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The article of record as published may be found at https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-is-just-starting/

NPS NRP Executive Summary This research will assess how strategic and non-strategic deterrence capabilities, to include nuclear weapons (both adversary and U.S. capabilities), would influence Taiwan Contingency operations. A publishable paper authored by Chris Twomey and an NPS student team designed wargame from the Wargaming Applications course will be utilized to inform and underpin this program of research. N3/N5 - Plans & Strategy This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

NPS NRP Executive Summary This research will examine the implications of the rise of two near-peer, nuclear-armed adversaries for the United States, with an emphasis on the Russian role as a pivotal player in this rising configuration. The focus on Russia will account for the fact that while China's rise makes it potentially the most significant long-term threat, the current scale of Russia's arsenal and its strategic posture make it the most immediate existential threat to the United States and its allies, as well as a key potential spoiler in the U.S. strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The research will proceed along three parallel tracks. The first track will analyze how the different motivations and capabilities of Russia and China to challenge the United States structures their incentives for strategic cooperation, and will review the key debates among Russian elites on these topics. The second part will analyze Russian elite perceptions of the opportunities and limits of cooperation with China in boosting each other's strategic capabilities and their employment strategies. The third track of the research will examine the role of arms control and confidence-building measures in the emerging trilateral context, with the United States facing two near-peer adversaries. This research will be conducted through a combined team effort of subject-matter experts on Russian, U.S., NATO, and Chinese strategic doctrines, capabilities, and behavior. The researchers will perform a rigorous analysis of the debates in the Russian literature, complementing and contextualizing this information through discussions with subject matter experts in Washington, USSTRATCOM, NATO Headquarters, SHAPE Headquarters, and in key European allies. The final report will provide a combined analytical assessment on the topic, and discuss the implications for the USN, DoD, and U.S. national security more broadly. N3/N5 - Plans & Strategy This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review. The article of record as published may be found at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Chinese_Nuclear_Posture_IB_v3.pdf In the context of an era of great-power competition, understanding the main countries’ nuclear capabilities and strategy is vitally important.1 While dwarfed by Russian and US arsenals, China’s strategic arsenal is growing rapidly, and strategic thought in China is also evolving in response to a wide variety of factors. As with all nuclear powers, China is also actively relying on the space and cyber domains to serve its strategic goals. This issue brief will survey these elements. The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic forces has been made possible by support from our partners, including: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, aswell as general support to the Scowcroft Center.

This research brief describes work done for RAND Project AIR FORCE documented in China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, by Eric Heginbotham, Michael S. Chase, Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark R. Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, RR-1628-AF, 2017 The article of record as published may be found at https://www.rand.org/t/RB9956

The article of record as published may be found at https://www.rand.org/RR1628

PASCC Report Number: 2017-001 The ninth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from September 8-10, 2015. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; it is formally unofficial but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at NPS. For the fourth time, this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). This “non-governmental” association, with close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), helped improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Performer: Pacific Forum CSIS and Naval Postgraduate School Project Leads: Ralph Cossa, Christopher Twomey, and Michael Glosny Project Cost: $400,000 FY15-16 Objective: China is currently modernizing its military capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal, and there remains a lack of official discussions on these issues. This communications gap increases the risks to strategic stability and the potential for inadvertent escalation. This project’s goal is to build greater understanding between the United States and China on strategic issues to prepare for or support official discussions. This dialogue project will build upon previous PASCC-sponsored U.S.-China Track 1.5s to achieve a deeper understanding of the issues. Less-official dialogues such as this one, while not a substitution for official dialogues, can be used to help identify and clarify agenda items for official talks as well as delve more deeply into sensitive issues. Expected topics to be addressed include nuclear postures, nonproliferation policy, no first use, mutual vulnerability, missile defense, strategic stability, long-range conventional weapons, and confidence-building measures. PASCC

Following a period of only slow growth, Chinese nuclear posture modernization and buildup has been an important development over the past decade. Key deployments in both land and sea based forces provide Beijing with new capabilities. Although Beijing's declaratory policy has remained constant, there are some signs of more subtle shifts in the way China may be thinking about its force. It is important to understand the drivers -- both internal and external -- for this modernization, the implications for strategic stability in the Sino-American relationship, and the new challenges this poses for U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the region.

