War manifests itself as an intergroup conflict, regardless of the motivations or groups involved. American Psychological Association (APA) defined intergroup conflict as a disagreement or confrontation between two or more groups and their members that may involve interpersonal, psychological, or physical violence (Cricenti et al., 2022). So, if a threat is believed to be related to personal safety or towards the country, conflict might lead to an ingroup and outgroup classification, resulting in support for aggressive polices toward the outgroup (Cricenti et al., 2022). We define intergroup bias as the systematic disposition of individuals to favorably evaluate their own membership group (the "ingroup") over a group to which they do not belong (the "outgroup") (Hewstone et al., 2002; Tajfel, 1970). Therefore, one's own ingroup's positive actions are interpreted as arising from the members' innate dispositions, whereas similar positive actions by the outgroup are seen as situational in nature. The outgroup was forced to act positively by the circumstance, whereas the ingroup did so because of its inherent nature. Contrarily, negative behavior by an ingroup is thought to be situational ("forced to be bad"), whereas negative behavior by an outgroup supports stereotypes of outgroup members as terrible actors (Lyall et al., 2013). A similar process occurred during Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014: War enhanced pro-home identity, strengthening the link between Ukrainian citizens and the state across ethnic groups (Erlich & Garner, 2021). Regardless of ethnicity, a newly salient, hostile outgroup emphasizing the value of civic identity contributed to higher levels of pro-home-state identity (Saideman & Ayres 2008). From a European perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 had a significant and long-lasting positive influence on EU identity among European citizens. It was linked to increased trust in EU institutions and support for common policies (Gehring, 2022). We suggest that the current Russia-Ukraine conflict has exacerbated these processes, so that European citizens have responded to the conflict’s outbreak by strengthening their European identity, seeing Europe (and Ukraine, which has highlighted its pro-European values and applied for membership of the European Union by the end of February 2022, after Russia's invasion) as the ingroup, and Russia (with the set of values that this state represents) as the outgroup. As a result, our goal is to investigate the individual’s perception of Russia and Ukraine after the outbreak of the war, by measuring the degree to which the two countries are implicitly and explicitly associated with the concept of War and Peace in a sample of Italian participants. Even if the conflict has taken on the meaning of a war, with attacks and counterattacks from both sides (so both countries should be equally associated to the construct of War and Peace), implicit and explicit associations could be influenced by Italian participants’ ingroup (Europe/Ukraine) vs outgroup (Russia) bias, considering the two countries differently involved and responsible for the ongoing conflict. Moreover, explicit (but not implicit) associations could be more sensitive to conscious citizens' willingness to endorse a specific narrative of reality and the framework of values that it implies, which sees the conflict between Ukraine and Russia as a clash between European values and anti-democratic values, leading to a dissociation between explicit and implicit measures. The idea that could exist a dissociation between implicit and explicit associations is consistent with the literature: Research on implicit social cognition showed how implicit and explicit attitudes correlation was markedly lower when participants considered the research topic social sensitive (in other words, when participants were very concerned about the impression that the self-report response would make on others); for example, according to Erlich and Garner (2021), examining attitudes toward the home state and the aggressor during wartime, presented a significant methodological challenge because these are the opinions that respondents are most likely to falsify. In times of conflict, survey respondents may feel considerable pressure to express support for their home country and hostility toward the adversary, especially if the question is posed by a researcher they have just met. Moreover, Falvo and coll. (2013) hypothesized that implicit associations may reflect the cultural context and public debate rather than personal beliefs, partially explaining the dissociation between implicit and explicit measures. Literature provides numerous examples of the importance of using both implicit and explicit methods to conduct a thorough investigation of how citizens perceive nations and conflicts, particularly in polarized international debates where individual opinions may be influenced by social desirability, such as the Russia-Ukraine war. To illustrate, Ugarriza and coll. (2022) used an Implicit Association Test to assess the intergroup prejudice among war victims, guerillas and paramilitaries involved in the Colombian armed conflict, with a focus on the victimization experience and the processes involved in the post-war reconciliation. Falvo and coll. (2013) investigated the correspondence between explicit and implicit images of USA among Italians with different political orientation, finding a dissociation in how people perceive explicitly and implicitly USA , particularly among left-wing participants. Implicit measures have also been used to investigate the role of ethnic identity in the home-state bias during wartime (Erlich & Garner, 2021). Specifically, an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) was used to evaluate pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia attitudes among Ukraine citizens (after Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014), hypothesizing that Ukraine’s self-identified ethnic Russian minority could show stronger explicit pro-Ukraine attitudes because of social desirability, but weaker and even opposite implicit attitudes (Erlich & Garner, 2021). Focusing on our study, the IAT is thus a suitable method to investigate implicitly the association between Russia, Ukraine, War and Peace. The IAT is an implicit method aiming to assess the strength of associations among concepts (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). The label “implicit” refers to the properties of the measure, that reveals the construct indirectly and implicitly (Greenwald et al., 2020), outside conscious awareness, addressing to the problem of “social desirability bias”, defined as participants’ reticence to express certain attitudes considered inappropriate and socially undesirable (Mo, 2015). The IAT measures associations between constructs in a relative rather than absolute way, thus being particularly useful for the purposes of this study. Ingroup-outgroup bias could also moderate beliefs about responsibility and blame for past actions toward the individual and the group, so that outgroup members’ actions are more blamed than the ingroup members’ ones, even in the war context (Lyall et al., 2013). If people tend to blame more outgroup actions and to favor members of one’s own group (Hewstone, 2002), we can suppose that the strength of the conscious ingroup-outgroup bias (reflected particularly in the explicit associations between Russia/Ukraine and War/Peace) could be correlated with the judgment of justifiability of Russia actions (as the outgroup, Russia should be blamed more when the ingroup-outgroup bias is stronger), and with the degree of agreement with the military and economic support of Ukraine (Ukraine should be considered as the ingroup, so participants with stronger ingroup-outgroup bias should be more favorably to help Ukrainian citizens). The judgment of justifiability of Russia actions could be considered as a specific attitude toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The literature highlighted that two constructs, the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the generalized attitude toward war, are positive predictors of attitudes toward specific wars (Pratto et al., 1994; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). SDO was defined by Pratto et coll. (1994) as "the extent to which one desires that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups" (p. 742). SDO could be considered the psychosocial foundation for the development of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths-attitudes, values, beliefs, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for practices that result in unequal social value allocation among social groups (Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). Moreover, previous research identified social dominance orientation as an important determinant of the generalized attitude toward war (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; McFarland, 2005; Cohrs et al., 2005).