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O artigo discute o papel que o comércio digital pode exercer sobre a construção de circuitos de comercialização de alimentos mais sustentáveis e que promovam, entre outros aspectos, (re)conexões, tanto entre espaços, quanto entre agentes envolvidos no sistema alimentar. Diante da forte concentração comercial exercida pelos supermercados e das dificuldades de acesso ao mercado para produtos e agentes que promovem sistemas alimentares alternativos, buscamos compreender como o comércio digital pode ser mobilizado para construir redes de abastecimento mais sustentáveis e em que medida essas redes conseguem implementar princípios ambientais e sociais mais responsáveis. Buscamos produzir um recenseamento de circuitos de comercialização digital independentes no Rio de Janeiro em 2021 e 2022, com foco naqueles que mobilizam princípios da sustentabilidade na sua comunicação. Após a caracterização da sua organização e dos aspectos da sustentabilidade que invocam, realizamos entrevistas semi-estruturadas com iniciativas cujo papel principal é atuar como intermediário comercial. Os dados obtidos contribuem para a distinção de diferentes perfis de circuitos na cidade, e fornecem elementos para discutir o potencial e os limites das ferramentas digitais para fomentar sistemas alimentares sustentáveis. The paper discusses the role that digital commerce can play in the construction of more sustainable food commercialization circuits that promote, among other aspects, (re)connections, both between spaces and between agents involved in the food system. Faced with the strong commercial concentration exercised by supermarkets and the difficulties for products and agents that promote alternative food systems to access the market, we seek to understand how digital commerce can be mobilized to build more sustainable supply networks and to what extent these networks are able to implement more environmentally and socially responsible principles. We sought to produce a census of digital marketing circuits independent of the large distribution networks in Rio de Janeiro in 2021 and 2022, focusing on those that mobilize principles of sustainability in their communication. After characterizing their organization and the aspects of sustainability they invoke, we conducted semi-structured interviews on initiatives whose main role is to act as a commercial intermediary. The data obtained contributed to the distinction of different profiles of circuits in the city and discuss the potential and limits of digital tools to foster sustainable food systems. L'article étudie le rôle que le commerce numérique peut jouer dans la construction de circuits de commercialisation alimentaire plus durables qui favorisent, entre autres, les (re)connexions, à la fois entre les espaces et entre les agents impliqués dans le système alimentaire. Compte tenu de la forte concentration commerciale exercée par les supermarchés et des difficultés d'accès au marché pour les produits et les agents qui favorisent les systèmes alimentaires alternatifs, nous cherchons à comprendre comment le commerce numérique peut être mobilisé pour construire des réseaux d'approvisionnement plus durables et dans quelle mesure ces réseaux peuvent mettre en œuvre des principes environnementaux et sociaux plus responsables. Nous avons recensé les circuits de commercialisation numérique indépendants des grands réseaux de distribution à Rio de Janeiro en 2021 et 2022, sélectionnant ceux qui mobilisent les principes de durabilité dans leur communication. Après avoir caractérisé leur organisation et les aspects de durabilité que ces circuits invoquent, nous avons mené des entretiens semi-directifs avec des initiatives qui joue un rôle d'intermédiaires commerciaux. Les données obtenues contribuent à distinguer différents profils de circuits dans la ville et ouvrent une discussion sur le potentiel et les limites des outils numériques pour favoriser des systèmes alimentaires durables.

We present a model of duopoly competition in a marketplace with a llotelling segment of consumer& where two business users (firms) have access to raw consumer data. The firms can chase between personalized prim (PP). using a costly personalized program device provided by the marketplace. or tunform prices at no additional cost. One firm has a higher level of experience in utilizing consumer data. insulting in a lower cost of price personalization (PP device cost). In order to promote its personalized program device, the marketplace may have an incentive to distort consumer preferences from a uniform to a triangular distribution. Our findings indicate that the marketplace is more likely to distort consumer preferences under specific conditions. This occurs when there is moderate asymmetry in experience between the rums and a high tariff for the program. or when there is weak asymmetry and a moderate program tariff. In these parameter regions, the distortion of COD/411111er preferences negatively impact the profits of the sellers while benefiting the consumers. nose insights contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of digital marketplaces and have implications for policymakers and competition authorities., This research has been financed by Portuguese public funds, through Norte 2020, FEDER and FCT(projects reference NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540 and FCT2022.03862.PTDC).

Η διπλωματική αυτή εργασία ασχολείται με την διερεύνηση των περιπτώσεων αντιτράστ στις ψηφιακές αγορές. Ο όρος τραστ αναφέρεται συνήθως σε έναν ιδιαίτερο τύπο οικονομικής ένωσης, όπου ένας αριθμός επιχειρήσεων συγχωνεύονται μεταξύ τους με σκοπό να δημιουργήσουν μία ενιαία επιχειρηματική οντότητα με σημαντική δύναμη αγοράς. Η αύξηση της δύναμης αυτής μπορεί να δημιουργήσει στρεβλώσεις στον ανταγωνισμό της αγοράς για αυτό και είναι απαραίτητη η σύσταση από το κράτος ειδικών επιτροπών ρύθμισης του ανταγωνισμού αυτού. Τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες, οι εταιρείες στον κλάδο της ψηφιακής τεχνολογίας απέκτησαν σημαντική δύναμη αγοράς χάρη στην πρόοδο της τεχνολογίας αυτής αλλά και στην ψηφιοποίηση μεγάλου μέρους των δραστηριοτήτων τους. Κάποιες φορές, ορισμένες από τις εταιρείες αυτές βρέθηκαν αντιμέτωπες με τη δικαιοσύνη για πολιτικές ή πρακτικές τους οι οποίες θεωρήθηκαν ότι στρεβλώνουν τον ανταγωνισμό. Στην εργασία αυτή εξετάστηκαν έξι μελέτες περίπτωσης αντιτραστ τεσσάρων εταιρειών στα πλαίσια της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ: της Google (2017, 2018, 2019) για τη πρακτική του self-preferencing, πολιτικών αποκλειστικότητας και διάκρισης τιμών στα προϊόντα και τις υπηρεσίες της και κατάχρησης της δύναμης αγοράς της αντίστοιχα, της Apple (2020) για τις πρακτικές self-preferencing και πολιτικών αποκλειστικότητας και διάκρισης τιμών στα προϊόντα και τις υπηρεσίες της, της Amazon (2020) για τις πρακτικές πρόσβασης σε μη δημόσια δεδομένα και της προνομιακής μεταχείρισης των υπηρεσιών της εις βάρος των ανταγωνιστών της και της Facebook (2021) για τη πρακτική της χρήσης δεδομένων από πωλητές που διαφημίζονται στο Facebook Marketplace. Σε όλες τις μελέτες διαπιστώνεται σημαντική απόκλιση των εταιρειών από τους κανόνες αντιτράστ της ΕΕ., This master thesis deals with the investigation of antitrust cases in digital markets. The term 'trust' usually refers to a particular type of economic association where a number of businesses merge together to create a single business entity with significant market power. The increase of this power can create distortions in the market competition for this and it is necessary for the state to set up special commissions for the regulation of this competition. In recent decades, companies in the digital technology industry have gained significant market power thanks to the advancement of this technology and the digitization of a large part of their activities. At times, some of these companies have faced legal action for policies or practices deemed to distort competition. This work examined six antitrust case studies of four companies in the context of EU legislation: Google (2017, 2018, 2019) on the practice of self-preferencing, exclusivity and tying practices and abuse of market power of respectively, Apple (2020) on self-preferencing practices and exclusivity/price discrimination policies for its products and services, Amazon (2020) for its practices of accessing non-public data and of preferential treatment of its services to the detriment of its competitors, and Facebook (2021) for its practice of using data from sellers who advertise their products on Facebook Marketplace. All the studies find a significant deviation of the companies from the EU antitrust rules.