Naval Research Program Poster Naval Research Program N5/C7F T15-1011

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002164 In analyses of China’s military modernization, it has become increasingly common to describe China as pursuing a “counter-intervention” strategy in East Asia. Such a strategy aims to push the United States away from China’s littoral, forestalling the United States’ ability to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan or in disputes in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, such a military strategy is consistent with a purported broader Chinese goal to displace the United States from its traditional regional role, including Washington’s support for global norms such as freedom of navigation in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and partnerships with long-standing treaty allies.

Three interrelated studies addressed the challenges facing the USN and its allies in Asia. (Two studies were dropped given labor and financial constraints.) The aim of the first study is to evaluate Chinese views of maritime strategy to evaluate possible areas for cooperation, deterrence enhancement, and risk mitigation. A second focuses on China’s expanding counterspace capabilities that threaten U.S. naval strategy Asia. Analyzing the emerging threat environment, thinking through specific counter-measures, and developing allied strategies with East Asian military partners could strengthen deterrence, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure operational effectiveness. A final study looks at the dilemma of strengthening US-ROK deterrence while minimizing risks of conflict escalation in the maritime realm. The context for this includes recent NK provocations, changes in ROK declaratory deterrence policy, and renewed ROK interest in tactical nuclear weapons Naval Research Program Prepared for: N5, C7F CAPT David Adams

The article of record as published may be found at https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24905293

This report is the product of collaboration between the Naval Postgraduate School, Center on Contemporary Conflict and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency The eighth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on strategic nuclear issues was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from June 8 to 10, 2014. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; it is formally unofficial but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at NPS. For the third time, this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). This “non-governmental” association, with close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), helped improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics.

"In early June, 2012, eight Chinese participants, including high-ranking Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, met with twenty-five Americans (a mix of officials and researchers) to discuss bilateral issues at an unofficial meeting. This dislogue, funded by DTRA, has been held annually for the past seven years. The overall tone was positive and substantive. Boilerplate concerns about U.S. policy in the region were kept to a minimum, although China continues to express concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs and conventional strike capabilities. China's "no-first-use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy served as a backdrop for some of the discussion, constraining engagement with some issues, and illustrating the depth to which that policy shapes even well-connected offical perceptions..." from the Executive Summary U.S.Defense Thrreat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD (PASCC).

Draft submitted to International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, March 2011 Forthcoming in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold, eds., Cross- Strait Relations: New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security, RAND (2011) This paper looks to assess the impact on Taiwan, and secondarily the United States, of China’s increased military capabilities as they pertain to the Taiwan Straits. The paper conducts analysis of the triangular relationships and considers the perceptual basis of power and the use of tacit and implied threats. A notional sketch of this author’s views is laid out explicitly as this shapes the bulk of the analysis and conclusions drawn below. Then a set of stylized goals is laid out for China and Taiwan with regard to future development on the unification/independence issue. (U.S. goals are also briefly discussed.) The bulk of the paper looks at how successful each of the three has been in achieving those goals in the context of the evolving military balance. While the types of data used vary substantially across each three, the conclusions all emphasize the challenges in relying primarily on power to assess the development of politics in the region. The paper concludes that the substantial military capability enhancements by the PRC have not led to commensurate gains in coercive outcomes. There appears to be some degree of deterrence success in stemming a further move towards independence within the Taiwanese body politic. However, there is no sign of significant compellent success in pushing it toward reunification. The U.S. role in this is central, as it too if affected by that balance and it too can influence policy in Taiwan. Indeed, perhaps the critically important element is that military coercive power has complex effects on a democracy. More generally, projecting influence from power is not straightforward.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Asia Policy Assembly in Washington, D.C., on June 17–18, 2010. This article evaluates the implications of nuclear multipolarity and strategic complexity in Asia.

