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В данной статье рассматриваются недостатки основной мировой резервной валюты – доллара США – и преимущества использования специальных прав заимствования СДР. Проведен анализ причин, по которым СДР за время своего функционирования не состоялись как общепринятая резервная валюта. Автором для исследования использован материал, находящийся в открытом доступе. Методический инструментарий исследования: общенаучные методы: анализ, синтез, индуктивные и дедуктивные методы. Сделан вывод о том, что в современных условиях переход к наднациональному регулированию требует паритетного распределения выгод и издержек между всеми без исключения участниками., This article discusses the disadvantages of the world's main reserve currency - the US dollar - and the advantages of using special drawing rights (SDRs). An analysis was made of the reasons why the SDR during its operation did not take place as a generally accepted reserve currency. The author used the material that is in the public domain for the study. Methodological research tools: general scientific methods: analysis, synthesis, inductive and deductive methods. It is concluded that in modern conditions the transition to supranational regulation requires a parity distribution of benefits and costs between all participants without exception., Экономика и предпринимательство, Выпуск 12 (149) 2023, Pages 1292-1295

This paper explores some of the ways in which international central banking can contribute to containing the imminent worldwide climate crisis in a context in which the role of national central banks is important but effectively limited to employing two new stabilization policy tools: macroprudential policy and QE programmes. The authors argue in favour of institutional reform that would gradually transform the IMF into an international central bank and the SDR into a genuine international currency. Even its limited scope would substantially increase the IMF’s capacity to solve one of the key problems of the global climate policy, namely the shortage of funding for the decarbonization of developing economies.

This article recounts China’s renminbi (RMB) internationalization experiences since the 2009 RMB cross-border trade settlement initiative. In the first few years, the RMB made inroads into global financial markets and had a few remarkable accomplishments, including the Special Drawing Right currency status. Since the 2015 market turmoil, RMB internationalization has levelled off – possibly due to changes in both domestic and geopolitical conditions. The RMB is currently under-represented in the global market. China’s deliberate and schematic policies will elevate the RMB’s global stature in a gradual manner but there will not be a leapfrogging in the near term

We analyse the determinants of RMB as an international reserve currency and the impact of joining the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) on the currency swap agreements between China and other countries....

The presented study analyzes the reasons for the need to move away from the US dollar (hereinafter referred to as the dollar) as a universal means of payment in international trade based on the existing threats, examines alternative means of international payments, and identifies their benefits and drawbacks in the context of Russia’s economic security.Aim. The study aims to identify and characterize the means of international payments that fall in line with Russia’s strategic priorities from the perspective of economic security.Tasks. The author considers the risks of using the dollar in international payments and reserves, assesses various means of international payments from the perspective of Russia’s strategic interests, and evaluates the possibility of substituting the dollar with alternative means of international payments.Methods. This study analyzes information from the International Economic Forums, statistics of the Central Bank of Russia, Federal State Statistics Service, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the economic security strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, reports of news agencies, and works of Russian and foreign authors on the subject.Results. Based on the results of the conducted study, the author draws several conclusions. Due to many factors, the most important of them being the volume of trade in dollars, the dollar will remain the world’s leading currency in international trade. However, given that de-dollarization is a global process, the existing trends will amplify. A supranational currency is unlikely to appear for a number of reasons. First, the obvious opposition of the United States due to its unwillingness to let go of such a powerful lever of economic well-being and political influence as the use of the dollar as a global means of payment. The US would probably agree to creating a supranational currency in the medium term if the global process of de-dollarization reaches critical values. Second, the financial and trade centers of the euro and renminbi area are likely to focus on developing their own currencies, especially given the growing global GDP and China’s trade. Creating a supranational currency based on the existing structure of the International monetary Fund (hereinafter — the IMF), following the example of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), with the IMF virtually controlled by the United States, will not eliminate the threat of the currency being used as an instrument of political pressure on individual countries. Replacing the dollar with such kind of supranational currency does not serve the interests of Russia’s economic security. A potential alternative involves creating a supranational currency based on a structure that is independent of the IMF. In this case, the obstacles would include the obvious opposition of the US and its allies and the potential influence of the US on the emission of the supranational currency using its foreign political resources to affect the decisions made by other countries. Using national currencies in international trade in the medium term under the influence of globalization would lead to a formation of multiple currency centers. These centers would most likely be the dollar, euro, renminbi, and ruble.Conclusions. The creation of a ruble-based International Monetary Center with the CIS, BRIC countries (except China), and Turkey serves Russia’s strategic interests. Further consolidation around the ruble would require implementing a financial sustainability policy, maintaining the stability of the macroeconomic environment, creating an international bank similar to the IMF with payments made in rubles, strengthening offshore ruble areas, and increasing high-tech exports.

