Search

Many environments contain numerous available niches of variable value, each associated with a different local optimum in the space of behaviors (policy space). In such situations it is often difficult to design a learning process capable of evading distraction by poor local optima long enough to stumble upon the best available niche. In this work we propose a generic reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm that performs better than baseline deep Q-learning algorithms in such environments with multiple variably-valued niches. The algorithm we propose consists of two parts: an agent architecture and a learning rule. The agent architecture contains multiple sub-policies. The learning rule is inspired by fitness sharing in evolutionary computation and applied in reinforcement learning using Value-Decomposition-Networks in a novel manner for a single-agent's internal population. It can concretely be understood as adding an extra loss term where one policy's experience is also used to update all the other policies in a manner that decreases their value estimates for the visited states. In particular, when one sub-policy visits a particular state frequently this decreases the value predicted for other sub-policies for going to that state. Further, we introduce an artificial chemistry inspired platform where it is easy to create tasks with multiple rewarding strategies utilizing different resources (i.e. multiple niches). We show that agents trained this way can escape poor-but-attractive local optima to instead converge to harder-to-discover higher value strategies in both the artificial chemistry environments and in simpler illustrative environments., Comment: Full length paper accompanying short format appearing at AAMAS 2023

Multi-agent artificial intelligence research promises a path to develop intelligent technologies that are more human-like and more human-compatible than those produced by "solipsistic" approaches, which do not consider interactions between agents. Melting Pot is a research tool developed to facilitate work on multi-agent artificial intelligence, and provides an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to novel social partners in a set of canonical test scenarios. Each scenario pairs a physical environment (a "substrate") with a reference set of co-players (a "background population"), to create a social situation with substantial interdependence between the individuals involved. For instance, some scenarios were inspired by institutional-economics-based accounts of natural resource management and public-good-provision dilemmas. Others were inspired by considerations from evolutionary biology, game theory, and artificial life. Melting Pot aims to cover a maximally diverse set of interdependencies and incentives. It includes the commonly-studied extreme cases of perfectly-competitive (zero-sum) motivations and perfectly-cooperative (shared-reward) motivations, but does not stop with them. As in real-life, a clear majority of scenarios in Melting Pot have mixed incentives. They are neither purely competitive nor purely cooperative and thus demand successful agents be able to navigate the resulting ambiguity. Here we describe Melting Pot 2.0, which revises and expands on Melting Pot. We also introduce support for scenarios with asymmetric roles, and explain how to integrate them into the evaluation protocol. This report also contains: (1) details of all substrates and scenarios; (2) a complete description of all baseline algorithms and results. Our intention is for it to serve as a reference for researchers using Melting Pot 2.0., Comment: 69 pages, 54 figures. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2107.06857

Multi-agent artificial intelligence research promises a path to develop intelligent technologies that are more human-like and more human-compatible than those produced by "solipsistic" approaches, which do not consider interactions between agents. Melting Pot is a research tool developed to facilitate work on multi-agent artificial intelligence, and provides an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to novel social partners in a set of canonical test scenarios. Each scenario pairs a physical environment (a "substrate") with a reference set of co-players (a "background population"), to create a social situation with substantial interdependence between the individuals involved. For instance, some scenarios were inspired by institutional-economics-based accounts of natural resource management and public-good-provision dilemmas. Others were inspired by considerations from evolutionary biology, game theory, and artificial life. Melting Pot aims to cover a maximally diverse set of interdependencies and incentives. It includes the commonly-studied extreme cases of perfectly-competitive (zero-sum) motivations and perfectly-cooperative (shared-reward) motivations, but does not stop with them. As in real-life, a clear majority of scenarios in Melting Pot have mixed incentives. They are neither purely competitive nor purely cooperative and thus demand successful agents be able to navigate the resulting ambiguity. Here we describe Melting Pot 2.0, which revises and expands on Melting Pot. We also introduce support for scenarios with asymmetric roles, and explain how to integrate them into the evaluation protocol. This report also contains: (1) details of all substrates and scenarios; (2) a complete description of all baseline algorithms and results. Our intention is for it to serve as a reference for researchers using Melting Pot 2.0., 69 pages, 54 figures. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2107.06857

Existing evaluation suites for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) do not assess generalization to novel situations as their primary objective (unlike supervised-learning benchmarks). Our contribution, Melting Pot, is a MARL evaluation suite that fills this gap, and uses reinforcement learning to reduce the human labor required to create novel test scenarios. This works because one agent's behavior constitutes (part of) another agent's environment. To demonstrate scalability, we have created over 80 unique test scenarios covering a broad range of research topics such as social dilemmas, reciprocity, resource sharing, and task partitioning. We apply these test scenarios to standard MARL training algorithms, and demonstrate how Melting Pot reveals weaknesses not apparent from training performance alone., Comment: Accepted to ICML 2021 and presented as a long talk; 33 pages; 9 figures