DRAFT Paper prepared for ISA-New Orleans, February 2010 China is the only country of the traditional nuclear powers whose nuclear arsenal is growing in size and capability. It is diversifying its delivery systems, modernizing its missiles, and building up its overall warhead arsenal. Further, it is engaged in a substantial buildup of conventional missiles. These are certainly facilitated by the economic and general military rise of China. It is less clear that China's strategic arsenal has in turn supported the gen- eral rise of China. That is, what benefits has China received given its en- hancements of its strategic forces? This chapter will begin by charting the changes in China's strategic arsenal, and compare that broadly to other re- gional and global players in this arena. It will then examine the ways in which nuclear weapons and strategic forces in general are thought to enhance the power of nations and assess the degree to which that has occurred for China.

The fifth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Honolulu, HI from May 2 through 4, 2010. The Dialogue is a track 1.5 conference; thus, it is formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-CSIS and is funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side's nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. Beyond that, the conference aims to deepen American understandings of the way China views nuclear weapons, the domestic debates that shape those views, and the degree to which there is change in strategy, doctrine, and force posture in Beijing. The previous four meetings have focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and prospects for cooperation with regard to specific policy areas. This year, the meeting was organized around six panels (see the attached agenda) centering on the key strategic threat perceptions of each side--general and proliferation related--and the various sorts of security policies each undertakes to address these threats--unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This is a study sponsored by the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment in which nine members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempt to reflect the intention of the three Sea Service Chiefs, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, by building an illustrative fleet on paper. The fleet's composition demonstrates the new strategy's viability within an affordable SCN budget. The study concludes with 12 actions that will begin, responsibly and experimentally, to establish the foundation on which to create a twenty-first century Navy that reflects the geopolitical environment and American national goals. Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Many aspects of the Chinese-U.S. relationship are mutually beneficial: some $400 billion in trade, bilateral military exchanges, and Beijing's increasingly constructive diplomatic role. There are other grounds for concern. Each side's militaries view the other as a potential adversary and increasingly make plans and structure their forces with that in mind.

Draft Prepared for International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2008 In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges.

The third annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Honolulu, HI from November 4 through 6, 2007. The Dialogue is a track 1.5 conference; thus, it is formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-CSIS and is funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side's nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. Beyond that, the conference aims to deepen American understandings of the way China views nuclear weapons, the domestic debates that shape those views, and the degree to which there is change in strategy, doctrine, and force posture in Beijing. Both of the first two meetings had focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and prospects for cooperation with regard to specific policy areas. (Conference reports from the first two meetings were published previously and are available from NPS at either the FOUO or unclassified level from this author.) This year, the meeting was organized around five panels (see the attached agenda) centering on the key strategic threat perceptions of each side--general and proliferation related--and the various sorts of security policies each undertakes to address these threats--unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

A book review of "China Rising" by David Kang.

Conference Report November 4-6, 2007; Honolulu, Hawaii

Washington has two long-term interests toward China: promoting a profitable, equitable economic relationship and managing Beijing’s challenge to the U.S.- led international order. Although recent policy has achieved many tactical suc- cesses in these areas, the predominant record is one of broader strategic failure in the face of the rise of China.

The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue brought together Chinese and U.S. strategic experts in their personal capacities to discuss to the role of nuclear weapons in Sino-American relations with the aim of minimizing mutual misunderstanding and identifying practical steps for bilateral cooperation. Relatively open discussions on core nuclear issues were held, positive signs on a number of regional topics were visible, and promising avenues for future discussions emerged. The goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side's nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. Beyond that, the conference aims to deepen American understanding of the way China views nuclear weapons, the domestic debates that shape those views, and the degree to which there is change in strategy, doctrine, and force posture in Beijing. Both of the first two meetings have focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and prospects for cooperation with regard to specific policy areas. (A conference report from the first meeting was published last year and is available from N.P.S. at either the FOUO or unclassified level from this author). Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.5, issue 7 September 2006 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.6, issue 10 (October 2005) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Conference Report. Conference organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. There is enormous intuitive appeal to the idea that, if "culture matters" at some general level, thenit must also be important in shaping national security processes and outcomes. There is anextensive academic literature on this issue, often called "strategic culture", and it serves as asort of "folk theorem" that practitioners and casual observers of foreign affairs find compelling.