This article explores whether there is a need for ex ante regulations in digital markets. It explains implications of ex ante regulations in digital markets and focuses on the competition jurisprudence which has generated new terminologies such as ‘tipping’, ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘self-preferencing’ over the last decade, indicating that competition law easily adapts to emerging problems and sweeping ex ante regulation efforts in the digital markets might be uncalled for. In this regard, the article summarizes the on-going debate on whether competition law, as is, can sufficiently address and deliver solutions for competitive concerns in digital markets. Within this scope, the paper examines the alleged competitive concerns in digital markets and argues that it is crucial to first conduct counterfactual analysis with concrete facts, parameters and data, to identify the risks associated with over regulations. The article further contends that the competition law toolkit in place is a sufficient and more appropriate way to deal with anti-competitive conducts and the ongoing ex ante regulation efforts in digital markets are condemned to result in a decline in competition and innovation in the long run.

This article analyses the digital economy, its treatment under competition, and the need for potential regulation. The aim of this article is to answer the question, of how a legal framework looks like that, on the one hand, prevents possible undesirable developments and undesirable side effects of digitization, while not unduly preventing opportunities and suppressing positive effects. The analysis requires an examination of the proper legal framework as well as the unique characteristics of the digital economy that this legal framework must take into account. As a result, in the first part of the paper, the particular features of the digital economy are worked out in the context of existing competition legislation. Based on this, the second part investigates the need for regulation. From the scientific methods, we have used the analytical and descriptive methods to analyze the current situation. By the comparative method, we introduce different views on legal regulation. The presented topic has not been thoroughly examined in the literature on the subject thus far, giving the chance to identify avenues for future research.

The EU is taking further steps towards the regulation of the digital space. Following on the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European Commission now proposes two new regulation proposals aimed at regulating online markets and create a safer online environment, where the fundamental rights of users are protected: the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. However, it is still up for discussion how these proposals will articulate with GDPR provisions. In this study, we shall discuss the potential impact on data protection rules of the latest EU legislative push and how it intends to balance the new horizontal regulation for digital markets with already existing legislation, in particular on data protection.

Digitalna tržišta posljednjih su godina izrasla u jednu od najistaknutijih područja rasprave i analize europskog prava tržišnog natjecanja i europskog prava zaštite podataka. Takav interes za digitalna tržišta nije slučajnost, već rezultat brzog rasta nekolicine velikih poduzeća kojima, zbog njihove dominacije na tržištu, praktički nije moguće konkurirati. Kako bi riješila navedenu problematiku, Komisija je donijela Akt o digitalnim tržištima, revolucionarno rješenje prava tržišnog natjecanja i zaštite podataka koje, kako se Komisija nada, treba pomoći europskom zakonodavstvu održati korak s velikim poduzećima, takozvanim ‘nadzornicima pristupa’ – zbog njihove neprijeporne sposobnosti da svojim konkurentima priječe ulazak na mjerodavno tržište i ostala povezana tržišta. Nova je Uredba hvaljena od mnogih, ali je jednako tako probudila i brojne kritičare njenih odredbi. U namjeri da pokuša razjasniti novine koje Akt o digitalnim tržištima uvodi, njene prednosti i nedostatke, rad daje sistematičan pregled zakonodavnog okvira Uredbe i zaključak o potencijalnoj sposobnosti iste da se suoči s problematikom ograničavanja tržišnog natjecanja i nepoštene prakse nadzornika pristupa u digitalnim tržištima. Zaključak rada je kako Akt o digitalnim tržištima, iako uvodi brojne pogodnosti za krajnje korisnike, nije bez kritika. Posebice jer je pravni temelj akta, mogućnost provedbe i učinka odredaba o zaštiti podataka istog, u konačnici neizvjesno. Zaključak rada, izveden iz stajališta brojnih pravnih stručnjaka tržišnog natjecanja, jest da je prerano ustvrditi uvodi li Akt o digitalnim tržištima rješenja koja će omogućiti rješavanje problematike ograničavanja tržišnog natjecanja i nepoštene prakse nadzornika pristupa u digitalnim tržištima., Digital markets have become one of the most prominently analysed and debated areas of the European competition law and the European data protection law in recent years, not by chance, but as a result of the rapid market power growth of a few large undertakings which are practically uncontestable in their dominance. To address these issues, the Commission has adopted the Digital Markets Act, a groundbreaking piece of competition and data protection legislation which the Commission hopes will help the European regulators keep pace with the large undertakings, referred to as the ‘gatekeepers’ – due to their uncontestable ability to bar their competitors from entering their market and other linked markets. This new Regulation has received much praise, but also much ink has been spilled criticising its provisions. To help understand what the Digital Markets Act ‘brings to the table’, what its benefits and downsides are, this paper overviews the legislation and gives its conclusion on the potential capacity for the Regulation to deal with the aforementioned contestability and fairness issues within the digital markets. The paper concludes how the Digital Markets Act, while providing many new benefits to the end users, is not without critique, especially as its legal basis, ability to be properly enforced, and impact of its data protection provisions, is uncertain. Ultimately, as the paper deducts from various different legal authors’ viewpoints, it is too early to tell if this act offers additional benefits and helps resolve fairness and contestability issues in the digital markets.