The coronavirus aka Covid-19 pandemic arrived in Zimbabwe at a time when the country was in the throes of its worst economic turmoil in recent years. Within months of its arrival, the pandemic has already upended the public healthcare system, eroded the livelihoods of millions of people, and further deepened the economic headwinds in the country. Apparently, Zimbabwe has been in a crisis mode since the beginning of the 21st Century. As such, the pandemic has added an extra burden to the country that is already creaking under mounting weight of external debt peonage, fiscal deficit, liquidity crisis, and international isolation among many other social and economic ills. In this context, the country faces an uphill task in mobilising financial and non-financial resources in order to contain the coronavirus crisis. This article therefore sets out to examine the obstacles and opportunities for financing the fight against Covid-19 pandemic within a discursive context of a debt trapped Southern African country.

Purpose This paper is submitted for a special issue of Asian Education and Development Studies on the topic of Greater China Development. The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges and opportunities of developing a free trade zone (FTZ)/free port in China’s Hainan island. Design/methodology/approach Hainan is to be Mainland China’s newest and largest FTZ. However, the experience of the existing Mainland FTZs is not encouraging, their limited, piecemeal reforms attracting little interest from foreign investors. To make a difference and provide a new engine of growth for the Mainland economy, the approach for Hainan needs to be much bolder. Hainan should aim to develop as a free port, a services centre and a financial centre. Findings Regarding the financial sector development, the opportunity should be taken to experiment with special drawing rights. Hong Kong can provide the exemplar and expertise to jump-start Hainan’s development. To provide critical mass, mutual access should be opened between Hainan and the nine Mainland municipalities of the Greater Bay Area. An inner border will be needed to distinguish the experimental area from the rest of the Mainland, and an outer border to preserve its integrity vis-à-vis the international environment. Originality/value If Hainan can be developed into the China Offshore Centre, it would have the potential to restart the Mainland’s stalled reform process, and to relieve international trade and financial tensions.

President Xi proposed building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, which became known as the “Belt and Road” Initiative. In 2016, the RMB (Chinese currency) officially joined the SDR (Special Drawing Rights), and the RMB’s entry is the integration of the Chinese economy into the global financial system. The internationalization of the RMB is the need for the development of global economic integration and the development of China’s international trade. This “initiative” provides strong support for the internationalization of the RMB. Besides, how to achieve balance in maintaining the country’s economic stability and promoting currency internationalization has always been a difficult issue faced by Chinese monetary authorities when the issue of “big country with small currency” presented. Based on the theory of internationalization of currency, this paper discusses the mutual promotion between RMB's internationalization and the "Belt and Road" initiative, the role of the "Belt and Road" Initiative as a driving force to RMB’s Internationalization.

Special Drawing Rights are reserve assets which ought to provide liquidity in times of a country’s financial distress. It is a potential claim on freely usable currencies of International Monetary Fund member countries. This article examines the possible effects of a global Special Drawing Rights implementation by the International Monetary Fund in case of a collapse of one of the major currencies. The question addressed is if a distressed fiat currency can be bailed out effectively by triggering the designation mechanism to the International Monetary Fund member countries The results indicate that the liquidity benefit per created Special Drawing Rights unit would proportionally increase with the rate of money supply.

