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This chapter addresses Africa’s most pressing issue at independence and since: economic development, overwhelmingly neglected during colonization, but now, major global organizations were procuring the opportunity to right these wrongs especially through the RECs and global IGOs, to achieve economic development. It explores the OAU’s Department of Economic Affairs, and OAU’s persistence in elevating global development agencies and agendas in IGOs. It studies the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) based in Ethiopia. Globally, it examines trade-based IGOs such as UNCTAD, GATT and its successor, the WTO. Other institutional arrangements are considered: the (Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 (G77) that convened in the shadow of UNCTAD, and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the (as of April 2020 Organisation of) Africa(n), Caribbean and Pacific States ([O]ACPs) are some of these avenues discussed. The African Economic Community (AEC) stemmed from the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which also set in place the integration of RECs into regional cooperation and ultimately, the foundation of the nascent Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

This chapter addresses the pertinent question of approaches to understanding foreign policy-making. Scholars have long debated whether the theories that explain foreign policy, overwhelmingly developed in western countries, are likely to explain the same phenomena elsewhere, especially in the Global South. Theories and approaches such as Almond’s Mood theory, domestic audience costs, bureaucratic politics, Groupthink, poliheuristic theory or foreign policy approaches that explain foreign policy in democracies have limited explanatory power over African countries, OAU and AU’s institutional foreign policy. This chapter examines the existence, absence, role and the sources of foreign policy in Africa—elites, bureaucracies, citizens, domestic audiences and the external stakeholders in the making of foreign policy. Foreign policy is a more recent area of growth in scholarship in global politics, and theory-testing around who the key actors, ideas and approaches continue to evolve. Though Africa’s post-colonial foreign policy was partly informed by colonial experiences and residual colonization, limited educational and political participation during colonialism impacted the ability of citizens to direct foreign policy and gave elites much latitude in crafting foreign policy. Still, once-consensus national, regional and Pan African goals were swept up in personality disagreements and regional vendettas. Still, understanding foreign policy from a theoretical perspective is invaluable; this chapter examines approaches that are more, or less likely, to explain foreign policy in Africa.

This chapter addresses the light that the OAU, once founded, shone on the twin issues of apartheid in South Africa and Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The OAU worked in concert with other IGOs such as the UN. Besides apartheid and UDI, African countries continued to gain independence: by 1968, 48 of 55 African countries (with Ethiopia / Eritrea and Sudan / South Sudan split) were free nations. As the largest bloc at the UN, and with the support of other voting blocs (e.g. Asian countries and G77 / NAM), the OAU was vocal, and benefitted from unusual allies: the USSR. USSR’s Cold War strategy saw Khrushchev sponsor UN Security Council resolutions to highlight US and its allies’ imperialist practices as they waged war against communist regimes around the world. Whether or not soviet support for decolonization stemmed from a belief of self-determination (despite its control in Eastern Europe and USSR member states) is in question, but Africa benefitted nonetheless. It also addresses tensions that were beginning to show in Africa, with some members (e.g. Malawi, Ivory Coast and Madagascar) supporting some rapprochement with South Africa and Rhodesia, in order to bring about changes in the country, especially based on economic interconnectedness, dependency on and benefits from South Africa.

This chapter addresses some of the other issues that African nations face, that require regional and continental approaches, collaboration and joint actions, especially in the context of the future of Africa as a future global player. Many current issues manifest, including the COVID-19 100-year global pandemic affecting tens of millions, killed millions and devastated global and therewith, African economies. Africa’s foreign policy was driven, from the beginning, by purpose: ending colonialism in all its manifestations, neutrality during the Cold War, avoiding internal conflicts, civil wars, interstate wars and secession, leveraging global institutions to achieve economic development, regional integration and pursuing the long-cherished Pan-African dream of continental unity. Africa has also had to contemplate global changes, for instance the subtle changes in the concept of sovereignty into Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the resolution of conflicts that have seen millions killed through war and genocides such as Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, the Rome Statute and the ICC and external intervention in African nations, where African countries, the OAU and AU are unwilling or unable to halt conflicts. Libya’s 2011 experiences are a good example, given NATO’s involvement. The chapter finds, and argues, that Africa has also had to address—and will likely continue to—challenges of state failure that began with Somalia and persisted for half of the country’s post-colonial life, becoming a haven for violent non-state actors and imperiling other nations through terrorism and related issues. The chapter addresses other issues and their impact on Africa: climate change and global warming, global governance, population growth and global pandemics, and Africa’s responses to these.

