epistemic regress argument. It argues for the plausibility of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium as an adequate method of justification of moral beliefs. Three problems arise in the attempt to show that reflective equilibrium can adequately respond to Sinnott-Armstrong’s regress argument. These are vicious circularity, arbitrariness and epistemic moral disagreement. It is shown in this essay that these problems can be satisfactorily dealt with.

Nihilism about practical reasoning is the thesis that there is no such thing as practical rationality—as rationally figuring out what to do. While other philosophers have defended a theoretically oriented version of the thesis, usually called “error theory”, a case is made for a fully practical version of it: that we are so bad at figuring out what to do that we do not really know what doing it right would so much as look like. In particular, much of our control of instrumental (or means-end) rationality is illusory, and we are almost entirely incompetent at managing the defeating conditions of our practical inferences—that is, of knowing when not to draw an apparently acceptable conclusion. If that is right, then instead of trying to reason more successfully, we should be trying to make failure pay.

This article explores, comparatively and critically, Sidgwick’s and Rawls’s reasons for rejecting desert as a principle of distributive justice. Their ethical methods, though not identical, each require giving weight to common sense convictions about justice as well as higher-level principles. Both men, therefore, need to find a substitute for desert that captures some of its content – in Sidgwick’s case ‘quasi-desert’ takes the form of an incentive principle, and in Rawls’s case a principle of legitimate entitlement. However their reasons for rejecting desert are unclear, and at points appear to rest on contestable conceptual or metaphysical claims that their methodological commitments are meant to rule out. To clarify matters, the article distinguishes between three levels at which anti-desert arguments may operate: 1) Those purporting to reveal some fundamental defect in the idea of desert itself; 2) Those purporting to show that we cannot find a coherent basis for desert, at least for purposes of social justice; 3) Those purporting to show that it is impossible for social institutions to reward people according to their deserts, no matter which basis is chosen. At each level, the arguments put forward by Sidgwick and by Rawls are shown to be unsound.

Background:Research Ethics Committees (RECs) or their equivalent review applications for prospective research with human participants. Reviewers use universally agreed principlesito make decisions about whether prospective health and social care research is ethical. Close attention to understanding how reviewers go about their decision-making work and consider principles in practice is limited.Objective:The study aimed to understand how reviewers made decisions in the contexts of meetings and to understand more about how reviewers approach their work. The purpose of this article is to draw on data and findings and to show how reflective equilibrium as a theoretical frame can (1) deepen understanding of ethics review and (2) permit a reflexive examination of the habitual processes of review.Design and participants:Methods captured the day-to-day work of the RECs. Seventeen applications were heard during eight observations. There were 12 formal interviews with reviewers (n = 12) and with researchers (n = 8) which are not reported on in this article.Ethical considerations:Organisational permission for the study was given by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) whose functions became part of the Health Research Authority (HRA) during the study. The study was given favourable opinion by the University of Salford's REC (Reference HSCR11/17).Findings:Data were analysed using constructed grounded theory resulting in eight themes which revealed attention to procedure and engagement with applications. Reflective equilibrium was used as a qualitative frame to interpret themes distilling them into three processes at work in review: emotion and intuition; imagination and creative thinking; and intuition and trust.Discussion:Reviewers went back and forth between universal principles and considered these in the contexts of each application using the above processes.Conclusions:Reflective equilibrium offers a coherent and grounded account of review work. Reflexivity in training for reviewers is essential for improving practices. The challenges reflexivity presents can be assisted by using reflective equilibrium as a tool to illuminate tacit review processes.

The purpose of this study is to test tasks that participants will—in subsequent work—complete both individually and in small groups. For the subsequent work, we will need forced binary choice reasoning tasks and thought experiments that produce a roughly equal proportion of each response. So we developed a battery of forced choice items from the intelligence, philosophy, and psychology literature that have been relatively highly cited and have been replicated. The broad research questions are as follows. Which items produced the most equal response distributions? Does performance vary depending on whether reasoning items are presented before (vs. after) thought experiments? How familiar are participants with modified versions of classic reflection test questions and thought experiments? This preliminary experiment addresses this question by randomizing participants to one of two conditions. The reflection-first condition begins with a randomized battery of reflection test questions and proceeds to a randomized battery of thought experiments. The philosophy-first condition reverses this order. (See attached survey.)