China has long been the world's second largest economy, with the largest foreign exchange reserves and the second largest share in world trade. However, its position in the global economy has long been recognized, but this recognition has not been accompanied by the international monetary significance of the yuan. Despite China's economic significance, the political importance and the voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cannot be compared to that of the U.S. because the U.S. has over 17% of the votes, whereas China has 3.8 %. Owing to that, the U.S., together with its allies, gets to block decisions and tailor global economic policy. Striving to establish the world's reserve currency, China has been leading comprehensive economic and trade policies while strengthening the yuan convertibility. As a result, effective October 1, 2016, the yuan has become a reserve currency in the basket of special drawing rights along with the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the British pound. China has been supporting the IMF reform while establishing new institutions aimed at redefining the current international policy under the strong influence of the U.S. The paper analyses the channels of Chinese authorities' actions and the prospect of recomposing the international monetary system and reducing the global U.S. influence, with the aim of identifying whether it is likely that the Chinese currency will obtain the status of the world currency.

Triangular arbitrage in the foreign exchange market of a group of countries exists whenever it is possible to make profit by buying and selling their currencies using the spot exchange rates. Working in the framework of the Aitchison geometry, and using characterizations of the absence of triangular arbitrage, we present two applications to the currencies of Brazil (Real), the European Union (Euro), Great Britain (Pound Sterling), and the United States of America (US Dollar). The first application refers to the Special Drawing Rights, an asset created by the International Monetary Fund to provide liquidity to the member countries. The exchange rates matrix is projected onto the subspace of no-arbitrage exchange rate matrices, and its only eigenvector, associated with a non-null eigenvalue, is demonstrated to be compositional and close to the Special Drawing Rights. The second application studies the relative exchange rate bubbles among the countries. It uses the closest no-arbitrage matrix of an exchange rate matrix and the purchasing power parity values for the fundamental exchange rates to analyze the dynamics of those bubbles. These applications show the potential the compositional approach has for the matrices of exchange rates.

This paper estimates the number of teachers required to meet different pupil-teacher (P-T) ratio targets in 2030 for all education levels in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). It also assesses the affordability of those targets based on different scenarios and presents detailed projections for the region as well as for 20 countries. To meet goals around education and learning, the model finds that governments in ESA will need to pay for more than five million additional teachers by 2030. When compared to affordability estimates, which reflect the latest teacher compensation spending trends, government investments will need to double. While there is variation across countries, the compounding shortage of teachers is a serious risk to improving learning across the region.These findings underscore the need to invest more resources in teachers and education systems more generally. If governments were able to progressively increase their investment in education to reach six percent of GDP in 2030, which is in line with the most ambitious target in the Incheon Declaration, it would be possible to recruit an additional three million teachers, which partially closes the gap. However, most governments will need to invest much more, including up to eight percent of GDP, to maximize learning opportunities and outcomes for all children in the region.Boosting investments in education systems is a particularly daunting task in the context of COVID-19 and the multitude of competing priorities. Nevertheless, governments are strongly encouraged to steadily increase the amount of resources allocated to the education sector each year, strengthen efforts to improve value for money and transparency in education spending processes, make the case to receive greater external support for education, and negotiate for debt relief that directly benefits the education sector, including through debt-for-education swaps.Boosting investments is particularly challenging in the context of COVID-19 and the multitude of competing priorities. However, governments can: (i) steadily increase the amount of resources allocated to the education sector in the annual budget cycle;(ii) convert some of the new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocated by the IMF to invest in the education sector;(iii) strengthen efforts to improve value for money and transparency in education spending processes;(iv) develop compelling investment cases to receive greater external support for education from donors and international financial institutions;and (v) negotiate for debt relief that directly benefits the education sector, including through debt-for-education swaps.