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.6, issue 9 (October 2005) Conference organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 1–3, 2005 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue brought together Chinese and U.S. strategic experts in their personal capacities to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in Sino-American relations with the aim of minimizing mutual misunderstanding and identifying practical steps for bilateral cooperation. The conference was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, in collaboration with Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and with support from the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of Defense Threat Reduc tion Agency, U.S. Department of Defense. The American participants were primarily academics, although several had experience in international security issues while working for the U.S. government. The Chinese participants were a mix of academics, think tank analysts, and military officers. (Please see the complete list of participants at the end of this report.) The conference was held under the explicit understanding that all participants were speaking unofficially, as observers of their government’s policy, not representatives of it.

The paper includes brief policy memos commissioned for the March 1994 IGCC conference, "The United States and Japan in Asia." Issue areas included politics and security, economics, science, technology, and the environment, and humna rights.

Since the latter half of the twentieth century, China’s conduct in territorial disputes within the nine-dash line (9DL) has received international criticism. After the landmark arbitral ruling in 2016 denounced China’s historical claims to maritime rights within the 9DL and ruled China’s actions in Philippine waters as unlawful, it became evidently clear to the international community that China had been overstepping the bounds of the United Nations Conventions on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Prior incidents with Japan and Vietnam had already portrayed China as provocative. If left unchecked, continued Chinese provocation in the South China Sea could threaten countries’ sovereign maritime rights in the region. This possibility poses an important question: Why have countries in Southeast Asia not more publicly and prominently cooperated with one another and the United States to balance against China’s claims in the South China Sea? This thesis argues that claimant countries have not taken a collaborative approach to challenging China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea due to three factors: heightened tensions in the South China Sea as a result of the U.S.-China rivalry, China’s economic influence on claimant countries’ decision-making, and the presence of a collective action dilemma among ASEAN to challenge China. Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

With its advanced missiles, sensor systems, and modernized navy, China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy threatens U.S. conventional military platforms’ survivability and freedom of maneuver, reducing U.S. credibility and power projection capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative strengthens its diplomatic and economic relationships with regional countries, threatening the U.S.-established rules-based regional order. As a result, the United States Marine Corps introduced Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) as both a warfighting concept to combat China’s A2/AD capabilities and as a form of deterrence. However, its success depends on U.S. access and freedom of maneuver to sovereign nations’ territory. Consequently, the efficacy of EABO is inextricably linked to security cooperation, as it is the Department of Defense’s primary means to gain access to foreign territory. This thesis begins by examining the threats to U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific, EABO and its requirements, security cooperation, and how to best tailor it to support the execution of EABO. It then evaluates the varying degrees of security cooperation activities the U.S. engages in with Japan and Indonesia and the impact those activities may have on the feasibility of conducting EABO from their territory. The findings suggest that security cooperation activities have enhanced the feasibility of conducting EABO from Japan but not Indonesia. Major, United States Marine Corps Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The increasing strategic cooperation between China and Russia has grown into a major threat to the current global order and U.S. interests in Europe and Asia, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the declaration of a “no-limits” partnership between these two revisionist powers. This thesis assesses the potential scope and limitations of the Sino-Russian strategic alignment from a historical perspective and through the lenses of the relevant theories of international relations dealing with alliances and interstate competition. It also examines the key policy options available to the United States and its allies to limit Chinese and Russian attempts to undermine the Liberal International Order (LIO), and to displace the U.S. in Europe and Asia. The thesis finds that the option of driving a “wedge” between Russia and China through détente with Russia is not feasible if President Putin remains in power; similarly, opportunities for selective cooperation with a resurgent China remain limited. Because Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation and aggressive behavior are primarily driven by the internal threat to their authoritarian systems posed by the LIO, the most appropriate response is to contain these regimes with a U.S.-led global coalition of democracies. Major, United States Marine Corps Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Chinese nuclear modernization has continued since China became a nuclear weapons state in 1964. As China’s nuclear arsenal and nuclear-related infrastructure progressed, Chinese declaratory strategies of active defense and no-first-use (NFU) have remained resolute. This thesis examines how Chinese strategies may or may not be driving China’s nuclear modernization from the years 2000 through 2020. In order to determine the extent to which strategy has influenced China’s nuclear modernization, this thesis explores Chinese nuclear capabilities, training and exercises, and declaratory policy. Additionally, this thesis also addresses the prospect of Chinese nuclear escalation based on related theoretical approaches. After taking into account each factor considered for China’s nuclear modernization, this thesis concludes that China’s nuclear modernization is not solely driven by its existing strategies of NFU or active defense. Though China remains consistent in advertising its espoused strategies, its nuclear modernization raises some concerns regarding its continued adherence to NFU. Additionally, Chinese ambiguity of strategy and more forward-leaning modernization suggests that active defense incorporates both deterrence and, now, the potential use of nuclear weapons to achieve coercive outcomes. Due to China’s robust nuclear modernization that has resulted in additional warfighting options, this thesis finds that escalation across the nuclear threshold is more likely. Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