Im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit: Medien der Erkenntnis – Experimentalsysteme in Wissenschaft und Kunst –, steht die Entwicklung und Anwendung eines Analyseschemas zur Untersuchung von Experimentalsystemen in Wissenschaft und Kunst und die daraus abgeleitete Explikation von Begriffen, bezogen auf die Bereiche Handeln, Medien und Erkenntnis. Die Symbol- und Erkenntnistheorie Nelson Goodmans bieten Grundlagen zur Entwicklung des Analyseschemas, darüber hinaus bilden zentrale Elemente von Goodmans Philosophie, etwa die Theorie der Bezugnahme und die der Notation, wichtige Elemente im Analyseschema. Für die Entwicklung des Leitgedankens des Analyseschemas spielt Goodmans Auffassung des Problems der Projektion eine grundlegende Rolle. Im Analyseschema nimmt Goodmans Begriff der Exemplifikation eine zentrale Position ein. Über die Exemplifikation erschließt sich unter anderem die Praxis der Probennahme in Wissenschaft und Kunst, über die metaphorische Exemplifikation das Phänomen des Ausdrucks. Die Theorie der Notation spielt auf der Ebene der Registrierung mit ihrer analog-digital Unterscheidung eine wichtige Rolle. Die Symptome des Ästhetischen bieten differenzierte Unterscheidungen zwischen der Bezugnahme in Kunst und Wissenschaft. Der Begriff des reflexiven Gleichgewichts fungiert gleichsam als Gravitationszentrum des Analyseschemas. Alle anderen Elemente sind um und auf diesen Kern ausgerichtet und formieren sich über ihn wechselwirksam. So gelingt etwa die Formierung eines Bezugnahmesystems durch die Etablierung eines reflexiven Gleichgewichts zwischen dessen Bestandteilen Bezugnahmeschema und Bezugnahmegebiet. Dabei spielen in einem Experimentalsystem alle anderen Elemente und Ebenen, wie der Rahmen, die Probennahme und die Registrierung, in ihrem dynamischen Wechselwirken eine konstituierende Rolle. Basis für den Vergleich zwischen dem Experimentieren in Wissenschaft und Kunst ist die Probennahme über die Exemplifikation. Unterschiede wiederum können differenziert erschlossen werden über die Begriffe Symptome des Ästhetischen, Denotation und metaphorische Exemplifikation. Die Anwendung des Analyseschemas erfolgt anhand von jeweils drei Fallstudien aus den Bereichen Wissenschaft und Kunst: Entwicklung des Thermometers, Elektrodynamik, Cloud Chamber, Constables Chiaroscuro, Gerhard Richter, Mel Bochners Wittgenstein Illustrations. Die Studien zur Cloud Chamber und zu Constables Chiaroscuro verbindet der geteilte Untersuchungsgegenstand des Phänomens Wolken. Die Fallstudien sind dabei immer gegliedert in drei Abschnitte: 1: Verortung und Verbindungen im Analyseschema, 2: Analyse, 3: Schlussbetrachtung – epistemologische Implikationen. Die Analysen zu den Fallstudien aus dem Bereich Wissenschaft basieren auf bereits vorliegenden Untersuchungen von Hasok Chang zum Thermometer, Friedrich Steinle zur Elektrodynamik, Peter Galison zur Cloud Chamber. Die Analysen der Fallstudien aus dem Bereich Kunst sind eigenständige Untersuchungen. Die sechs Fallstudien bieten ganz bewusst sehr unterschiedliche Ansätze zur Verortung und zum Verbindungsverlauf im Analyseschema. Mit der damit angestrebten großen Bandbreite an Ausrichtung und Gewichtung soll die weit gefasste Leistungsfähigkeit des Analyseschemas belegt werden. Die Studien aus dem Bereich Wissenschaft beginnen am Beispiel der Entwicklung des Thermometers vergleichsweise einfach ausgelegt, die Komplexität steigert sich über die Elektrodynamik bis zur Cloud Chamber. Die umfangreichste Untersuchung bietet als Kernstück die zu Constables Chiaroscuro. Sonderrollen nehmen die Studien zu Gerhard Richter und zu Mel Bochners Wittgenstein Illustrations ein. Die Analyse zu Gerhard Richter ist vergleichsweise kurz, wird aber ergänzt um Anmerkungen zu Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Literatur zum Experiment und Ausführungen zu John Dewey. Die abschließende, ebenfalls umfangreichere Untersuchung zu Mel Bochner und Wittgenstein beleuchtet noch einmal eingehender das zentrale Problem der Projektion aus der Perspektive Wittgensteins, wobei signifikante Parallelen zu Goodman ausgewiesen werden und im Hintergrund immer gedanklich mitlaufen. Eine besondere Rolle spielen dabei neben dem Bezug zu Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen und Über Gewißheit, auf das sich Bochners Counting Alternatives beziehen, die Anmerkungen zum Experiment in Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik. Es können noch einmal Rückbezüge hergestellt werden zur Entwicklung des Leitgedankens des Analyseschemas und zu den Fallstudien zum Thermometer und zur Elektrodynamik. Im Schlussteil wird aus den Analysen eine Explikation des Begriffs des kreativen Handelns abgeleitet. Dieser wird verortet in Bezug auf die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns von Jürgen Habermas. Es wird dargelegt, in welcher Weise Experimentalsysteme in Wissenschaft und Kunst als Medien der Erkenntnis verstanden werden können und im Sinne Goodmans als Weisen der Welterzeugung.

Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the mo...

In this paper, we investigate how data about public preferences may be used to inform policy around the use of controversial novel technologies, using public preferences about autonomous vehicles (AVs) as a case study. We first summarize the recent ‘Moral Machine’ study, which generated preference data from millions of people regarding how they think AVs should respond to emergency situations. We argue that while such preferences cannot be used to directly inform policy, they should not be disregarded. We defend an approach that we call ‘Collective Reflective Equilibrium in Practice’ (CREP). In CREP, data on public attitudes function as an input into a deliberative process that looks for coherence between attitudes, behaviours and competing ethical principles. We argue that in cases of reasonable moral disagreement, data on public attitudes should play a much greater role in shaping policies than in areas of ethical consensus. We apply CREP to some of the global preferences about AVs uncovered by the Moral Machines study. We intend this discussion both as a substantive contribution to the debate about the programming of ethical AVs, and as an illustration of how CREP works. We argue that CREP provides a principled way of using some public preferences as an input for policy, while justifiably disregarding others.

Is it morally justifiable to force non-consenting pregnant women to submit to caesarean surgery to save their fetus in distress? Even though proponents and opponents largely agree on the interests at stake, such as the health and life of the fetus and the respect for bodily integrity and autonomy of pregnant women, they disagree on which moral weight to attach to these interests. This is why disagreements about the justifiability of forced caesareans tend to be pervasive and intractable. To sidestep this deadlock, we will focus on conditions that give rise to the ‘caesarean dilemma’ in the first place, namely the conflict between inherent norms and values medical professionals are committed to by virtue of being a medical professional. Using the reflective equilibrium, we will test the opponents’ and proponents’ considered judgments about forced caesareans against the norms and values they—as medical professionals—are committed to and determine whether they are coherent. Subsequently we will identify the proponents’ incoherencies between the considered judgments and norms and values they are committed to and conclude that as long as these incoherencies are in place, forced caesareans are morally impermissible.

Despite the rapidly growing literature on realism, there’s little discussion of the ideology critique of John Rawls offered by one of its leading lights, Raymond Geuss. There is little understandin...

The lingering mystery of John Rawls’s reflective equilibrium is that its nature is unclear. Rawls at times suggests he is merely describing people’s conceptions of justice, whereas at other times he implies that his reflective equilibrium is a way to justify his conception of justice. Faced with seemingly conflictual passages, most scholars privilege the justificatory ones. However, I argue that this is not an effective strategy because understanding how the descriptive and justificatory aspects of reflective equilibrium fit together is the key to unlocking its nature and actual force. This paper compares Rawls’s method to the philosophical method of later Wittgenstein in his so-called private language argument to argue how the descriptive and justificatory aspects of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium fit together. In my view, both philosophers’ methods are descriptive clarifications of our unclear conceptions. However, their clarification is not just descriptive; they also aim at their readers achieving enlightenment. Importantly, I argue, that enlightenment offers us justification of the conception resulting from their clarification. Hence, their methods are justificatory as well. Finally, I claim that this way of understanding reflective equilibrium makes us realise how Rawls could respond to a prominent objection to it.