Num mundo cada vez mais inovador e tecnológico, tem-se vindo a observar um crescimento exponencial das plataformas digitais. Novos negócios e novas estratégias têm vindo a emergir através do uso do big data. O acesso aos dados tornou-se essencial para o desenvolvimento das atividades económicas. Contudo, o tratamento e a análise destes também é indispensável para o progresso e sobrevivência das plataformas nestes mercados. Esta transformação digital levou a uma maior eficiência das empresas e à diminuição do seu número neste campo. Posto isto, esta dissertação estuda o contributo das plataformas digitais para o aumento da concentração no setor, como também a adaptação das medidas utilizadas pela Comissão Europeia e pela Autoridade da Concorrência ao novo mercado digital, de forma a prevenir certas estratégias de abuso. Desta forma, foram observados diversos estudos de caso. Analisou-se as empresas Google e Amazon pelo abuso da posição dominante e a fusão das empresas Facebook/WhatsApp, Apple/Shazam e Microsoft/LinkedIn. O estudo constatou que a concentração nestes casos tem vindo a acelerar, sendo que as maiores empresas têm vindo a aumentar cada vez mais o seu valor e a distorcer a competitividade. A complexidade dos dados e a diminuição da transparência, fazem surgir a necessidade de criar ferramentas para a intervenção do estado, quer para sancionar como para prevenir as estratégias de abuso de posição dominante. In an increasingly innovative and technological world, digital platforms are growing exponentially. New businesses and new strategies have been emerging through the usage of big data. Data access has become essential for the development of economic activities. However, the handling and analysis of this tool is also essential for the progress and survival of platforms in such markets. This digital transformation has led to more efficient companies and also to a reduction of their number in the market. Therefore, this dissertation studies the contribution of digital platforms to the increase of market concentration, as well as the adaptation of the measures used by the European Commission and the Competition Authority to the new digital market, in order to prevent certain abuse strategies. To this extent, several case studies were observed. The companies Google and Amazon were analyzed for abuse of dominant position as well as the merger of companies like Facebook/WhatsApp, Apple/Shazam and Microsoft/LinkedIn. The study found that market concentration has been accelerating, with the largest companies increasingly expanding their value and distorting market competitiveness. The complexity of the data and the decrease in transparency, make it necessary to create tools for state intervention, both to sanction and to prevent the abuse of dominant position strategies.

Big Data technologies have significantly increased the possibility for sellers to adopt personalisation strategies, especially in digital markets. Among such strategies, price discrimination, a practice where the same commodity is sold at different prices, either to the same customer or to different customers, stands out. Particularly, the online airline ticket market has risen the attention of economists in recent studies, both because of its specificity and of the high data availability. This manuscript enters the debate and analyses the airline ticket market in an original way. Indeed, the aim of this work is to empirically understand whether some airline companies discriminate in prices by using the customers’ data that they collect from their websites, and, if so, which is the impact on social welfare. For performing this assessment, a software that is able to automatically collect pricing data is developed and freely released. By executing the software in two time periods, tickets prices of three airlines, three itineraries, and four different user profiles are acquired. A double analysis is performed to check if customers’ information are used to discriminate (intra-user), and if different prices are offered to distinct user profiles (inter-user). Moreover, the analyses consider control data collected from the API of the Global Distribution System Amadeus, the main flight booking platform dedicated to travel agents. Upon inspection, no evidence is found in this study to support the hypothesis that airlines use price discrimination techniques.

Nowadays equity crowdfunding plays an important role in the entrepreneurial finance markets. To better understand the functioning of the industry, it is important to consider the entire equity crowdfunding process and all the actors involved. Equity crowdfunding platforms match indeed the demand of capital from entrepreneurial ventures with the supply of capital by investors. This manuscript is a first step in this direction, by (1) comparing equity crowdfunding with traditional sources of entrepreneurial finance; (2) discussing the potential and the perils of equity crowdfunding for inclusivity and democratization; (3) highlighting the role of visual information in digital finance; and (4) providing first insights on the industrial dynamics in equity crowdfunding. The paper gives researchers and practitioners orientation about recent developments in equity crowdfunding literature and provides relevant research directions.

Cataloged from PDF version of article. Thesis (Master's): Bilkent University, Department of Law, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2022. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-159). Verinin işlenmesi yoluyla önemli ekonomik menfaatler elde edilmesi, başta dijital pazarlar olmak üzere her türlü pazarda verinin elde edilmesini, işlenmesini ve akışının sağlanmasını ekonomik bir gereklilik haline getirmiştir. Bu veri kümesi içerisinde kişisel verilerin sınırsız ve ölçüsüz olarak işlenmesi kişisel verilerin korunması ihtiyacını doğurmuş, bu ihtiyaca cevap veren düzenlemelerle ilgili kişilere birtakım haklar tanınırken veri sorumlularına da bazı yükümlülükler getirilmiştir. Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Tüzüğü’nün ilk kez tanıttığı veri taşınabilirliği hakkı, bireylere kişisel verileri üzerinde daha fazla kontrol imkânı tanımaktadır. Veri taşınabilirliği hakkının, bireylerin kişisel verilerin korunması yönünden menfaatlerine etki ederken, veri sorumlularının ekonomik menfaatleri dolayısıyla pazarlardaki rekabet düzeyine yönelik etkiler göstereceği kabul edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, kişisel verilerin korunması, veri taşınabilirliği hakkı ve rekabet hukuku arasındaki çok yönlü ilişki dikkate alınarak veri taşınabilirliği hakkından ne anlaşılması gerektiği ve bu hakkın rekabeti nasıl etkileyeceği sorusu cevaplanmıştır. Obtaining significant economic benefits by processing data has made it an economic necessity to obtain, process and flow data in every market, especially in digital markets. Unlimited and unreasonable processing of personal data within this data set has created the need for the protection of personal data. With the regulations that meet this need some rights have been granted to the data subjects and some obligations have been imposed on the data controllers. The right to data portability which has been introduced for the first time by the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, gives individuals more control over their personal data. While it will affect the level of competition in the markets due to the economic interests of data controllers, it is accepted that the right to data portability will also affects the interests of individuals in terms of the protection of personal data. In this study, the question of what should be understood from the right to data portability and how the right will affect competition has been answered by considering the multifaceted relationship between the protection of personal data, the right to data portability and competition law. by Beste Yılmaz LL.M.