With the return of great power and strategic competition, a renewed analysis of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific is required. Competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War elicited the formation of NATO, a multilateral collective defense institution. This thesis aims to answer why, despite a rapidly militarizing China, there remains no such institution in Asia. To that end, it examines the Chinese threat relative to that posed by the Soviet Union, then examines U.S. relations with its major partners in the region—India, Japan, South Korean, and Australia—to understand the forces that are inhibiting multilateralism. This thesis finds that the current geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific does not yet warrant a change to the hitherto successful hub-and-spokes system. China’s increased assertiveness in the region does not present an existential threat to the United States and its allies, and China’s economic appeal and regional clout disincentivize states from provoking it. However, parsimonious structural theories inadequately explain the lack of a multilateral institution in Asia. Domestic politics, norms, identity, and legal constructs also influence states’ desires and/or abilities to participate in such an institution. Nevertheless, a substantial Chinese transgression that severely upsets the status quo could drive states to form a multilateral collective defense institution in the region, as the appetite for defense-related multilateralism is increasing. Outstanding Thesis Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Over the past decade, Southeast Asian countries have struggled to devise effective responses to China’s efforts to assert its claims in the South China Sea. This thesis aims to explain why some of those responses have been more successful than others. Using five case studies from 2012–2020, this thesis examines how the following four factors account for the success or failure of Vietnamese and Malaysian responses: increased external balancing with the U.S., increased internal balancing, increased coercive diplomacy, and stronger diplomatic support from the international community. The thesis finds that successful responses rely on a combination of internal balancing with coercive diplomacy and international support. It finds only weak evidence that countries in Southeast Asia engage in external balancing in response to China’s actions in the region. These conclusions suggest that the United States should increase its diplomatic and military cooperation with Southeast Asian partners in ways that enhance their capacity to deploy maritime forces and generate international support in response to Chinese assertiveness. Future research should examine whether increased military cooperation with middle powers such as India and Australia may contribute to more successful outcomes. Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines the political and security implications of China's economic expansion into the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. It employs a comparative case study method to assess the PRC's relations with three Arab states: Saudi Arabia, which is a major source of China's petroleum imports; Egypt, which is a significant destination for Chinese infrastructure development resources and a participant in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and Jordan, which has relatively weak economic ties with the PRC. This research broadly encompasses the period between 1993, the year of China's emergence in the MENA region as a net energy importer, and the present. Ultimately, this thesis finds that China's increasing levels of regional economic engagement are linked with political responses from certain Arab governments. China's economic activities have not induced a shift in partner states' voting behavior as it specifically relates to human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It has, however, influenced the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments to respond domestically and internationally to China's Uyghur situation in ways that align with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests. It is also correlated with the weakening of the political and security partnership between Egypt and the United States. As such, this analysis suggests that China's regional economic engagement may be having effects on the broader international order. http://archive.org/details/oasesofinfluence1094567151 Outstanding Thesis Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Relations between the United States and North Korea reached a pivotal point in 2018 when a noticeable détente occurred while the United States pursued a foreign policy of denuclearization toward North Korea. The policy was predicated on the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. This thesis asks whether the current United States policy toward North Korea, which places continued emphasis on the only acceptable condition for denuclearization be that it is complete, verifiable, and irreversible, is the best strategy, or if there are alternatives to this policy that the United States could feasibly pursue? This thesis answers the research question by examining and analyzing nuclear proliferation drivers and inhibitors and conducting a comparative study in which some cases maintain a nuclear weapons