This article makes a case for wide reflective equilibrium in doing African epistemology. It argues that on the issue of formulating a viable theory of knowledge, such an approach is more promising than the extant dominant approaches, namely the method of ethno-epistemology and the method of particularistic studies. More specifically, wide reflective equilibrium articulates a proper balance between philosophy and culture and endows a theory of knowledge with multiple sources of normativity.

Authors Andrew Bollhagen Abstract The paper takes a novel approach to a classic problem—Hempel’s Raven Paradox. A standard approach to it supposes the solution to consist in bringing our inductive logic into “reflective equilibrium” with our intuitive judgements about which inductive inferences we should license. This approach leaves the intuitions as a kind of black box and takes it on faith that, whatever the structure of the intuitions inside that box might be, it is one for which we can construct an isomorphic formal edifice, a system of inductive logic. By popping open the box we can see whether that faith is misplaced. I aim, therefore, to characterize our pre-theoretical, intuitive understanding of generalizations like “ravens are black” and argue that, intuitively, we take them to mean, for instance: “ravens are black by some indeterminate yet characteristic means.” I motivate and explicate this formulation and bring it to bear on Hempel’s Problem.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons?s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons?s main criticism.

Health insurance coverage for incarcerated citizens is generally acceptable by Western standards. However, it creates internal tensions with the prevailing justifications for public healthcare. In particular, a conceptualization of medical care as a source of autonomy enhancement does not align with the decreased autonomy of incarceration and the needs-based conceptualization of medical care in cases of imprisonment; and rejecting responsibility as a criterion for assigning medical care conflicts with the use of responsibility as a criterion for assigning punishment. The recent introduction of sofosbuvir in Germany provides a particularly instructive illustration of such tensions. It requires searching for a refined reflective equilibrium regarding the scope, limits, and justifications of publicly guaranteed care.

These reflections elaborates the theory of The Idea of Human Rights by addressing a topic that theory attempts to bracket: international and regional judicialization in the form of international courts and tribunals. Using the method of reflective equilibrium, the article argues that this exclusion is inconsistent. Including these international courts and tribunals (‘ICs’) prompts several changes to the original theory, and opens new research questions. The original theory is on the one hand too narrow regarding both the objectives and tools of international mechanisms of corrective concern. The account should consider further subsidiary modes of support. On the other hand the theory is too broad, in that it gives insufficient guidance to the judges of ICs and others able to effect changes. This leaves the theory incomplete, and open to similar criticism as the book raised against others. Accounts of the theory presented in The Idea of Human Rights,and of ICs and their roles regarding human rights allow us to explore some implications of ICs for The Idea of Human Rights.We then consider how if at all The Idea of Human Rights can guide international judges.

Moral realism is the doctrine that some propositions asserting that some action is ‘morally’ good (obligatory, bad, or wrong) are true. This paper examines three different definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good (with corresponding definitions for ‘morally’ obligatory, bad, or wrong) which would make moral realism a clear and plausible view. The first defines ‘morally good as ‘overall important to do’; and the second defines it as ‘overall important to do for universalizable reasons’. The paper argues that neither of these definitions is adequate; and it develops the view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau that we need a definition which is partly in terms of paradigm examples of morally good actions, which they call ‘moral fixed points’. Hence the third and final definition is that an action is morally good if it is ‘overall important to do because this follows from a fundamental universalizable principle, belonging to a system of such principles which includes almost all the moral fixed points; when a suggested fundamental principle is one which would be shown to be very probably true by the exercise of reflective equilibrium over many centuries’.

This article aims to stimulate dispute about the justification of Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic reading of John Rawls. Offering a close, methodically point-for-point textual engagement, I shall propose that Ricœur’s misreading of certain hermeneutic circularities in Rawls is owed to some confusion about the role of the procedural nature of Rawls’ theory. Generally speaking, the problems with Ricœur’s interpretations center on the question of whether there is something “pre-understood” within the formal theoretical understanding of the procedural theory of justice and the substantive convictions and judgments that figure within the reflective equilibrium of deliberations about the terms of justice. Arguably, Ricœur has not made a satisfactory case that the difference and liberty principles are considered convictions that anticipate their discovery and establishment. Ultimately, Ricœur has not demonstrated that there is a single presuppositional form that renders Rawls’ procedure self-defeating. Instead, he has proposed to us several potential forms of damaging presupposition, each of which is based on a questionable reading of Rawls’ text.