Over the past few years, EU and national regulators accelerated their plans to regulate digital platforms. The EU is not alone in this quest, as many other jurisdictions around the world are considering various options for regulatory intervention in digital markets. Rather than being an ‘outlier’ on this issue, Europe has a chance to set new standards in this domain, which other countries may end up emulating. In this context, the proposed EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) represents a major endeavour to tackle the concentration of economic power in the hands of large-scale Tech companies. One of its most significant features is that it marks a transition from the traditional application of ex post antitrust rules, towards an entirely new ex ante regulatory scrutiny, aimed at systematically preventing possible abuses by those platforms that can be defined as gatekeepers of entire digital ecosystems. This paper explores the pros and cons of this shift, and discusses whether the proposed enforcement of the DMA, concentrated in the hands of the European Commission, is likely to prove sufficiently effective. The author assesses whether the DMA, together with other legislative proposals presented by the European Commission over the past few months (Data Governance Act, Data Act, Digital Services Act, Artificial Intelligence Act, etc.) will pave the way for a more economically and socially sustainable digital ecosystem in the years to come.

We discuss three important cases that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has completed over the past year: First, the coronavirus pandemic has had implications for a wide range of the CMA's work; we describe the work on price gouging conducted by the CMA's Covid-19 taskforce and respond to the argument that competition authorities should not be concerned about such behaviour. Second, a number of high-profile studies have considered the appropriate application of competition policy in digital industries. The second two cases-the Online Platforms and Digital Advertising market study, and the Google/Looker merger-show the work the CMA has continued to do in this area.

Although e-commerce is relatively new, it has been the cornerstone of international trade in the modern world. Broadly, e-commerce can be described as the process of buying, selling or exchanging any kinds of products, services and information via electronic channels. The economy is one of the areas directly affected by e-commerce, and as a result of this significant impact, the concept of the digital economy has emerged. It is complicated to define the concept of the digital economy as it continues to expand in scope day by day; however, its impact can broadly be experienced in many different fields. To set an example, the occurrence of the digital economy has already caused many significant changes in many areas, such as the examination of competition issues in the markets. It has significant effects on current EU competition law understanding, and it is evident that it will continue to form future prosperity. Therefore, this article aims to explain the general dynamics of the digital economy and digital markets as an important issue being discussed in EU competition law., E-ticaret her ne kadar görece yeni bir kavram olsa da, modern dünyada uluslararası ticaretin temel taşı olmuştur. Genel olarak e-ticaret, her türlü ürün, hizmet ve bilginin elektronik kanallar aracılığıyla satın alınması, satılması veya değiş tokuş edilmesi süreci olarak tanımlanabilir. Ekonomi, e-ticaretten doğrudan etkilenen alanlardan biridir ve bu önemli etkinin bir sonucu olarak dijital ekonomi kavramı ortaya çıkmıştır. Dijital ekonomi kavramını tanımlamak gün geçtikçe kapsamı genişlemeye devam etmesi sebebiyle oldukça güçtür; ancak etkisi birçok farklı alanda geniş ölçüde deneyimlenebilir. Örnek vermek gerekirse, dijital ekonominin ortaya çıkması, piyasalardaki rekabet konularının incelenmesi gibi birçok alanda şimdiden birçok önemli değişikliğe neden olmuştur. Mevcut Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku anlayışı üzerinde önemli etkileri vardır ve gelecekte de refahı oluşturmaya devam edeceği açıktır. Bu nedenle bu makale, AB rekabet hukukunda tartışılan önemli bir konu olarak dijital ekonominin ve dijital pazarların genel dinamiklerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır.

This paper seeks to situate an understanding of the long-term implications of Smart Contract (SC) technologies as a cluster of technologies that together with AI (shorthand for software applications) and 5G (shorthand for networked ICTs) will prove important for enabling a future wherein any task may be automated. Although the "any task can be automated" future is far off and AI, 5G, and SC technologies are still evolving rapidly, this paper argues for timely consideration of the policy implications for SCs. Like those other technologies and to a perhaps even greater extent, SC technologies (which include cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and smart contracts as distinct elements) have been the focus of excessive hype that has given rise in the academic and mass media press to misconceptions about what is important about SCs that this paper seeks to identify and dispel. In an effort to start to understand the challenges and likely trajectory for SC regulation, this paper focuses on FINTECH and the policy challenges that are emerging there related to SCs. The overall conclusion is that lots more needs to be done, and while it is clear that SCs will play an important role in FINTECH's future and the regulation of that future will require significant focused research attention, it is unclear how useful such research will be as a template for addressing the challenges that will emerge as SCs migrate to other sectors where the economic implications are expected to be much larger. The paper concludes with speculations about where key trends in SC technologies seem to be going.

There is a broad consensus that the EU has great sources of power but little agreement on how and when this power is actively leveraged to shape global market regulation. Scholars have noted a widespread fragmentation and called for studies that cover multiple cases and account for how contextual factors influence strategic aims. This article responds to these calls by conceptualizing ���regime vetting��� as a technique used by the European Union to reach beyond its borders in various sectors. By coining this term, the article enables exploration of a form of active and de-centred power projection that leverages the EU���s main sources of power. The article also offers a typology of four different types of regime vetting and propositions on how internal and external contextual factors systematically shape the strategic uses of regime vetting, thereby contributing to the theoretical discussion on how ���context matters��� in shaping EU external action.

Although experimentalist governance - presented as a novel alternative to conventional hierarchical governance - has attracted attention over the past 15 years, we still know little about its real spread and scope conditions. Examining the application of competition policy to the digital sector, the article reveals that the European Competition Network and the procedures modernized in the early 2000s actually host a variety of governance processes, ranging from hierarchical development and enforcement of stable solutions at one extreme to experimentalist discretion of local actors, review of their implementation experiences, and central revisions in their light at the other. Futher, shifts from hierarchy to experimentalism might reverse. As for explanations, variation in governance processes cannot be explained by formal distributions of power, which were the same. Instead, the greater the uncertainty about solutions and the weaker the readily available coalitions in their support, the more actors favored experimentalist governance, and vice versa. The broader implications thus caution against general claims, challenge the influence of legal factors, and suggest that far from being necessarily antitethical, functional and political factors may bear together on the spread of distinct forms of governance.

Digitization has changed economic activity in many ways. While digitization has contributed to a very dynamic development of markets and competition, concerns are also being expressed about powerful positions of some companies. The digital transformation poses new challenges for companies, consumers, politics and society. Competition policy is also required to address these developments and to adapt existing competition law, if necessary. The following analysis of digital markets showed that it is not possible, in general, to make concrete competition policy statements or even to give detailed recommendations for the antitrust analysis. The aspects are to be considered separately and in detail when examining search engines, social networks, trading platforms and other business models. On the other hand, data (and data analysis) should stand in the centre of competition law analysis due to their importance for the economic success of digital market companies.

