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Magna Carta poses the question of how a document (mere “parchment,” in the classic dismissive phrase) actually has an impact, 800 years after its adoption, on protection of rights and limitation of government. This argument competes with a quite different narrative, in which particular configurations of social forces are essential to any serious progress in either of these realms. (See, e.g., Olson, 1993 ). My tentative hypothesis is that although the modern force of the document is purely rhetorical it is nonetheless real, and derives in significant part from: (1) its arising at least in part from the sort of pressure contemplated by Olson; (2) its having considerable concrete applicability in the short run (so that it can get “practice” that is recognized as such); (3) its having in some clauses a degree of generality and aspiration (rhetorical appeal), so that citizens can deploy it for realization of broader, not immediately realizable goals; and (4) its being attached to some kind of institutional framework for its realization. These characteristics made possible the gradual (though to be sure uneven) accretion of a reputation, which, coupled with the drama of its origin, account for its modern substance as persuasive rhetoric.

V.A. Maklakov, a prominent criminal defence lawyer of turn‐of‐the‐century Russia, was a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) and sat on its central committee from its founding in 1905 until well after the party’s cause was lost in 1917. He also headed its ‘school’ for orators who presented the party’s case in the Duma elections. Despite this close involvement with the party, he had reservations about its commitment to immediate majoritarian democracy and its reluctance to break with the Left. In his voluminous writings in emigration, which are analysed in this article, Maklakov makes a powerful case that the party would have enjoyed a better chance of achieving its goals if it had seized the rule‐of‐law values inherent in the old regime’s concessions as a foundation for building a constitutional monarchy. He also argued that Kadet conduct in the February Revolution manifested an insensitivity to rule‐of‐law values that was comparable to its conduct in 1905–07. His focus on the players’ a...

Deterrence theory justifies tort law as a cure for market failures related to risky products and services. Negligence liability gives the providers of goods and services an incentive to take all cost-justified precautions in the design and manufacture of what they sell. Strict liability not only creates those incentives, but also brings about the economically correct levels of production: suppliers' prices will reflect the relative riskiness of their goods, making consumers adjust their purchases to the level they would have demanded if they were fully informed about the products' residual hazards.' Thus, under either a negligence or a strict liability system, soft drink and beer manufacturers will take cost-justified steps to prevent bottles and cans from exploding, cutting drinkers' lips, and the like. Under strict liability, if bottles are more dangerous than cans even after these safety measures have been taken, the price differential between the two will reflect the risks and thus spur consumers to adjust their consumption decisions accordingly. The allocation of resources as between bottles and cans will be optimal. The validity of deterrence theory, as applied to claims by people who contract to buy the goods or services that cause their injuries, depends on an assumption about rational consumer ignorance. At least for low-probability risks, for which consumers may "not have much intuitive feel," deterrence theory assumes that consumers will rationally invest little time or effort in informing themselves.2 Moreover, because of the relative unimportance of such risks in comparison to the costs of studying the language of a contract, the consumer may not find it worthwhile to study even a "clear and conspicuous" dis

This essay describes the doctrinal development that led the Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas to strike down impediments to interstate trade in water resources. It proceeds to consider justifications that states may invoke in support of explicit export barriers and explicit discriminations against nonresident water users. Further, it suggests ways in which the judicial intervention paradoxically might prove to be a setback for free trade in water.

Positions on the exhaustion issue can usually be classified as pessimistic or optimistic. The pessimists point to the obvious fact that the physical supply of nonrenewable resources is shrinking; once a barrel of oil is used for fuel, synthetic fibers, or whatever, it is no longer there. Even if the resource can be recycled, there will be some irretrievable loss in the process. The optimists usually counter by shifting the focus to a pattern of steady increase in known, commercially extractable reserves-in the case of some resources, a dramatic increase (as suggested by Table 1). And they find further confirmation for their position in the price trends of raw materials relative to the price of labor (see Table 2). To all this, the pessimists reply by saying, in essence, "One swallow doesn't make a summer." They suggest that the 1900-1970 pattern is probably more a quirk of fortune than a longrun trend.

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