program and others have chosen to abandon such efforts. The study of proliferation drivers and inhibitors concluded that North Korea is unlikely to accept the conditions of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. However, the United States can likely achieve tangible and genuine results toward denuclearization by changing its perspective on North Korean nuclear weapons and adopting a policy that embraces North Korea’s unique reasons for nuclear proliferation. Major, United States Air Force Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Increasing economic power has driven China’s global rise, providing China with immense influence and capabilities. China has used this power in pursuit of its strategic objectives especially in the Indo-Pacific. How has Chinese economic statecraft and coercion impacted South Korea’s and Australia’s security relations with the United States? This thesis conducts comparative case studies of South Korea and Australia and their economic relations with China and security relations with the United States. This research made use of multiple databases to examine 20 years’ worth of records detailing bilateral relations and trade for instances of Chinese economic coercion to identify the core cases, and makes shorter assessments of other key cases. This thesis finds that China primarily uses informal economic coercive methods for a range of issues including territorial maritime disputes, human rights, and security interests. The tactics have become more active and sophisticated over time in being able to precisely and flexibly target industries. However, China’s use of economic coercion has so far achieved mixed results as there seem to be no long-term concrete changes to the U.S. alliances and, in some cases, evidence that it has backfired. This thesis recommends that the United States increase its cooperation and establish new institutions with its allies, other countries and the private sector to limit and counter the effectiveness of Chinese economic coercive tactics. Captain, United States Air Force Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines the impacts of national identity, cross-strait economic relations, and the security threat of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on Taiwan's relationship with mainland China since 2000. Analyzing primary sources and academic analyses on both the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations, this thesis argues that Taiwan's national identity has moderated its political elites to implement policies that would otherwise excessively challenge Taiwan's de facto sovereignty status. From an economic standpoint, Taiwan has shown to consistently establish close economic ties with the mainland to bolster its prospects in the global market. On the role of national security, the island has steadily refined its defense strategy and invested in its military to contest the expanding security threat from the PLA. In observation of these findings, this thesis predicts that in the near term, Taiwan's two main opposing political parties, the KMT and the DPP, will both increasingly adopt a centrist view toward its mainland policies, asserting its de facto sovereignty status and continuing to resist the mainland's pressure for unification. Based on past trends, Taiwan will likely continue to maintain its economic ties with the mainland and remain committed to its national defense in order to deter and defend against the PLA. Major, United States Air Force Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines the implications of President Trump's "America First" foreign policy (AFP) on the balance of power as it relates to America's hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia. Before the AFP, President Trump often questioned the relevancy of America's alliances with South Korea and Japan, accusing each of not paying their fair share for American extended deterrence. The president pressured both allies to increase their burden sharing and enhance their capabilities to defend themselves. Since the AFP, South Korea has doubled down on its goal to reduce dependency on the U.S. alliance by expediting the transfer of wartime operational control of its forces from the United States. Additionally, the policy demands that South Korea shoulders the full cost to maintain the alliance. The AFP calls on Japan to take a more assertive leadership role in regional security, pushing on an open door that allows Japan to expand its interpretation of collective defense. Taiwan has benefited greatly from the AFP, but it also received pressure similar to America's treaty allies. The strategically ambiguous partner has now tied its defense spending to keep pace with its growing economy. This allowed Taiwan to purchase an advanced fighter from the United States that will increase parity with Chinese threats while allowing for enhanced interoperability with the U.S. military in the event of a crisis. Major, United States Marine Corps Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines Beijing’s geopolitical strategy through its use of Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the internationalization of the renminbi and its implication on the Liberal International Order (LIO). The first portion of this paper focuses on the structure of the U.S. hegemonic ordering system and its relationship to the LIO framework. The