The aim of the paper is to present an insight into the challenges raised by digitalized and data-driven markets to competition policy and enforcement in the Big Data era. Focusing on the assessment of information exchange in the digitalized environment, traditional risk factors are analyized and it is argued that new risk factors can be identified. The paper provides an overview of relevant recent Hungarian case-law to examine the role of information exchange, taking place in a data environment that offers an increased amount of up-to-date and relevant market information for analysis. Further, the paper summarizes the enforcement responses to the demandside challenges raised by online platforms, user interfaces applying new approaches and practices that can directly influence consumer behavior. The consequence is drawn that the extended economic and IT-related argumentation may affect the nature of proceedings and some new phenomena, as the role of secondary intermediaries, integration of online and offline market segments open new fields for assessment.

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We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the highest investment attracts all consumers. On the one hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive element: holding fixed the behavior of its rival, a firm with a larger captive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand, the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high quality introduces a pro-competitive element: a high investment becomes more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic effect on the investment levels of both firms and on consumer surplus. We relate our findings to competition cases in digital markets.

This paper offers some insights for competition policy agencies in charge of determining whether the use of data by dominant firms can harm competition and consumers. When the welfare criterion is consumer surplus we show that in markets characterized by sufficiently low entry costs, the ability of the incumbent firm to price discriminate is not enough to exclude the rival from the market. In this case, we show that price discrimination intensifies competition and overall consumer surplus is above its non-discrimination counterpart. In these markets there are no reasons to block price discrimination. In contrast, in markets with intermediate values of entry costs, the incumbent access to data for personalised prices, might act as an important barrier to entry. With no intervention, the entrant would decide to stay out and the incumbent would be able to increase profits at the expense of consumer welfare., Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT)

This paper investigates the role of an incumbent.s data investment decisions in shaping the competitive interaction of .rms and market structure. We provide antitrust agencies with some insights that may help them to determine whether and when personalized pricing (PP) by a dominant .rm, which is enabled by the use of exclusive data, dampens competition and harms consumers. In markets with intermediate entry costs, where entry is blocked without any intervention, a data openness remedy, by means of a mandatory information sharing, is an e¤ective tool to restore competition and boost consumer welfare. Even in markets where entry is inevitable, due to low entry costs, a mandatory information sharing to promote competitive PP further boosts consumer surplus in comparison to the case where only the incumbent employs PP. In contrast, public agencies should consider a ban on PP in markets with su¢ ciently high entry costs. In these markets, a mandatory information sharing remedy would simply not produce the desired competitive outcome.

Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox (1978) has been justification for lack of antitrust behavior for over four decades. His test essentially asks if consumers are harmed by the pricing practices of the firm in the market in which they purchase the good or service. Even if these firms are monopoly or oligopolies in their fields with huge economic rents, if they pass this test, no action is taken against them. "Bigness is not bad." This narrow view, inter alia, ignores two- and multisided markets (MSM) where the appearance of "no harm" is addressed to only one side of the market. The correct view is to examine all the markets impacting potential harm to consumers. It illustrates the harm which is "free" to the users, but advertisers pay dearly for the ability to micro-focus on potential consumers of their products. Facebook and Google are used as examples. This advertising cost is added into the sales price of the product, resulting in consumers being harmed by the embedded advertising costs in the products or services purchased. We argue here, using Bork's own criterion - except to expand it to the other side of the market and eliminating producer's surplus - that much needed antitrust action has been ignored by this narrow criterion. This analysis indicates that antitrust action is long overdue after considering two-sided markets. In addition, we argue that his "consumer welfare" criterion is misleading and liable to deceive, thus the hoax. The Bork critique is a hoax in two ways: Bork's analysis does not include the other side of the market. The cost of advertising has to be included in the price of the products being sold in order for the firm to remain in business. So, clearly, the price of goods and services is increased by the cost of advertising, thus reducing consumers' surplus. The second flaw is Bork's definition of "consumer welfare" - it includes the economic rents of the firm - all at a cost to consumers. Enhancing the wealth (profits) of corporations in the name of efficiency was not the purpose of the antitrust laws. We address the Bork Paradox on its own terms by examining the second side of the market which harms consumers indirectly by increasing the price of the products and services they purchase. Using the corrected Bork metric - both sides of the market and no producer's surplus - the estimated loss of consumers' welfare in $60.4 and $43.7 billion respectively from Google and Facebook, respectively.

Digital currencies make transfers in digital markets, providing transaction participants with many advantages: easy access to markets, maintaining the identity of participants in transfer transactions, even their application is constantly expanding when buying new and innovative goods. Banks are an integral and significant part of this turnover, which gives them additional advantages and direct effects and exposes them to additional difficulties and dangers. The increased interest in them was noted mainly due to the continuous growth of their market rate and the additional growth of cryptocurrency extraction. Most transactions with them are based on the regulations of the applicable law. Still, the possibility of being the object of a crime has provoked a backlash from financial supervisors to protect the rights of other market participants and especially banks as the most accessible of all. Although it is a legal system in place to prevent banking institutions from being involved in money laundering operations, digital currencies are now a new opportunity with the specific advantages that ensure their smooth transfer to the network. The leading business companies such as TESLA have offered the opportunity to buy electric cars with digital currencies, with the growing demand for cryptocurrency services. Partly aided by the rising value of essential natural resources, important components for building information infrastructure, and the Covid-19 pandemic, significant financial institutions have permanently established themselves in digital markets such as JPMorgan, BNY Mellon, and Morgan Stanley, BlackRock and many others. Despite the targeted actions of state regulatory institutions, whose duty is to ensure the public good “cybersecurity”, the mass entry into these markets leaves consumers relatively unprotected. Money laundering or terrorist financing often provokes crises among regulatory institutions because they are usually accompanied by arms deals, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and others, as well as tax fraud, terrorism, and drug trafficking. A current application of digital currencies is their use to pay for services related to cyber attacks on financial institutions, objects of national security, etc. when the entire population suffers the damage. The new roles of financial institutions in the digital markets strengthen the notion of compliance as possible risk threats, realizing through compliance functions to automate and implement the integrated approach to all types of risk that accompanies the movement of digital financial assets. For some banking intermediaries, this has changed their cybersecurity strategy.

Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target potential competitors yet fly under the radar of current merger control due to the features of the digital economy. We empirically study the competitive effects of big tech acquisitions on competitors in a relevant online market. We identify acquisitions by GAFAM involving apps from 2015 to 2019, matching these to a comprehensive database covering apps available in the Google Play Store. We find that competing apps tend to innovate less following an acquisition by GAFAM, while there seems to be no impact on prices and privacy-sensitive permissions of competing apps. Additionally, we find evidence that affected developers reallocate innovation efforts to unaffected apps and that affected markets experience less entry post-acquisition.