This chapter addresses secession and Africa’s responses to the breaking of European-constructed nations, challenging the OAU’s 1964 Cairo Declaration that retained colonial borders and reaffirmed the principle of uti possidetis—retaining pre-independence borders. Africa experienced some interstate conflict, but internal conflict was far more insidious and as Rwanda’s 1994 genocide showed. However, secessionist wars have caused copious numbers of deaths, challenged territorial integrity and the OAU’s ability to broker peace, and the splitting of African nations. The chapter further examines Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD), the Greater Somalia project, former Coastal Sultanates, Nigeria’s Biafra War and Sudan’s conflicts. The First and the Second Sudanese Civil Wars are addressed as are the circumstances leading to South Sudan’s secession in 2011, after the series of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and a referendum, capping 40+ years of conflict and close to 3 million deaths. It examines OAU responses to secession attempts, showing the organization itself to be beholden to Uti possidetis, challenging the OAU’s ability to be a neutral arbiter, but also exposing divisions among African countries—for example, in the Biafra War, 6 countries abstained or voted against reaffirming Nigeria’s territorial integrity. Biafra also mirrored other secession attempts such as Katanga and the Ogaden regions. OAU’s stance appeared to give carte blanche to countries unwilling to deal with internal conflicts even with legitimate causes, sustaining the internal conflicts.

This chapter sets the scene for the formation of states in Africa, as a result of independence, beginning late in the 1950s, particularly in the Sub-Saharan region. As World War II concluded and a new world order emerged, pitting the US-led, democratic capitalist western world against the USSR-led communist-socialist world, European countries, war ravaged and desperately holding onto increasingly assertive and soon-to-be independent colonies in Asia and Africa, found themselves increasingly on the periphery of global order debates, but also provided ammunition to the USSR and its allies, given continuing colonialism. Pressure also came from within the colonies in the form of independence movements, from the more receptive Soviet orbit, from the US itself given the pointed contradictions, from regional organizations, such as the Arab League and afield, Asian countries and their collective action (e.g. the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement), and the liberated African countries such as Ghana and former French West Africa. The chapter outlines the most important issues addressed in the monograph—read foreign policy—that would confront the countries, individually, and together, as they struggled to rid the continent of the yoke of colonialism especially in the southern African region.

This chapter addresses two polar opposite issues: closer regional collaboration through RECs and continental unity through the OAU, but tempered by the perennial human condition of armed conflict. Early on, intra-state conflicts appear in the shadow of Africa’s of Regional Trade Associations (RTAs) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). These groups were built on and based upon relationships with former colonizers (e.g. Anglophone, Francophone or Lusophone) countries. They included linguistic communities such as the abortive, if ever active French Community, regional, financial and commercial relations-based organizations such as the Communaute Financiere d’Afrique (CFA) or Air Afrique; there was also the larger set of linguistic-post-colonial global associations e.g. The Commonwealth. That members were now fighting was surprising but not unexpected. Most of the warring countries shared colonial experiences, borders, and often, people. As Morocco and Algeria fought in the ‘Sands War’ in 1963 and 1964, OAU and the Arab League responses (to which both were members) demonstrated the challenges of conflict resolution. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia were at it, later Somalia and Kenya and most unexpectedly, Tanzania and Uganda in the late 1970s, shortly after the collapse of EAC I, to which both were members. Yet through these conflicts, the OAU and RECs did cut their teeth in addressing conflict, often successfully.