For the Biden Administration to break new ground in U.S.–Africa relations while curbing China's growing influence, reversing Trump’s actions is insufficient if it means simply returning to the pre-Trump status quo. Instead, for the benefit of both the U.S. and African countries, a bold new partnership framework is essential. China’s growing presence on the continent, which shows no signs of stopping, results from a fundamental respect of the power of African markets and resources, if not necessarily African people or African governments. The United States should differentiate itself by playing up its comparative advantages in engagement, innovation, and norm-setting. Engagement involves initiatives such as significantly increasing high-level visits to the African continent and vice versa, as well as expanding U.S. immigration paths for African students in the U.S. Innovation should be built around two pillars: rhetoric and certification. The U.S. should refrain from referring to Chinese financial flows as “investment” when not meeting equity requirements, while also providing assistance on certification systems for African infrastructure. Finally, in terms of norm-setting, the United States can once serve a global leadership role in pressing issues such as promoting COVID vaccination supply and supporting debt relief, actions which will reverberate beyond simply countering China.

This chapter considers how a strengthened IMF could play a more central role in the international monetary system by reforms in its financial and operational responsibilities. The chapter examines, in particular, the changes that could be made to allow the IMF’s global reserve asset (SDRs or Special Drawing Rights) to become over time the principal reserve asset of the international monetary system, as intended when the Bretton Woods Agreement was revised in 1978. The chapter notes that this kind of reform would require strong agreement among the major shareholders in the Fund to overcome likely resistance on the part of the United States.

Since the foreign reserve is endogenously determined by each country, its identification is challenging. To overcome this difficulty, we utilize the special drawing rights (SDR) allocation of USD 650 billion by the International Monetary Fund to combat the coronavirus disease pandemic. Given the stylized fact that a sudden stop is likely to depreciate foreign exchange in a very short period, it is natural to expect the SDR allocation to mitigate the risk of devaluation, especially for emerging countries, which typically face a liquidity constraint. According to our empirical results, the increase in foreign reserves by the SDR allocation appreciates the exchange rate among emerging countries while depreciating foreign generally.

The Frankel-Wei regression framework measures the comovements between currencies, and assumes that all foreign exchange rates share a common numeraire. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Special Drawing Right (SDR) is a regular choice for the common numeraire. However, the five-currency basket of the SDR lacks diversification, which results in significant positive comovements between the basket currencies and the SDR currency basket. Consequently, the estimator of the regression coefficient is biased away from its true value. We suggest that the common numeraire be a large well-diversified currency basket, rather than a small undiversified currency basket, such as the five-currency SDR.

This review draws pragmatic lessons for developing countries to address COVID-19-induced recessions and to sustain a developmental recovery. These recessions are unique, caused initially by supply disruptions, largely due to government-imposed 'stay-in-shelter lockdowns'. These have interacted with falling incomes and demand, declining exports (and imports), collapsing commodity prices, shrinking travel and tourism, decreasing remittances and foreign exchange shortages. Highlighting implications for employment, wellbeing and development, it argues that governments need to design comprehensive relief measures and recovery policies to address short-term problems. These should prevent cash-flow predicaments from becoming full-blown solvency crises. Instead of returning to the status quo ante, developing countries' capacities and capabilities need to be enhanced to address long-term sustainable development challenges. Multilateral financial institutions should intermediate with financial sources at low cost to supplement the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights to lower borrowing costs for relief and recovery.

We call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of COVID‐19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies EMDEs and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that EMDEs need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (1) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (2) issue at least $500 billion of special drawing rights through the IMF; (3) improve the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; (4) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (5) increase the resources and geographic coverage of regional financial arrangements; (6) coordinate capital flow management measures; (7) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (8) request that credit‐rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that leaders should swiftly move to address these structural gaps in the GFSN: (1) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (2) create an appropriate sovereign debt restructuring regime; (3) expand surveillance activity; and (4) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy.

A major issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) through the International Monetary Fund would be a key tool to provide financial support to developing and emerging economies and limit the economic and financial fallout of the COVID-19 crisis. SDRs are an unconditional resource, and the case for such an allocation is very strong during an exogenous shock, such as the current one. An SDR allocation would enhance the international liquidity in the hands of emerging and developing countries, so that public responses to the health crisis are not imperilled by financial crises. Close to two-fifths of a new SDR allocation would directly go to developing and emerging economies. In addition, a new mechanism should be created through which countries that do not need their SDR allocation lend them to the IMF, to increase the Fund’s lending capacity. Developed countries can also allocate the SDRs they do not use for official development assistance.