The challenge of developing powerful and general Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents has received increasing attention in recent years. Much of this effort has focused on the single-agent setting, in which an agent maximizes a predefined extrinsic reward function. However, a long-term question inevitably arises: how will such independent agents cooperate when they are continually learning and acting in a shared multi-agent environment? Observing that humans often provide incentives to influence others' behavior, we propose to equip each RL agent in a multi-agent environment with the ability to give rewards directly to other agents, using a learned incentive function. Each agent learns its own incentive function by explicitly accounting for its impact on the learning of recipients and, through them, the impact on its own extrinsic objective. We demonstrate in experiments that such agents significantly outperform standard RL and opponent-shaping agents in challenging general-sum Markov games, often by finding a near-optimal division of labor. Our work points toward more opportunities and challenges along the path to ensure the common good in a multi-agent future., 20 pages, 11 figures. To appear in 34th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2020)

Here we explore a new algorithmic framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning, called Malthusian reinforcement learning, which extends self-play to include fitness-linked population size dynamics that drive ongoing innovation. In Malthusian RL, increases in a subpopulation's average return drive subsequent increases in its size, just as Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 was the relationship between preindustrial income levels and population growth. Malthusian reinforcement learning harnesses the competitive pressures arising from growing and shrinking population size to drive agents to explore regions of state and policy spaces that they could not otherwise reach. Furthermore, in environments where there are potential gains from specialization and division of labor, we show that Malthusian reinforcement learning is better positioned to take advantage of such synergies than algorithms based on self-play., Comment: 9 pages, 2 tables, 4 figures

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Being able to reason in an environment with a large number of discrete actions is essential to bringing reinforcement learning to a larger class of problems. Recommender systems, industrial plants and language models are only some of the many real-world tasks involving large numbers of discrete actions for which current methods are difficult or even often impossible to apply. An ability to generalize over the set of actions as well as sub-linear complexity relative to the size of the set are both necessary to handle such tasks. Current approaches are not able to provide both of these, which motivates the work in this paper. Our proposed approach leverages prior information about the actions to embed them in a continuous space upon which it can generalize. Additionally, approximate nearest-neighbor methods allow for logarithmic-time lookup complexity relative to the number of actions, which is necessary for time-wise tractable training. This combined approach allows reinforcement learning methods to be applied to large-scale learning problems previously intractable with current methods. We demonstrate our algorithm's abilities on a series of tasks having up to one million actions.

Many real-world problems come with action spaces represented as feature vectors. Although high-dimensional control is a largely unsolved problem, there has recently been progress for modest dimensionalities. Here we report on a successful attempt at addressing problems of dimensionality as high as $2000$, of a particular form. Motivated by important applications such as recommendation systems that do not fit the standard reinforcement learning frameworks, we introduce Slate Markov Decision Processes (slate-MDPs). A Slate-MDP is an MDP with a combinatorial action space consisting of slates (tuples) of primitive actions of which one is executed in an underlying MDP. The agent does not control the choice of this executed action and the action might not even be from the slate, e.g., for recommendation systems for which all recommendations can be ignored. We use deep Q-learning based on feature representations of both the state and action to learn the value of whole slates. Unlike existing methods, we optimize for both the combinatorial and sequential aspects of our tasks. The new agent's superiority over agents that either ignore the combinatorial or sequential long-term value aspect is demonstrated on a range of environments with dynamics from a real-world recommendation system. Further, we use deep deterministic policy gradients to learn a policy that for each position of the slate, guides attention towards the part of the action space in which the value is the highest and we only evaluate actions in this area. The attention is used within a sequentially greedy procedure leveraging submodularity. Finally, we show how introducing risk-seeking can dramatically improve the agents performance and ability to discover more far reaching strategies.

Philosophers writing about the ravens paradox often note that Nicod's Condition (NC) holds given some set of background information, and fails to hold against others, but rarely go any further. That is, it is usually not explored which background information makes NC true or false. The present paper aims to fill this gap. For us, "(objective) background knowledge" is restricted to information that can be expressed as probability events. Any other configuration is regarded as being subjective and a property of the a priori probability distribution. We study NC in two specific settings. In the first case, a complete description of some individuals is known, e.g. one knows of each of a group of individuals whether they are black and whether they are ravens. In the second case, the number of individuals having a particular property is given, e.g. one knows how many ravens or how many black things there are (in the relevant population). While some of the most famous answers to the paradox are measure-dependent, our discussion is not restricted to any particular probability measure. Our most interesting result is that in the second setting, NC violates a simple kind of inductive inference (namely projectability). Since relative to NC, this latter rule is more closely related to, and more directly justified by our intuitive notion of inductive reasoning, this tension makes a case against the plausibility of NC. In the end, we suggest that the informal representation of NC may seem to be intuitively plausible because it can easily be mistaken for reasoning by analogy., On raven paradox, Nicod's condition, projectability, induction

