1. Do rules breed rules?
- Author
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Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Wesley Kaufmann, Research programme I&O, Research Group: Public Governance, Public Governance, and Tilburg Institute of Governance
- Subjects
PERCEPTIONS ,Public Administration ,GOAL AMBIGUITY ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Public administration ,Interview data ,EUROPEAN-UNION ,Perception ,0502 economics and business ,050602 political science & public administration ,Economics ,media_common.cataloged_instance ,Energy market ,Business and International Management ,European union ,ALIENATION ,media_common ,FORMALIZATION ,Government ,Public economics ,MEMBER STATES ,Member states ,05 social sciences ,RED TAPE ,0506 political science ,ENERGY MARKET ,US FEDERAL-AGENCIES ,Law ,GOVERNMENT ,050203 business & management ,Organizational level - Abstract
Understanding where (ineffective) organizational rules come from is of vital importance for both public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms that explain why external rules may cause organizational rule breeding and, as a by-product, red tape. Using a combination of archival and interview data, the authors empirically study rule-breeding processes in the case of Gasunie, which is a heavily regulated Dutch gas transport organization. The archival findings indicate that rule stocks have increased substantially over time at every policy level. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that policymakers at different levels are jointly responsible for excessive rule breeding and, ultimately, organizational red tape.
- Published
- 2018
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