After the global crisis of 2008&ndash, 2009, the world economy entered the era of restructuring. This article focuses on the risks that a new leader will face in the process of shaping the world economy. The methods employed in the research include big data processing of continuous change and the results of the symmetric macroeconomic analysis based on the statistics collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Word Bank (WB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Central banks and Treasuries. The study results proved that the recessionary processes, their depth and global nature, are caused by a combination of world financial system crises and general civilization problems. These new systemic risks for the world economy might result in new global crises that will limit the resources of international financial institutions for sustainable development. Besides, for most banks these crises will mean shifting a big share of derivatives to the off-balance liabilities, using Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in deals, followed by an increase in state and corporate debts, trade wars, a slowdown of economic development in China, and widening contradictions between global and national finances. Regular research and systematization have developed certain guidelines for the global economic restructuring process. First of all, it is recommended on the base of interstate compromises to focus on international agreements to ensure a solid foundation for global finance. On the basis of the comparative analysis carried out for the USA, China and other counties, it was made clear that no one leader in world economy in 21st century views the world reserve as based on the currency of one country only. Instead, there will be a slow transition to using Special Drawing Rights (SDR) with a basket from 15&ndash, 20 currencies G20.

The stock of Target balances is recorded in the national accounting systems in the same way as international fiscal credit. A country’s Target claim is part of its net foreign asset position, and the increase of this claim is recorded as a public capital export. Intra-Eurosystem interest on Target balances is booked in the country’s current account in the same way as ordinary international interest payments. Target balances resemble not only the ISA balances of the US Federal Reserve System but also the special drawing rights of the IMF, Keynes’ bancor currency, Soviet transfer rubles, stocks of foreign currency in fixed exchange rate systems and the sovereign wealth portfolio accumulated by the Central Bank of Switzerland.

As of this writing, the Trump Administration has blocked a proposed new allocation of the unique reserve asset issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), called the Special Drawing Right (SDR...

Since the end of the Bretton Woods era, the world has operated on a de facto system of free‐floating exchange rates, with the US dollar as the dominant international currency. The system, characterized by large pro‐cyclical capital flows and chronic imbalances, is inherently unstable, and has contributed to repeated crises, recessions and geopolitical tensions. One potentially “least‐difficult” line of reform would be to allow the evolution of a multi‐currency system, underpinned by an expanded role for Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Attempts to promote wider use of the SDR have foundered on the liquidity premium. However, for Chinese corporations and institutions, at present restricted in their capital account activities, the SDR liquidity premium would appear less daunting. The Chinese authorities could provide policy encouragement for the use of SDRs by their institutions. This initiative, supported by China's Special Administrative Region Hong Kong, would kick‐start an international SDR ecosystem, and encourage even broader use of SDRs, to the benefit of international monetary stability.

This article examines China’s participation in the trade, monetary and development assistance fields and concludes that China’s rise does not undermine the centrality of the Bretton Woods institutions or Word Trade Organization (WTO) in global economic governance. Whereas China’s participation in the WTO presents some challenges to the long dominance of the United States and the European Union, it reaffirms the central role of the WTO. China’s monetary strategy also indicates the continuing importance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the international monetary regime. Whereas the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) introduces some competition to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), China’s efforts in establishing new multilateral development banks are mainly driven by its frustration with stalled reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. By and large, China’s economic emergence does not challenge, but reaffirms, the post-World War II global economic architecture.

This article focuses on the political economy that shaped the Special Drawing Right (SDR) by examining the three drivers of reform that influenced the creation of the SDR and resulted in changes in the international monetary system (IMS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The three factors examined are, first, informal intergovernmental forums working outside the framework of the IMF; second, the eclipse of the IMF as the central institution of the IMS; and finally, the lack of reference to the private sector in the discussions, even though capital movements were the central cause of strains in the IMS. The article concludes that the resulting limitations of the SDR solution—an institutional change brought about by the compromise between parties to the discussions—meant that major imperfections in the IMS remained unresolved.