main analytical portion of the thesis examines the extent to which China has progressed toward creating a new liberal order or a new illiberal order, or sustaining the current Western-led order. Research finds that China has displayed reformist, revisionist, and status quo characteristics across the international order spectrum. This suggests that China is pragmatic in its foreign policy, choosing to challenge norms and order in the institutions that it does not agree with, but maintains and upholds norms in institutions that benefit China. China is also routing around certain international orders while upholding others. Ultimately, China is a reformist state that looks to reshape the LIO more in line with Beijing’s interests; however, current international liberal norms will limit the extent to and the likelihood of success with which Beijing can reshape the world. http://archive.org/details/thedragonsjourne1094564040 Outstanding Thesis Captain, United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream has elicited the assistance of ethnic Chinese people around the world in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The People’s Republic of China has not hidden its intent at influencing the overseas Chinese diaspora having embarked on a soft power campaign to achieve its geopolitical objectives. Using its extensive state media apparatus, the PRC has extended its media influence throughout the globe with a persistent narrative conforming to the China “story” developed by the Chinese Communist Party. This study determines the extent to which China leverages its state media and diaspora to promote its narratives regarding its core national interests around the world. These interests concern primarily its issues over sovereignty to include the South China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This study includes a quantitative analysis through regression testing of a sample of Twitter and media archive data and United Nations migrant data. Furthermore, this study highlighted several regional cases in Oceania—namely, Australia and New Zealand—and Southeast Asia in a qualitative analysis to answer this study’s research question. Overall, this study found significance of a relationship between Tweets regarding the PRC’s core national issues and the Chinese diaspora implicating overseas Chinese communities’ contribution to the PRC’s geopolitical narratives. http://archive.org/details/themanchurianque1094564041 Major, United States Army Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines the relationships between Russia’s arms export industry and three major customer states in Asia. What motivated China, India, and Vietnam to procure conventional arms from Russian rather than other major suppliers, particularly in the post–Cold War era? The answer is a complex mix of strategic goals, political rationale, financial affordability, technological suitability, and old habit. This thesis centers on individual case studies for each of the three customer states, and is bookended by an opening review of the modern Russian arms industry and a final discussion of common themes and what to expect from future arms transfers from Russia. It uses press reporting, analysis by independent organizations, and a framework incorporating theories of international relations to address the research question. The main intention of this thesis is to examine the role of arms transfers across multiple states both as a practice per se, and as a component of national (and international) policy; additionally, it is designed to provide value to military personnel who wish to become more familiar with this important topic. http://archive.org/details/russianconventio1094564184 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In March 2018, the Chinese National People’s Congress voted to abolish presidential term limits, paving the way for Chinese President Xi Jinping to rule the country indefinitely. This decision was but one part of a broader trend of power centralization taking place within the People’s Republic of China. Driven by Xi’s desire to centralize power in himself and in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this trend has reversed the institutionalization of several rules and norms in Chinese politics, begging the question: How exactly was Xi able to overcome decades of momentum to bring about significant changes within the Chinese political system? In this thesis, I test two possible explanations for Xi’s success. First, I examine the possibility that Xi leveraged a strong desire among many members of the CCP to restart political and economic reforms within the country in order to persuade the party to back his political changes. Second, I test the idea that Xi has paved the way for his changes in the political sphere by using his anti-corruption campaign to purge political opponents from the CCP and to silence others. Using the best available evidence, I conclude that the preponderance of evidence indicates that Xi utilized both these methods to strengthen his personal power and reverse the trend of institutionalization in the Chinese political system, but the changes Xi has brought to the Chinese political system could not have been possible without the support of the CCP as a whole. http://archive.org/details/powertoxihowxiji1094562804 Ensign, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.