We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.

Courts are committed to promoting the diachronic integrity of legislative bodies, whether or not the latter are devoted to it. Such commitment materializes through theories of statutory interpretation that assume the law forms a consistent, coherent and complete whole. Courts assume that legislative bodies already —and have always— abided by ‘diachronic integrity’, that is, a commitment to consistency and coherence over a series of legislative decisions. Yet, contrary to this assumption, legislatures do not do so. Legislative bodies may change their mind over time. I argue that a realistic respect for diachronic legislative integrity should account for the dynamism of legislative activity. Whereas a ‘static’ account assumes that legislative bodies have reached some sort of reflective equilibrium where each piece of legislation is consistent and coherent with the others, a ‘dynamic’ account understands that legislative bodies are instead in an ongoing process of building this consistency and coherence and revising their judgments and principles upon learning new information, discovering undesirable outcomes and changing decision makers. Such a dynamic judicial approach to diachronic legislative integrity is more respectful of democracy.

Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls’s view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal or idealizing and conception-applying). It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in public justification.

Reflective equilibrium (RE) has been criticized for various reasons ever since the publication of Rawls’A Theory of Justice. Recent empirical research into moral decision-making poses new challenges to RE because it questions the reliability of moral intuitions. This research might discredit moral intuitionism in general and RE in particular insofar as it ascribes epistemic value to moral intuitions. These findings suggest, for instance, that moral intuitions vary with cultural background, gender or framing. If it could be shown that all or certain kinds of moral intuitions are unreliable, this would diminish the plausibility of the claim that they provide good reasons to believe in the truth of their content, especially given the growing evidence that professional philosophers are just as biased and susceptible to distorting factors as lay people. In this paper I critically discuss three recent defenses of RE against this unreliable intuitions objection (UIO). Two of these defenses argue that the UIO misses its target, because RE does not depend on intuitions, or because the relevant considered judgments in RE are not intuitions. The third defense grants that RE depends on intuitions and that some Rawlsian considered judgments are intuitions. But it argues that the notion of considered judgments can be revised, and that wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) has the means to adopt the criticism because it can use information about unreliable intuitions and exclude those from further consideration. I argue that the first two defenses do not succeed. The third defense is the most promising one. However, I argue that this defense also fails. In this defense, RE is not a distinctive moral epistemic theory: different versions of RE would be conceivable, all of which are deeply problematic. I conclude with a discussion of the broader philosophical implications of the UIO, specifically whether or not accepting the UIO would warrant skepticism regarding moral knowledge.

Neopragmatist epistemology rejects any significant distinction between ethics and the sciences. The idea is that in ethics, we acquire knowledge in similar ways as in the natural sciences. Quine/Duhem holism applies to both fields, which explains why the aim of reaching reflective equilibrium is prominent in many meta-ethical accounts: As in the sciences, our ethical system of belief is constrained by logic, observation, coherence, simplicity and parsimony. Whereas considerations of beauty (an important ingredient of scientific methodology) are irrelevant in ethical epistemology, emotions play an essential role; these, in turn, do not matter in the sciences.

Avner de-Shalit has devised a methodology for coming closer to a settled view in political philosophy which he calls ‘public reflective equilibrium’, extending ideas of John Rawls and Michael Walze...

I am sympathetic to Avner de Shalit’s position that a political philosophy should incorporate public values, but I see their role differently. Philosophers of science standardly distinguish between...

In this paper, I outline two concerns regarding Avner de Shalit’s proposal for a public reflective equilibrium. Firstly, de Shalit's work suggests a division between the philosopher and the people....

I would like to begin by expressing my sincere and profound thanks to all those who suggested criticism and comments to my paper. As I write this reply, like many around the world, I am at home, in...