This chapter examines OAU/AU relations with BRICs: primarily, Brazil, Russia, India and China. Given the power changes that occurred after the Cold War, these countries have provided an alternative approach to economic development and world order, challenging a US-led global order. China, rapidly emerging as the US’ major challenger, and once the subject of experiences similar to those of African and Asian nations by western powers, has increased its engagement and infrastructure funding, making state-centric economic development seem viable. Focusing on China because of its extensive relations with the AU and bilaterally with African countries and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and its summits every three years, the chapter also examines how other BRICs have addressed AU relations. Brazil’s engagement is sporadic, driven by its history with Portugal and Portugal’s colonialism in Africa, and lacking a state-level forum. Russia’s first forum was held in 2018; Russia’s challenges dealing with Africa are myriad, given a lack of shared history, geography or direct interactions. India began convening the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), but its internal issues (e.g., a sixth of its population living under the poverty line) and the history of India-Africa relations especially during colonization, the chapter assesses both the opportunities for collaboration but also the areas of differences in these relationships.

This chapter examines some of the immediate, most pressing issues that Africa contended with at the dawn of independence. Because these issues had been largely inherited from the colonial state but spoke to the very existence of the new African state, it was necessary, even imperative, to resolve the contours of statehood, the issue of borders (the OAU decided to retain colonial boundaries), the outline of a continental union (especially the consensus on a loose or other format of a continental federation) that would work towards continental unification, and the place of regional economic communities and organizations. It aggregates the three most pertinent ideas and regional groupings, their positions on African Unity and the (role and location) of Ethiopia as OAU headquarters; to wit, it discusses the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia group, and also highlights the role of regional economic communities and whether or not they supported or inhibited continental unity. The chapter discusses the tension between absolute twin principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of members, and the effortless OAU position of forming the African Liberation Committee (ALC) to support freedom movements especially in Rhodesia and South Africa, and the concept of NIBMAR—no independence before majority African rule in the region.

This chapter takes a literal detour in its examination of directions in foreign policy towards Africa. It examines the rise of the BRICs, defines who they are, and how some of them have emerged from European control, to become power players, for example, China. First, it considers the case of Brazil (and its challenges, relative to Africa and its support for Portuguese colonization). It then examines Russia, which was preceded by the Soviet Union, and which demonstrated an interest in Africa only to the extent that it could use the continent to constrain American influence and expansion abroad, but now appears to have little to no interest in the continent. It then examines India, which by 1947 was still a colony, but has begun to build its industries with ferocity and improved life for its citizen, and can provide a template for the development of former colonies. It examines China and the latter’s significant actions, investments and activities in Africa, and addresses questions of whether China is a new imperialist or a development partner.

This chapter takes a different trajectory: it examines “other” Great Powers (or countries that have been Great Powers and that have been linked with Africa through history), by focusing on Europe, after the end of colonialism. It examines this relationship in the context of whether this has been a partnership, continued dependency, or continued exploitation. The chapter examines the role of Europe in the formation of states in Africa and questions whether the example provided by Europe as colonists can explain some of the weak states to be found all over Africa. It examines institutional-level cooperation between Europe and Africa, and the trajectories of the formation of the two continental bodies, and how their differences (may) have accounted for the difference in levels of success of their members, in insuring statehood. It questions whether African Union (OAU)’s design created the conditions for its failure by eliminating countries’ responsibilities to good governance as conditions for membership.

This chapter hones in on the key focus of the book: the relationship between the United States and Africa, and begins its examination by considering a brief history of the relationship. It traces the unhappy history to the Olmecs and their rumored Afro-originating civilization, to the more, and better-known slave trade, that surprisingly only took 6% of the estimated 10 million Africans captured as slaves to North America. It traces the US exclusion of African migrants from the United States for most of the twentieth century, while examining the gradual recognition by the United States of post-colonial Africa as both a place to expand its influence, but also to constrain Soviet expansion during the Cold War. By 1958, the US Bureau of Africa is formed, to coordinate responses to African independence, but as will be evident, through the Cold War, apartheid and other issues, the United States appeared to have little in the way of strategy for Africa, the missed opportunity and the problematization of US–Africa relations.