We present a general equilibrium model of the world economy where sovereigns face idiosyncratic risks and can default on their debt. In this model, the world interest rate is determined through the global financial market equilibrium, the amount of safe asset is endogenous and determines international risk sharing. Non-trivial multiple equilibria naturally arise, due to the endogeneity of the interest rate. These equilibria can be ranked according to their aggregate welfare, such that equilibria with a higher quantity of safe assets correspond to higher welfare. Due to a shortage in the safe asset supply, even the equilibrium with the highest welfare is not constrained-efficient. Finally, we prove that a world fund issuing a safe asset can reach the constrained-efficient aggregate welfare. With a standard calibration, the size of the fund is found to be around 4.1% of the world GDP. Its relationship with the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF is discussed.

In November 2008 the G20 became the premier forum for international economic and financial affairs. As a result, the international monetary system has come to reflect the transformation of the global economy brought about by China’s emergence as the second largest economy and major exporter, and by the related limits of international governance, especially of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions. This article argues that Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, started an international debate about the shortfalls of the international monetary system in March 2009, after which China pursued the internationalization of its own currency, the renminbi, to turn it into one of the key international currencies. To this purpose, China has put together a policy framework that facilitates the international use of the renminbi without opening domestic capital markets - a requisite for a fully convertible international currency. This article discusses the renminbi’s trajectory over the last five years and suggests that it has become more regionalized rather than internationalized. It also discusses the challenges that Chinese authorities experience as they try to put the renminbi in the pockets of foreign investors and at the same time maintain control - “managed convertibility” - of capital flows in and out of the domestic market. The article concludes that the decision to include the renminbi in the International Monetary Fund’s basket for its special drawing rights reflects expectations that the international monetary system will shift from a dollar-dominated to a multi-currency system. However, this will take several years; in the meantime, international governance will continue to reflect the influences of the issuers of the key international currencies.

After the 2008 financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund realises that reforms are needed to reduce the reliance on the US dollar as the only international reserve currency. It began to nurture super-sovereign reserve money where SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is the most favourable candidate. Joining SDR will push forward China’s exchange rate reform to meet the standard of a real international reserve currency, which requires more skilful domestic and international policy coordination.

To estimate the currency composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves and assess its effectiveness of management, the constrained least square method and variance sensitive analysis are utilized, respectively. Based on portfolio accounting identities, the change of foreign exchange reserves was decomposed into the net purchase change and the non-purchase change. The newly constructed non-purchase change was used to estimate the latent currency composition. Empirical results show that by the end of 2015Q1, China held about 63.6% of its reserves in the U.S. dollar, 19.6% in the euro, 3.09% in the Japanese yen, 4.89% in the pound sterling, 2.22% in the Canadian dollar, 2.03% in the Australian dollar, and 0.09% in the Swiss franc. Although the currency composition kept relatively stable, more attention had been paid to the emerging international currencies. China decreased the U.S. dollar share during the subprime crisis, while resorted to the portfolio rebalance strategy since 2011. The euro shar...

The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, the monetary and exchange rate regimes of the Asian countries are described and analyzed. The degrees of flexibility in exchange rates and capital controls vary across countries. Some countries have adopted a flexible inflation targeting framework, while others have pursued exchange rate targeting. The paper presents a new result of a tradeoff between price stability and exchange rate stability in the hyperbolic relationship of Asian countries. Second, a framework that analyzes and quantifies the degree of currency internationalization is proposed and applied to the RMB. In every indicator, the RMB’s weight in private-sector international finance has grown in the last several years, both in the private and public sectors. In the settlement role of currency, the RMB is ranked 8th in the BIS survey and 7th in SWIFT usage. This paper exploits data of a recent period when the RMB became de-pegged from the USD and show some of the emerging Asian currencies co-moving with the RMB, more so than the USD. In the official sector, RMB is also increasing its weight. The Chinese central bank has extended the currency-swap agreements with 30-some countries, so that the RMB can be used for trade finance and liquidity assistance. The RMB is adopted as a composition currency of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), effective in October 2016, with 10.92%, ranking number 3, surpassing the JPY and GBP. Finally, potential impending changes in the Asian monetary and exchange rate regimes in Asia are discussed. Projecting the growth of the Chinese economy into the future, the weight of the RMB in the financial markets will increase globally as well as in Asia.