Background Shared decision-making (SDM) is often considered the ideal for decision-making in oncology. Views of specific groups such as ethnic minorities have seldom been considered in its development. Aim In this study we seek to assess in oncology if there is a need for adaptation of the current SDM model to ethnic minorities and to formulate possible adjustments. Design This study is embedded in empirical bioethics, an interdisciplinary approach integrating empirical data with ethical reasoning to formulate normative conclusions regarding a practice. For the empirical social scientific part, a cross-sectional qualitative study will be conducted; for the ethical reflection the Reflective Equilibrium will be used to develop a coherent view on the application of SDM among ethnic minorities in oncology. Method Semi-structured interviews combined with visual methods (timelines and relational maps) will be held with healthcare professionals (HCPs), ethnic minority patients, and their relatives to identify values steering the behavior of these actors in SDM. In addition, focus groups (FGs) will be held with ethnic minority community members to identify value structures at the group level. Respondents will be recruited through organizations with access to ethnic minorities and collaborating hospitals. Data will be analyzed using a reflexive thematic analysis through the lens of Schwartz’s value theory. The results of the empirical phase will be included in the RE to formulate possible adjustments of the SDM model, if needed. Discussion The integration of empirical data with ethical reflection is an innovative method in decision-making. This method enables a systematic and profound assessment of the need for adaptation of SDM and the formulation of theoretically and empirically based suggestions for adaptations of the model. Findings of this study may enrich the SDM model.

Neural language models (NLMs) are susceptible to producing inconsistent output. This paper proposes a new diagnosis as well as a novel remedy for NLMs' incoherence. We train NLMs on synthetic text corpora that are created by simulating text production in a society. For diagnostic purposes, we explicitly model the individual belief systems of artificial agents (authors) who produce corpus texts. NLMs, trained on those texts, can be shown to aggregate the judgments of individual authors during pre-training according to sentence-wise vote ratios (roughly, reporting frequencies), which inevitably leads to so-called discursive dilemmas: aggregate judgments are inconsistent even though all individual belief states are consistent. As a remedy for such inconsistencies, we develop a self-training procedure—inspired by the concept of reflective equilibrium—that effectively reduces the extent of logical incoherence in a model's belief system, corrects global mis-confidence, and eventually allows the model to settle on a new, epistemically superior belief state. Thus, social choice theory helps to understand why NLMs are prone to produce inconsistencies; epistemology suggests how to get rid of them.

When faced with an emergency situation, politicians are often forced to sacrifice their core moral principles in order to better serve the immediate public interest. This is commonly described as the Dirty Hands dilemma. Dirty Hands theorists conditionally defend politicians, but they leave the dilemma under-defined. Realists think that politicians do not even need defence, but their approach is overly relativistic and fails to distinguish between moral and immoral exercises of political authority. The present study critically engages with both sides of the debate in two parts. First, I use the method of conceptual analysis — and specifically conceptual disambiguation — to find out how each side conceives of the nature of the Dirty Hands dilemma. I find that (1) the dilemma emerges when a politician is forced to disregard the core human rights of certain individuals or groups to safeguard similar rights of others, and (2) the Realists fail to distinguish the concept of Dirty Hands from the concept of Political Compromise and Dirty Hands dilemmas from ordinary moral dilemmas. Second, using the method of reflective equilibrium, I advance the normative judgement that, instead of expressing guilt and paying the price, politicians should commit to not making their actions easy precedents when they confront a Dirty Hands dilemma. This study offers a better theoretical understanding of the Dirty Hands dilemma and a practical approach to distinguishing between moral and immoral exercises of political authority.

This paper presents, defends and applies a conception of public health ethics as focused on liberty-limiting public health action. This approach has been persistently criticised, but the criticism is ambiguous between two challenges: that the focus on liberty makes an objectionable presumption in favour of liberal values and that the focus on liberty fails to address institutionalised social injustice. Part One of the paper addresses both challenges to show they can be met by a nuanced account of a liberty-oriented public health ethics. Part Two establishes that debates about policy responses to the current Covid-19 pandemic illustrate and vindicate this conception of public health ethics as focused on liberty-limiting public health action. The discussion then turns to the methodological question as to how public health policies are to be evaluated, focusing particular on the role of normative theory in such evaluations. The methodology of ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ is described and endorsed; the paper ends with a case study to illustrate this evaluative methodology, focused on the ethics of COVID-19 immunity passports.