In recent years, there has been a tremendous technological and digital development and innovation that, consequently, led to its increasing influence on markets and economy. The fast growth of the digital economy, driven by the appearance and expansion of digital platforms, has continuous created new challenges for competition agencies. In this context, digital platforms have gained extreme importance in the world economy and in the consumers daily life, resulting in the emergence of new challenges for competitive policies and laws regarding the definition of methods and the revision of legislation to regulate and control the way they behave. This dissertation seeks to explore the theme of consequences of digital platforms in Competition Law, analyzing their distinctive characteristics and questioning how law and competitive policies are being interpreted and enforced. Nos últimos anos temos assistido a uma grande inovação e evolução tecnológica e digital e, consequentemente, ao incremento da influência destas nos mercados e na economia. O rápido crescimento da economia digital, impulsionado pelo surgimento e expansão de plataformas digitais, tem criado incessantemente novos desafios para a(s) autoridade(s) da concorrência. Neste contexto, as plataformas digitais ganharam uma importância extrema na economia mundial e no quotidiano dos consumidores da qual resultou o surgimento de novos desafios para as políticas e leis da concorrência no que respeita à definição de métodos e à revisão da legislação para controlo e regulação dos seus comportamentos. A presente dissertação procura explorar a temática das consequências das plataformas digitais no direito da concorrência, analisando as suas caraterísticas distintivas e questionando a forma como a lei e as políticas concorrenciais estão a ser interpretadas e aplicadas.

Over the period 2015-2017, the five giant technologically leading firms, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft (GAFAM) acquired 175 companies, from small start-ups to billion dollar deals. By investigating this intense M&A, this paper ambitions a better understanding of the Big Five's strategies. To do so, we identify 6 different user groups gravitating around these multi-sided companies along with each company's most important market segments. We then track their mergers and acquisitions and match them with the segments. This exercise shows that these five firms use M&A activity mostly to strengthen their core market segments but rarely to expand their activities into new ones. Furthermore, most of the acquired products are shut down post acquisition, which suggests that GAFAM mainly acquire firm's assets (functionality, technology, talent or IP) to integrate them in their ecosystem rather than the products and users themselves. For these tech giants, therefore, acquisition appears to be a substitute for in-house R&D. Finally, from our check for possible "killer acquisitions", it appears that just a single one in our sample could potentially be qualified as such.

В культурологическом дискурсе последней четверти века культурное пространство определяется в качестве конкретной формы бытования и реализации культуры (В.Л.Кургузов, А.И.Пигалев, А.Я.Флиер) Несмотря на позитивные перемены, в сфере культуры села сохраняются и остаточный принцип финансирования сельских учреждений культуры, и устаревшая материальнотехническая база, проблемы технического обеспечения и кадровой политики. В данных условиях особую актуальность обретают поиски новых путей сохранения и возрождения культурного пространства сельских территорий с использованием современных технологий управления культурным пространством и расширением спектра оказываемых населению культурных услуг. Так, акторами культурного влияния на местах при существующем в Якутии быстром росте рынка социальных сетей, реализации региональной подпрограммы «Цифровые технологии в культуре» в силу инерции и цифрового неравенства слабо используется потенциал цифровой трансформации формирования цифровой культуры. Цель статьи показать возможности использования цифровых инструментов организации виртуальных культурных ивентов. Авторами проанализированы четыре цифровых инструмента (лендинг, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok) для организации виртуального культурного ивента в сельской местности на примере фестиваля хорового пения «Мелодии родного аласа». Благодаря творческой деятельности известного за пределами республики коллектива -«Тюнгюлюнского народного хора»поддерживается и развивается социокультурное пространство села Тюнгюлю Мегино-Кангаласского улуса, а фестиваль хорового пения «Мелодии родного аласа» при применении современных методов управления имеет высокий потенциал стать полноценным виртуальным культурным ивентом и визитной карточкой муниципального объединения., In the cultural discourse of the last quarter of the century, cultural space is defined as a specific form of existence and implementation of culture (V. L. Kurguzov, A. I. Pigalev, A. ya. flier) Despite the positive changes in the field of rural culture, the residual principle of financing rural cultural institutions, as well as outdated material and technical base, problems of technical support and personnel policy remain. In these conditions, the search for new ways to preserve and revive the cultural space of rural areas using modern technologies for managing cultural space and expanding the range of cultural services provided to the population is particularly relevant. Thus, actors of cultural influence on the ground with the rapid growth of the social network market in Yakutia and the implementation of the regional program "Digital culture", due to inertia and digital inequality, poorly use the potential of digital transformation in the formation of digital culture. The purpose of the article is to show the possibilities of using digital tools in organizing virtual cultural events. The authors analyzed four digital tools (landing page, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok) for organizing a virtual cultural event in rural areas, using the example of the choral singing festival «Melodies of native alas». Thanks to the creative activities known outside the Republic collective «of Tungusskogo folk choir»- the maintenance and development of socio-cultural space of the village Tungulu Megino-Kangalassky ulus, and the choral festival «Melodies of native alas» in the application of modern management techniques has high potential to become a virtual cultural event and a hallmark of the area «Beyond the river»., Экономика и предпринимательство, Выпуск 9 (122) 2020

Рассматриваются вопросы государственного регулирования деятельности цифровых агрегаторов и маркетплейсов, а также вопросы правовой регламентации ответственности в сфере электронной торговли.

В статье исследуется антимонопольное регулирование, в частности поправки в российское законодательство о конкуренции, которые изложены в проекте «Пятый антимонопольный пакет», а также введение системы антимонопольного комплаенса. В качестве примера автор приводит решение ФАС России по антимонопольным делам «Лаборатория Касперского» против Apple Inc.; «Лаборатория Касперского» против Microsoft.

Digital markets are at the forefront of competition policy. Over the past five years, antitrust regulators around the world have opened many investigations on digital platforms and issued and/or commissioned dozens of studies or expert reports that are focused on understanding the general competitive dynamics of markets such as online search, social media, e-commerce/marketplaces, and mobile operating systems. These studies and reports represent the forefront of our current understanding of how to adapt antitrust policy to the digital era. However, much of their wealth of knowledge is lost because these documents, which add up to thousands of pages of text, figures and tables, have been scattered around the websites of different competition agencies. This literature review consolidates the knowledge of twenty-two reports and studies on topics related to competition in digital markets issued by eighteen different authorities and expert panels around the world over the past five years. It addresses how these reports portray the general competitive dynamics of digital markets, the benefits generated by digitalization, the potential competitive shortcomings of digital markets in general and of well-defined relevant markets in particular, and the solutions that have been proposed to increase competition in the digital world. It also indicates areas where further academic research is needed. In doing so, it should serve as a guide to antitrust scholars, regulators, and practitioners, helping them understand the frontier of knowledge on the competitive dynamics of digital markets and the range of materials that are available for those who want to explore a certain topic more in-depth.