Bayesian sequence prediction is a simple technique for predicting future symbols sampled from an unknown measure on infinite sequences over a countable alphabet. While strong bounds on the expected cumulative error are known, there are only limited results on the distribution of this error. We prove tight high-probability bounds on the cumulative error, which is measured in terms of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We also consider the problem of constructing upper confidence bounds on the KL and Hellinger errors similar to those constructed from Hoeffding-like bounds in the i.i.d. case. The new results are applied to show that Bayesian sequence prediction can be used in the Knows What It Knows (KWIK) framework with bounds that match the state-of-the-art., Comment: 17 pages

We present a new algorithm for general reinforcement learning where the true environment is known to belong to a finite class of N arbitrary models. The algorithm is shown to be near-optimal for all but O(N log^2 N) time-steps with high probability. Infinite classes are also considered where we show that compactness is a key criterion for determining the existence of uniform sample-complexity bounds. A matching lower bound is given for the finite case., Comment: 16 pages

We use optimism to introduce generic asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agents. They achieve, with an arbitrary finite or compact class of environments, asymptotically optimal behavior. Furthermore, in the finite deterministic case we provide finite error bounds., Comment: 13 LaTeX pages

Following a recent surge in using history-based methods for resolving perceptual aliasing in reinforcement learning, we introduce an algorithm based on the feature reinforcement learning framework called PhiMDP. To create a practical algorithm we devise a stochastic search procedure for a class of context trees based on parallel tempering and a specialized proposal distribution. We provide the first empirical evaluation for PhiMDP. Our proposed algorithm achieves superior performance to the classical U-tree algorithm and the recent active-LZ algorithm, and is competitive with MC-AIXI-CTW that maintains a bayesian mixture over all context trees up to a chosen depth.We are encouraged by our ability to compete with this sophisticated method using an algorithm that simply picks one single model, and uses Q-learning on the corresponding MDP. Our PhiMDP algorithm is much simpler, yet consumes less time and memory. These results show promise for our future work on attacking more complex and larger problems.

Ray Solomonoff invented the notion of universal induction featuring an aptly termed "universal" prior probability function over all possible computable environments. The essential property of this prior was its ability to dominate all other such priors. Later, Levin introduced another construction --- a mixture of all possible priors or `universal mixture'. These priors are well known to be equivalent up to multiplicative constants. Here, we seek to clarify further the relationships between these three characterisations of a universal prior (Solomonoff's, universal mixtures, and universally dominant priors). We see that the the constructions of Solomonoff and Levin define an identical class of priors, while the class of universally dominant priors is strictly larger. We provide some characterisation of the discrepancy., Comment: 10 LaTeX pages, 1 figure

We provide a formal, simple and intuitive theory of rational decision making including sequential decisions that affect the environment. The theory has a geometric flavor, which makes the arguments easy to visualize and understand. Our theory is for complete decision makers, which means that they have a complete set of preferences. Our main result shows that a complete rational decision maker implicitly has a probabilistic model of the environment. We have a countable version of this result that brings light on the issue of countable vs finite additivity by showing how it depends on the geometry of the space which we have preferences over. This is achieved through fruitfully connecting rationality with the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The theory presented here can be viewed as a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach to probability of Ramsey and De Finetti., Comment: 16 LaTeX pages

We identify principles characterizing Solomonoff Induction by demands on an agent's external behaviour. Key concepts are rationality, computability, indifference and time consistency. Furthermore, we discuss extensions to the full AI case to derive AIXI., Comment: 14 LaTeX pages

We are studying long term sequence prediction (forecasting). We approach this by investigating criteria for choosing a compact useful state representation. The state is supposed to summarize useful information from the history. We want a method that is asymptotically consistent in the sense it will provably eventually only choose between alternatives that satisfy an optimality property related to the used criterion. We extend our work to the case where there is side information that one can take advantage of and, furthermore, we briefly discuss the active setting where an agent takes actions to achieve desirable outcomes., 16 LaTeX pages

We provide a variable metric stochastic approximation theory. In doing so, we provide a convergence theory for a large class of online variable metric methods including the recently introduced online versions of the BFGS algorithm and its limited-memory LBFGS variant. We also discuss the implications of our results for learning from expert advice., Comment: Correctment of theorem 3.4. from AISTATS 2009 article

Suppose that X and Y are Banach couples and suppose that there is a bounded linear couple map Q from Y to X which has the property that Q restricted to the endpoint spaces is injective and the images of the endpointspaces of Y are closed in the endpoint spaces of X, then we say that Y is a subcouple of X. If F is an interpolation functor we want to know how F(Y) is related to F(X). In particular we want to know for which F it holds that Q is an injection that maps F(Y) onto a closed subspace of F(X). In recent years interest has been paid to subcouples of finite codimension and in particular to subcouples of codimension one. We will in this thesis present an interpolation theory for subcouples of codimension one and then generalize it to finite codimension. Our theory will include both a larger class of couples and a larger class of interpolation functors than earlier results. The interpolation method that will be considered is the regular real method. Our general theory will imply older results by Kalton, Ivanov and Löfström. We will use the theory to answer questions about Hardy-type inequalities that were raised by Krugljak, Maligranda and Persson in 1999 and our new theory will also answer a question concerning interpolation of Banach algebras.