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El cuerpo es el constructo central del ámbito de la Educación Física, pero, en los últimos años, la mirada sobre el cuerpo se ha expandido, en especial, a partir de los Nuevos Materialismos que han cuestionado y desplazado el sentido del cuerpo como realidad física y cultural a la noción de corporeidad. Este concepto vincula el cuerpo a lo relacional, va más allá de lo humano y expande las zonas de proximidad entre el cuerpo y el mundo. Esta perspectiva que diluye la idea del cuerpo como entidad que se cierra en sí misma, junto a la Teoría de los Afectos, ha llevado a cuestionar una noción de cuerpo inerte que espera pasivamente la imposición de una significación construida social y culturalmente por el sujeto. Desde este enfoque hemos indagado cómo un grupo de docentes de secundaria sitúa la corporeidad en sus trayectos en torno al aprender.

In a paper published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides a methodological argument for the 'disquotational,' Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation. Gómez-Torrente's previous work has greatly contributed to making this theory perhaps the most widely supported view of pure quotation in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative view for which I myself have argued. Gómez-Torrente argues that rival views make quotation 'an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon.' I aim to turn the methodological tables. I reply to his objections to my own version of a demonstrative account, and I show that disquotational proposals provide no better account of the data. I also show that, unlike the demonstrative account, disquotational views make an ungrounded distinction between quotations that semantically refer to their intuitive referents and others that merely speaker-refer to them. I conclude that the demonstrative account is to be preferred on abductive grounds.

Experimental philosophy "has rudely challenged the way professional philosophers like to think of themselves", for unlike traditional philosophers, who produce their theories by reasoning alone, the advocates of the new movement are "convinced that [they] can shed light on traditional philosophical problems by going out and gathering information about what people actually think and say." Those were Anthony Appiah's words, describing experimental philosophy for the general public, in 2007. There is no question that experimental philosophy, or X-Phi as it is usually known, a movement that started at the turn of the century, has been a source of controversy. Some philosophers have dismissed it as an inconsequential fad, whose impact on real philosophical theorizing is spurious. For some others, on the contrary, the results brought forward by X-Phi practitioners reveal how misguided the methods used by traditional philosophers are; how unmotivated, and unmotivating, their conclusions.

Experimental philosophy "has rudely challenged the way professional philosophers like to think of themselves", for unlike traditional philosophers, who produce their theories by reasoning alone, the advocates of the new movement are "convinced that [they] can shed light on traditional philosophical problems by going out and gathering information about what people actually think and say." Those were Anthony Appiah's words, describing experimental philosophy for the general public, in 2007. There is no question that experimental philosophy, or X-Phi as it is usually known, a movement that started at the turn of the century, has been a source of controversy. Some philosophers have dismissed it as an inconsequential fad, whose impact on real philosophical theorizing is spurious. For some others, on the contrary, the results brought forward by X-Phi practitioners reveal how misguided the methods used by traditional philosophers are; how unmotivated, and unmotivating, their conclusions.

El cinismo y el escepticismo están contemplados hoy como curiosidades dentro de la historia del pensamiento filosófico, reducidos a personajes "excéntricos" como Diógenes de Sinope y Pirrón de Elis y una serie de anécdotas sobre ellos. Sin embargo, han trascendido más allá de la Antigüedad clásica, hasta nuestros días. Ambas corrientes lanzan un reto constante al pensamiento "oficial", bon ton: crítica burlona e irreverente en el caso de la primera y relativismo extremista en la segunda. El presente artículo presenta una apuesta epistemológica a favor de la recuperación de los principios del cinismo y del escepticismo pirrónico para la crítica del pensamiento histórico en la Modernidad. Se divide en dos partes: la primera muestra los grandes lineamientos de estas corrientes filosóficas y la segunda examina sus aportes al conocimiento histórico, a partir de dos casos: Cioran para el cinismo y Veyne para el escepticismo. Cynicism and skepticism are nowadays conceived as curiosities in the history of philosophical thought, reduced to "eccentric" characters like Diogenes of Sinope and Pyrrho of Elis and a series of anecdotes about them.However, they have gone beyond classical antiquity to the present. Both schools of thought offer a constant challenge to the "official" thought bon ton: mocking and irreverent criticism in the case of the first and extreme relativism in the second.This paper presents an epistemological approach supporting the recovery of the cynicism and the pyrrhonian skepticism principles for the criticism of the historical thought in the modernity It is divided into two parts: the first one shows the broad features of these philosophical trends and the second examines their contributions to historical knowledge based on two cases: Cioran for the cynicism and Veyne for the skepticism. O cinismo e o ceticismo estão contemplados hoje como curiosidades dentro da história do pensamento filosófico, reduzidos a personagens "excêntricos" como Diógenes de Sinope e Pirrón de Elis e uma série de anedotas sobre eles. No entanto, transcenderam para mais além da Antiguidade clássica até os nossos dias. Ambas as correntes lançam um desafio constante para o pensamento "oficial", bon ton: crítica zombeteira e irreverente no caso da primeira e relativismo extremista na segunda. O presente artigo apresenta aposta epistemológica a favor da recuperação dos princípios do cinismo e ce-ticismo pirrónico para a crítica do pensamento histórico na Modernidade. Divide-se em duas partes: a primeira mostra as grandes di-retrizes destas correntes filosóficas e a segunda examina seus aportes ao conhecimento histórico, a partir de dois casos: Cioran para o cinismo e Veyne para o ceticismo.

El trabajo tiene como objetivo fundamental el de poner de relieve la conexión de la teoría crítica de J. Habermas con el planteamiento fenomenológico y el movimiento crítico de la modernidad, teniendo en cuenta, a la vez, las profundas diferencias que separan la "teoría crítica tradicional" y la "teoría del conocimiento como crítica de la sociedad". Se parte del establecimiento del marco general en el que se encuadra el problema, se continúa con el análisis del "nuevo planteamiento trascendental habermasirno", hasta terminar con el estudio de los "intereses" como constitutivos de la razón, especialmente con el "interés emancipativo".

Experimental philosophy "has rudely challenged the way professional philosophers like to think of themselves", for unlike traditional philosophers, who produce their theories by reasoning alone, the advocates of the new movement are "convinced that [they] can shed light on traditional philosophical problems by going out and gathering information about what people actually think and say." Those were Anthony Appiah's words, describing experimental philosophy for the general public, in 2007. There is no question that experimental philosophy, or X-Phi as it is usually known, a movement that started at the turn of the century, has been a source of controversy. Some philosophers have dismissed it as an inconsequential fad, whose impact on real philosophical theorizing is spurious. For some others, on the contrary, the results brought forward by X-Phi practitioners reveal how misguided the methods used by traditional philosophers are; how unmotivated, and unmotivating, their conclusions.

Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.