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduces a new right to data portability, which allows users to move their personal data to other platforms, potentially affecting competition between rival platforms offering similar (homogeneous/substitute) products or services within the European Union. However, it is still unclear what effects this new regulation could have on competition and, consequently, on innovation in digital markets. Therefore, this paper analyzes the effect of data portability driven by competition on the data-driven innovation response of online platforms such as Spotify, Google, and Facebook. We conduct an empirical analysis of Spotify, which is an online platform facing competition within the EU, and perform a comparison between data portability to number portability of the telecommunication sector to predict the future impact of the new regulation. Finally, we compare the observations on Spotify with Facebook and Google, which are companies in winner-takes-all markets. We argue that online platforms like Spotify, which face competition within the EU, will invest in two forms of data-driven innovation due to the effect of data portability. These types are 'exploitation-innovation,' by improving the existing technology, and 'exploration-innovation' by developing new technology. In 'exploitation-innovation,' firms, like Spotify, will increase investments in data-driven innovation to enhance users' engagement and retention to avoid churn. In 'exploration-innovation,' these firms will invest in data-driven innovation to develop new algorithms to include data from customers acquired from their competitors. On the contrary, online platforms, like Facebook or Google, which do not face real competition, will not have a substantial need to invest in data-driven innovation solely due to data portability.

This report provides an overview on the economics of attention intermediaries. It addresses the following questions: What are the economics of attention intermediaries? For competition policy, how should markets be defined and market power of attention intermediaries be assessed? What theories of harm in merger control and abuse of dominance possibly apply to attention intermediaries? The report also touches on consumer protection policies and other regulatory issues.

A consensus is emerging around the world about the need for policymakers to address certain characteristics and competitive tendencies that are generated by digital platforms or digital ecosystems, with a view to reforming the public policy instruments currently in place so that they are fit for the digital age. The paper starts by reviewing the relevant precedents under EU competition law and economic regulation upon which this reform could be based. The paper then puts forward recommendations to adapt competition rules, in particular as regards the determination of market power (e.g., by better taking into account the effects of ecosystems, the impact of potential competition and the role of innovation) and the application of theories of harm (i.e. by focusing on leveraging and envelopment behaviour, access to key innovation capabilities, discrimination and self-preferencing and the violation of normative regulatory principles). The paper then proceeds to propose a cumulative 'three criteria test' to determine the types of digital platforms upon which competition rules, and possibly complementary regulation, should focus. These three criteria require an assessment of: (i) the existence of market structures which are highly concentrated and non-contestable; (ii) the presence of digital gatekeepers which act as unavoidable trading partners; (iii) and, for the purposes of ex ante regulation, the lack of effectiveness of competition rules to address the identified problems in the market. The paper also considers the types of remedies that could be imposed on those identified digital platforms, including: interoperability and access to key innovation capabilities such as data; the prohibition of anti-competitive discrimination; and the facilitation of consumer switching. Given the rapid evolution of technology and market uncertainty, consideration should be given as to whether these remedies should be imposed in a participatory manner with the industry stakeholders directly affected by the measures. Finally, the paper deals with a number of procedural and institutional issues raised by the adoption of such a legal standard, proposing to adapt existing antitrust guidelines, to extend the power of DG Competition to conduct fully fledged market investigations (as is the case in the UK and Australia) and possibly to work closely with National Regulatory Agencies, coordination with whom at EU level arguably needs to be strengthened.

This research examines the phenomenon of food delivery services from the mobile app user&rsquo, s perspective and how consumers&rsquo, lifestyles are changing because of the convenience provided by the apps. By means of an online survey targeted at US food delivery app customers, our study analyzes the main motivations that lead them to use and recommend these technology-based services. The results of the study revealed that some of the theory of planned behavior model variables (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms), influence customer use and word-of-mouth (WOM) intentions. Security influences intention to spread WOM, whereas customer lifestyle compatibility influences intention to use the food delivery apps. A post hoc analysis revealed that perceived control is only important for older customers, who need to perceive that they control the apps before they will recommend them to other customers. The findings of the study are discussed and contrasted with previous research in the field. The managerial implications derived from the findings provide practical guidance for food delivery app companies. Further research avenues are suggested to encourage scholars to continue investigating the challenge of the diffusion of mobile apps in the food delivery and related sectors.

The digital economy and multi-faceted markets have significantly contributed to the efficacy of most transactions governing modern humankind. Digital platforms have become an irreplaceable cross-border asset that has acclimatized with technological advancements. However, there is obscurity in the methods of accommodation of digital economy in competition laws of most jurisdictions globally. Consequently, there are ascertainable issues in competition laws of such jurisdictions. Such issues remain unaddressed due to the absence of evaluation parameters of digital platforms in the conventional market system and culminate into an Implicit and undetected abuse of dominance. This study used the doctrinal method by highlighting the distinctness of contemporary digital markets and their consequential issues. This study explicated the issues in the competition that need to be independently addressed, considering the intricacies of digital platforms. The presence of non-price factors, multi-faceted markets, and data-driven networks being the primary source of such novel issues have been particularly explicated. The established premise was substantiated by way of case studies of major events involving factors such as predation, deep discounting, and data privacy. Elucidation of the competition system in most jurisdictions in Asia and the accommodation of digital platforms in the same was also sufficiently enunciated to present a holistic insight to the established premise. Finally, the authors suggested ways to sufficiently address the issues arising from the distinctness of digital platforms, thereby giving rise to a dynamic and all-inclusive competition. KEYWORDS: Digital Markets, Competition Law, Data Privacy.

This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that create important challenges for competition policy. We show that these features have been key determinants of the theories of harm in major merger cases in the past few years. We then analyse the characteristics of almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major digital companies - Amazon, Facebook, and Google - between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity and show that they span a wide range of economic sectors. In most cases, their products and services appear to be complementary to those supplied by the acquirers. Moreover, target companies seem to be particularly young, being four-years-old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition. Finally, we examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the CAs performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.