The impact of currency reserve accumulation is controversially discussed since reserve accumulation potentially destabilises the international financial system and causes crises due to higher systemic risk. The main aim of this paper is to put the macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation for four Asian economies under closer scrutiny. The key question is whether accumulating currency reserves is beneficial from a long†run perspective. Based on a vector error correction approach, we start by analysing long†run steady†state relationships between currency reserves, exchange rates against the US dollar, real GDP and interest rates. Our findings show that cumulated currency reserve shocks significantly affect real GDP. A likely explanation for our finding is that accumulation of reserves has supported growth through providing liquidity and supporting the development of the financial sector for the economies under observation.

In the postcrisis period, some foreign policymakers accused the Federal Reserve of engaging in “currency wars” and inadvertently creating “financial spillovers,” arguing that these were especially consequential given the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance. This lecture analyzes these critiques, and argues: (1) little support exists, either theoretical or empirical, for the currency wars claim; (2) the United States and its trading partners should use nonmonetary tools for dealing with spillovers; and (3) the benefits of the dollar standard to the United States and the world are considerably more symmetric than in the Bretton Woods era.

Despite the spread of budget initiatives for gender equality following the Beijing Declaration of 1995, resources allocated for eliminating gender inequalities remain inadequate. This paper proposes to create a Global Fund for Women through Innovative Finance (GFWIF) with the ability to raise funds through innovative sources of finance on a scale more appropriate to the estimated requirements of making reasonable progress toward gender equality (US$31–107 billion per year in constant 2014 dollars). It builds on previous calls by feminist economists for the establishment of such funds through global forms of taxation. Since donors’ commitments only meet the lower bound, the GFWIF could scale up funding for gender equality interventions commensurate with country needs. Global resource mobilization through innovative mechanisms, including allocations of new Special Drawing Rights, currency transaction taxes, and carbon taxes, have the potential to provide the necessary financing at a much faster pace...

In recent years, China become the second largest economy in the world. Therefore, China has an important role in the Asia and Global Economy. China’s rapid economic growth is the reason why Renminbi (China currency) becomes an international currency. On October 2016, Renminbi was recognized by International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an international currency by including it in global reserve currency (Special Drawing Right). Furthermore, Renminbi is in the top 10 traded currencies in the world even in Asia. In global trade, China has trade relation with various country, so it can provide benefit for country that have economic relations with China especially countries in Southeast Asia which is a member of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The purpose of Renminbi Internationalization is to increase China’s economic growth and spillover from China to ASEAN. China’s economic spillover to ASEAN has been growing in the few past years through financial linkage and trade linkage. This paper examines China’s economics spillover to ASEAN-6 (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Laos) before and after Renminbi internationalization through both trade and financial linkage. We use ratio of ASEAN-6’s exports and imports to China to its total exports and imports as a proxy of trade linkage and ASEAN-6’s Stock Price Index as a proxy of financial linkage, while we use claim and share of Renminbi in global foreign exchange reserve as moderator variable to find out whether the Renminbi internationalization can strengthen China’s economic spillover to ASEAN-6 or not. Thus, we use Moderated Regression Analysis and Panel Least Square method in 6 ASEAN countries from 2012:Q1-2018:Q4. The result indicate that Renminbi Internationalization can strengthen China’s economic spillover to ASEAN-6 economies that can be seen through trade linkage with an increase in imports and through financial linkage with an increase in Stock Price Index.

Financial crisis is nothing new in the annals of history of the capitalistic path of economic development; it is a part of the business cycle. The theoretical basis is well entrenched in the concept of ‘Keynesian Cross’. The tale of crisis, dating back centuries, has taken a new turn with the call for more globalization—liberalize trade and open up the financial sector. This has made many nations vulnerable to crises that are likely to be repeated, perhaps frequently. Based on recent experience, warning signs can be read from the dollar-centric exchange rate, the mainstay for the stability of the current global financial system. To a careful observer, fatigue in the system cannot be overlooked.