Uma tendência recente da filosofia da lógica, sob a designação de “antiexcepcionalismo lógico”, propõe que a epistemologia da lógica deve ser aproximada à das ciências: teorias lógicas não são justificadas por intuições a priori, mas ao invés, como nas outras ciências, por evidências a posteriori ou empíricas. Como exatamente a relação entre lógica e ciência será desenvolvida por um anti-excepcionalista ainda há de ser determinada. Uma abordagem preferida por muitos é adotar o “método abdutivo” para selecionar a melhor teoria lógica. É argumentado aqui que tal abordagem não é livre de problemas. Anti-excepcionalismo lógico não deveria suceder ou fracassar nos métodos do abdutivismo lógico, ou de qualquer método de revisão de teorias em particular. Ao invés de definir o anti-excepcionalismo em termos da aplicação do método científico de revisão de teorias à logica, a presente tese propõe definí-lo apenas em termos de revisão racional de teorias. Tal definição permite que diferentes visões ontológicas e metodológicas se enquadrem no escopo do antiexcepcionalismo. A presente tese articula o que seria revisão racional de teorias lógicas para além do abdutivismo lógico. A recent trend in the philosophy of logic, under the title of “anti-exceptionalism”, proposes that the epistemology of logic should be approximated to that of science: logical theories are not justified by a priori intuitions, but rather, as in the other sciences, by a posteriori (or empirical) evidence. How exactly the relation of logic and science is to be fleshed out by the anti-exceptionalist remains to be determined. An approach favored by many is to adopt “the abductive method” to select the best logical theory. This approach is not without its problems, or so it is argued herein. Anti-exceptionalism should not stand or fall on the merits of logical abductivism, or those of any method of theory revision in particular. Rather than defining antiexceptionalism in terms of applying the scientific methodology of theory revision to logic, the present thesis proposes to define it simply in terms of rational theory revision. Such definition allows for divergent ontological and methodological views to fall under the scope of anti-exceptionalism. The present dissertation articulates what rational theory revision of logic looks like beyond logical abductivism.

Ce mémoire cherche à porter au jour les présupposés normatifs substantiels de la théorie de la justice comme équité (TJÉ) de John Rawls. Plus précisément, il tente de déduire puis de définir ses présupposés éthiques, c’est-à-dire ce qu’elle tient implicitement pour être des biens constitutifs de la justice. En supposant l’existence d’éléments normatifs se rapportant à la question du bien en amont des normes du juste, cette proposition de recherche contredit en elle-même le trait essentiel du déontologisme procédural rawlsien, soit la primauté du juste (right) sur le bien. Nous suivons en cela Paul Ricœur et réitérons sa thèse du primat de l’éthique, entendue comme visées à propos du bien, sur la morale, comprise comme normes à visées universelles définissant des obligations. Selon cette thèse, toute norme morale s’ancre nécessairement dans un sens éthique qui la précède ou, pour le dire dans les mots de Rawls, dans un sens de la justice. Nous tentons en premier lieu de démontrer que deux présupposés éthiques, en tant qu’idéaux non thématisés, règlent pourtant de bout en bout toute la modélisation théorique de la TJÉ. On pourrait ainsi dire qu’ils sont les points fixes normatifs les plus élémentaires du sens de la justice opérant l’équilibre réfléchi. Il s’agit des présupposés de l’autodétermination des personnes et de la réciprocité symétrique. Ensuite, à l’aide de ce que Ricœur nommait sa « petite éthique », laquelle se trouve en dialogue explicite avec Rawls, nous nous efforçons de préciser les visées originaires à propos du bien donnant force de norme à chacun des deux présupposés éthiques. Une fois la particularité du sens de la justice à l’origine de la TJÉ ainsi exposée et précisée, il sera possible de prendre la mesure des impasses théoriques et pratiques auxquelles se bute forcément une théorie politique dont l’ambition de fonder la légitimité politique sur l’entente mutuelle s’autorise de la prétention à éviter les questions controversées à propos du bien., This thesis seeks to bring to light the substantial normative presuppositions of the theory of justice as equity (TJE) of John Rawls. More precisely, it tries to deduce and define its ethical presuppositions, that is to say what it implicitly considers to be constitutive goods of justice. In assuming the existence of normative elements that pertain to the question of the good prior to the norms of justice, this research proposal in itself questions the essential feature of Rawlsian procedural deontologism, namely the primacy of the right over the good. In this regard we follow Paul Ricœur, as we reiterate his thesis on the primacy of ethics, understood as ends relatives to the good, on morality, understood as universal norms defining obligations. According to this thesis, any moral norm is necessarily anchored in an ethical aim that precedes it or, to put it in Rawls' words, in a sense of justice. We first attempt to demonstrate that two ethical presuppositions, as non-thematized ideals, nevertheless govern from end to end all the theoretical ordering of the TJE. We could thus say that they are the most elementary normative fixed points of the sense of justice operating the reflective equilibrium. These are the assumptions of self-determination of people and symmetrical reciprocity. Then, using what Ricœur called his "petite éthique", which is in explicit dialogue with Rawls, we attempt to specify the original aims of the good which give normative potency to each of the two ethical presuppositions. Once the particularity of the sense of justice at the origin of the TJE is thus exposed and clarified, it will be possible to recognize the theoretical and practical shortcomings that a political theory that claims to avoid controversial questions about the good in order to justify the possibility of reaching mutual understanding will inevitably encounter.