This chapter examines how the international system, through history, but especially beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia and the development of the modern state system, has construed and constructed world order. The discussions here also focus on the definition of what Great Powers are: their characteristics, which countries have been Great Powers, and how they define their interests. The chapter also examines the origins of world order and disorder, including the pursuit of colonies, and how this fostered wars, especially between the European powers. It questions whether the past two centuries have fundamentally altered how states view power, order, and war, among other things. It then examines the entry of the Global South countries into the already established international order, and how that had the effect of disrupting the system, and how Global South states have conducted themselves through the process of finding their niche in the international system.

This chapter examines US foreign policy during a time of its global preponderance of power; since 1990, and going into the 2000s, the United States has not had any viable competitor. For Africa, this could have produced two outcomes: the United States focusing on the next billion, or neglect since the United States did not need to constrain anyone (except China, which seems to have moved in with gusto). Since 2000, the United States has continued with its policy of benign neglect of Africa: Africa’s problems are a problem for the Europeans to solve, or to be ignored. Where there has been any action, the United States has problematized its relationship with Africa (looked at it through the prism of fixing a problem). Even when Obama was elected president, despite the hopes that he would have a different perspective and approach to Africa, this was not to be. His successor was no better: indeed, his earliest and only comments about Africa were to mispronounce Namibia and then suggest that it was a bunch of s**e countries. Enter the new century, same as the old century.

This chapter examines the rise of Great Powers and their consequence, and outlines which states have been considered Global Powers; they have included Portugal, Spain, UK, France, Netherlands, Russia/USSR, Germany, Japan and the United States. Because the Great / Global Powers have dominated global politics, for example between 1945 and 1990 during the Cold War, their rivalry, which extended to the whole world, are examined. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 left the United States as the hegemon, which started creating a new world order. It examines the challenges that have begun to rise, some parallel with the establishment of global hegemony. The notion of state failure/failed states is one that is examined in detail, including the characteristics of failed states, how they affect world order (harboring terrorists and pirates), and how the United States, the current global hegemon, has started to deal with (or failed to deal with) the phenomenon.

Scholars generally are in agreement that the pace of globalization is rapidly accelerating. Globalization’s impact, beyond the socio-economic and political discourses, is affecting conceptions of culture and cultural studies, and changing and restructuring spaces, global, national and personal interactions and relationships. The “texts” and artifacts borne of culture—activities, events and our conception thereof are a mechanism for the propagation of culture. Simultaneously Westernization/Americanization impacts local cultures through consumerism, which obfuscates local traditions, knowledge and experiences. This research argues that culture is a dynamic, adaptive concept and practice, “borrowing” liberally from ideological and technological innovations of other cultures and integrating these borrowed aspects into the construction and modification of culture across spatial and geographical divides to ensure particular cultures’ survival. The research shows that the local affects the global, and vice versa. It selects local communication “texts” to show that cultures are not “victims” of globalization or the proliferation of mass media. Cultures actively adopt and integrate globalization’s technological artifacts. Globalization’s positive effects are dynamic and span cultural interactions and permeate structures of authority at personal, national and global levels.

Women in many countries account for over half the population but are marginalized in political and legislative processes and in socio-economic development. This chapter examines the role of women in development, at the grassroots level, in political participation, decision making, and resource allocation. Effective political participation is hypothesized to lead to better development indicators for women. Analyzing International Parliamentarians’ Union, UNFPA and the UNDP data, the results confirm women’s underrepresentation in leadership positions. Of 193 heads of governments, 28 are women; women make up of 16 % of all House and Senate elected leaders. Rwanda has the highest female representation in the legislature (48.8 %) but many countries in sub-Saharan Africa reflect world averages (17 %). There is need for greater women participation at grassroots level, to influence allocation of resources.

Progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa is mostly marginal; the UN 2012 report found that by 2015, sub-Saharan African countries will not have progressed sufficiently to reach the target if current trends do not change. Goals most closely associated with women have recorded least progress—except in reducing the prevalence of HIV-AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and near-parity in girls’ Primary School enrolment. This chapter argues socio-cultural traditions still drive inequality; MDGs have failed to consider the impact of traditional cultural practices on cultural change. Property ownership and ability to leverage personal property for loan and economic purposes economically disempower women. Without countering the resultant negative effects, MDGs will not be achieved even after the 2015 deadline.