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The problems of digitalisation and transition of companies into the digital markets has become one of the crucial issues in contemporary business. Digital transformation is changing markets and interactions. These trends impose a question on how secure is this environment and how companies are combating this issue. This new environment shows us how knowledge is dispersed across a global market and in individual, national, markets. The goal of the research is to investigate the differences between countries in Europe according to how their companies tackled the challenges of IT security. Clustering is conducted by the use of simple k-means method using the data on European countries available in Eurostat. The digital divide has been found among European countries according to their usage of investigated IT security practices. This work is licensed under aCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

В статье раскрыта сущность цифровой экономики, предложена авторская модель цифрового человека, раскрыта структура цифровой экономики на основе исследования РАЭК. Модель цифрового человека представлена тремя уровнями: базис, центр и креатив. Сущность цифровой экономики отражена через ее основные формы проявления. Структура цифровой экономики представлена через семь хабов и десять срезов семи хабов экосистемы цифровой экономики: аналитика и данные, разработка и дизайн, API и BIGDATA, HARDWARE, регулирование, бизнес-модели, MOBILE, платформы, интернет вещей, стартапы и инвестиции., The essence of the digital economy is revealed in the article, the author’s model of the digital human is proposed, the structure of the digital economy based on the RAEC study is disclosed. The digital human model is represented by three levels: basis, center and creative. The essence of the digital economy is reflected through its main forms of manifestation. The structure of the digital economy is represented through seven hubs and ten slices of the seven hubs of the digital economy ecosystem: analytics and data, development and design, API and BIGDATA, HARDWARE, regulation, business models, MOBILE, platforms, Internet of things, startups and investments.

La era digital se caracteriza por la gran producción de datos (algunos de ellos de naturaleza privada) a gran escala. La vulnerabilidad y la exposición está ocurriendo a un ritmo sin precedentes, produciendo grandes incentivos económicos para los propietarios de estos datos. Sin embargo, los proveedores de dichos datos, que a menudo son consumidores de contenido gratuito en plataformas digitales, están comenzando a desarrollar problemas de privacidad y, por lo tanto, conducen a la consiguiente reducción de la confianza en los mercados digitales. El objetivo principal de esta tesis es analizar la privacidad desde una perspectiva informativa y fuente de ineficiencias en el mercado. Además, la tesis ofrece un análisis de las decisiones óptimas de los agentes económicos teniendo en cuenta la necesidad actual imperante de una demanda de privacidad. Después de la introducción del tema, el Capítulo 2 analiza el papel de la privacidad en la discriminación de precios basada en canales y la dispersión de precios. El Capítulo 3 investiga la decisión del monopolista de invertir en seguridad en los mercados digitales para influir en los consumidores aumentando su confianza en cuestiones de seguridad y privacidad. El Capítulo 4 estudia el comportamiento estratégico de los consumidores en un mercado compuesto por un mercado ascendente y un mercado descendente, donde la información sobre ellos se puede vender a otra empresa que venda otro bien que también podrían comprar. Además, examinamos el escenario en el que se ofrece a los consumidores una opción de exclusión para evitar que su información sea vendida. Como conclusiones generales, descubrimos que el monopolista obtiene mayores ganancias esperadas bajo la discriminación de precios basada en el canal. Además, existe una dispersión de precios por canales, muy en línea con la literatura. De hecho, la dispersión de precios depende de las preocupaciones de privacidad media de la población en el mercado. Obtenemos que el monopolista considera rentable invertir en seguridad. Sin embargo, tales inversiones en seguridad pueden resultar en una transferencia del coste directamente a los consumidores a través del precio, y puede resultar en abuso de posición. Finalmente, la venta de información al consumidor genera un mayor excedente del consumidor que no permitir la venta de información en el mercado. Sin embargo, cambiar las reglas para permitir la exclusión voluntaria nunca mejora el excedente agregado del consumidor. The digital era is characterized by the large production of data (some of them of private nature) on a large scale. The vulnerability and exposure is occurring at an unprecedented rate, producing great economic incentives for the owners of these data. However, the providers of such data, who are often consumers of free content on digital platforms, are starting to develop privacy concerns and thus, lead to the subsequent reduction of confidence in digital markets. The main objective of this thesis is to analyze privacy from an informational perspective and source of inefficiencies in the market. Furthermore, the thesis offers an analysis of optimal decisions of economic agents considering the current prevailing need for a demand for privacy. After the introduction of the topic, Chapter 2 analyzes the role of privacy in channel-based price discrimination and price dispersion. Chapter 3 investigates the monopolist's decision to invest in security in digital markets in order to influence consumers increasing their confidence in matters of security and privacy. Chapter 4 studies the strategic behavior of consumers in a market composed by an upstream market and a downstream market, where information about them can be sold to another firm selling another good they might also buy. Furthermore, we examine the scenario when consumers are offered an opt-out option to avoid having their information sold. As general conclusions, we find out that the monopolist gets higher expected profits under channel-based price discrimination. Moreover, it does exist price dispersion over channels, much in line with the literature. Indeed, price dispersion depends on the average population privacy concerns in the market. We get that the monopolist finds it profitable to invest in security. However, such investments in security may result in a transfer of the cost directly to consumers through the price, and it might result in abuse of position. Finally, selling consumer information renders higher consumer surplus than no letting the sale of information in the market. However, changing the rules to permit free opt-out never improves aggregate consumer surplus.

Over the period 2015-2017, the five giant technologically leading firms, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft (GAFAM) acquired 175 companies, from small start-ups to billion dollar deals. By investigating this intense M&A, this paper ambitions a better understanding of the Big Five's strategies. To do so, we identify 6 different user groups gravitating around these multi-sided companies along with each company's most important market segments. We then track their mergers and acquisitions and match them with the segments. This exercise shows that these five firms use M&A activity mostly to strengthen their core market segments but rarely to expand their activities into new ones. Furthermore, most of the acquired products are shut down post acquisition, which suggests that GAFAM mainly acquire firm's assets (functionality, technology, talent or IP) to integrate them in their ecosystem rather than the products and users themselves. For these tech giants, therefore, acquisition appears to be a substitute for in-house R&D. Finally, from our check for possible "killer acquisitions", it appears that just a single one in our sample could potentially be qualified as such.

This article focuses on the economics of digital markets with particular emphasis on those features that are commonly deemed critical for Antitrust. Digital markets are often concentrated due to network effects and due to the need of large amounts of Data for production. We review papers characterizing the nature of social harms caused by market power and the role of competition FOR the market and IN the market to relief some of that harm. Special emphasis is given to the role of (i) human attention (which is monetized and is a key input in advertising markets), (ii) Data (which is the oil that powers these markets) and (iii) innovation (incentives, entry for buyout and killer acquisitions).

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