I argue that theoretical developments in the study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) should occur alongside progress in moral psychology, particularly moral cognition. More specifically, I argue that Universal Moral Grammar (UMG), a model positing an innate, regulative, and universal moral faculty characterizable in terms of rules and principles, fulfills the role of the foundational model needed to usefully conceptualize the UDHR. As such, I provide a detailed account of UMG against competing models in moral psychology. Furthermore, I combine UMG with Talbott’s Historical-Social Process of Moral Discovery and Rawls’s reflective equilibrium to show how the UDHR represents a major development in moral exploration, one indicating a more penetrative look into the inner moral nature of humans that attempts to reach, but does not attain, one interpretation of reflective equilibrium tied to cognitive moral psychology.

I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle (and modifying elsewhere accordingly) to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic.

To understand something involves some sort of commitment to a set of propositions comprising an account of the understood phenomenon. Some take this commitment to be a species of belief; others, such as Elgin and I, take it to be a kind of cognitive policy. This paper takes a step back from debates about the nature of understanding and asks when this commitment involved in understanding is epistemically appropriate, or ‘acceptable’ in Elgin’s terminology. In particular, appealing to lessons from the lottery and preface paradoxes, it is argued that this type of commitment is sometimes acceptable even when it would be rational to assign arbitrarily low probabilities to the relevant propositions. This strongly suggests that the relevant type of commitment is sometimes acceptable in the absence of epistemic justification for belief, which in turn implies that understanding does not require justification in the traditional sense. The paper goes on to develop a new probabilistic model of acceptability, based on the idea that the maximally informative accounts of the understood phenomenon should be optimally probable. Interestingly, this probabilistic model ends up being similar in important ways to Elgin’s proposal to analyze the acceptability of such commitments in terms of ‘reflective equilibrium’.

According to an influential characterisation of reflective equilibrium, it is a kind of algorithm for licensing explicitly normative claims in philosophical inquiries. Call this the machine-view of reflective equilibrium. The machine-view implies a causal relation between input and output data that is devoid of human agency in any significant sense. In this paper, I argue for a neo-Aristotelian alternative view. According to this view, the judgement that is called forth in the decision procedure of reflective equilibrium is a rational response of an epistemic agent, which integrates the whole of her character as a knower, both cognitive and affective, and which cannot be reduced to the explicit following of rules or an algorithm. Unlike the machine-view, this alternative account is able to support the dynamic structure and the normative status of the decision procedure.

Reflective equilibrium is a powerful and popular method of theory evaluation. This article argues that the judgments of coherence required by the method are unexplained by the going accounts of reflective equilibrium and that they are best understood as a species of judgments of beauty. It argues that the distinctive feature of judgments of beauty is that they are unprincipled and yet nevertheless possible and that judgments of coherence share this distinctive feature. This conclusion entails that reflective equilibrium is a partially aesthetic method of theory evaluation and that part of using the method is evaluating candidate theories by their beauty.