The analysis of powers and order of monetary issue by the Central Bank of Russia in the system of the relations of the state sovereignty is carried out. Is considered contradictions of independent position of the Central Bank and the Government of the Russian Federation in questions of the state economic policy. Is defined that the fiat monetary system is based only on the authority of the Central bank and government whereas cryptocurrency – on the system of own safety and a way of its generation: blockchain. Is defined that in the independence and activity of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation can not consider “wishes” and plans of the government and Senate of Russia. Positive and negative properties of cryptocurrency in a modern financial system are considered. The cryptocurrency is considered out of communication with a monetary system, but only as subject to financial manipulations. It is necessary to change ideology of monetary issue. Non-cash money, special drawing right and so forth are considered as cryptocurrency prerequisites, but controlled by the currency center. Whereas the sense of cryptocurrency consists in its decentralization. The release of money has to be provided with a national product. The offer on establishment of legal bases of regulation of process of monetary issue is made.

China and the international monetary system need each other. The international monetary system is strained, with crisis just around the corner, yet reform is not on anyone’s agenda. Meanwhile China, deeply invested in the current system, faces narrowing options as trading partners question its moves abroad, debt levels rise at home, and its current account moves from surplus to deficit. RMB internationalization might appear to provide a way out, but the policy has its limits and tends to exacerbate rather than relieve tensions. We argue that a tension-reducing solution is at hand to the problems of both the international monetary system and China—IMF-style Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). If in a unilateral initiative China were to make the SDR central to its next phase of capital account opening, China’s institutions, corporates and individuals—presently restricted in their access to international currency—would likely embrace it. Begun by China, with support from the international community and Hong Kong, promulgation of the SDR would usher in an era of lower tensions, providing space for development and avoidance of conflict within a reordered monetary system in which China would have a more prominent role.

Объектом исследования является мировая монетарная система в глобальной экономике. Предметом исследования в выпускной квалификационной работе является роль доллара США в мировой монетарной системе. Целью выпускной квалификационной работы является разработка и апробация методики оценки роли доллара США в мировой монетарной системе. Анализируются составные элементы глобальной экономики: система международной торговли, мировое производство товаров и услуг, мировая валютно-финансовая система, перемещение факторов производства, единое информационное пространство. В работе описывается историческая эволюция мировой валютной системы, место доллара США в ней. Проведен анализ основных институтов мировой монетарной си-стемы: специальных прав заимствования, золотовалютных резервов, монетарного золота. Исследуются практические аспекты роли доллара США в миро-вой валютно-финансовой системе. Сделан прогноз объема международной торговли, объема мировых резервов, объемы мировых инвестиций, объема правительственных облигаций США, объема ценных бумаг. Оценивается текущее состояние доллара США на финансовых рынка, в международной торговле, в мировых валютных резервах., The object of the study is the world monetary system in the global economy. The subject of research in the final qualifying work is the role of the US dollar in the global monetary system. The purpose of the final qualifying work is the development and testing of a methodology for assessing the role of the US dollar in the global monetary system. The components of the global economy are analyzed: the interna-tional trade system, world production of goods and services, the global monetary and financial system, the movement of production factors, a sin-gle information space. The paper describes the historical evolution of the world monetary system, the place of the US dollar in it. The analysis of the main institutions of the world monetary sys-tem: special drawing rights, foreign exchange reserves, monetary gold. The practical aspects of the role of the US dollar in the global monetary and financial system are explored. The forecast of the volume of international trade, the volume of world reserves, the volume of world investment, the volume of US government bonds, the volume of securities. Estimated current state of the US dollar in the financial market, in international trade, in world currency reserves.

This article examines the geopolitics, legal nuances and monetary policy which inform Carney's proposal. Part I sets out the application of block-chain technology in the context of payment systems, and discusses the geopolitics of Libra and the shift in focus to Central Bank Digital Currencies ('CBDCs'). It suggests that state-backed cryptocurrencies are more likely than their private sector counterparts to fit the role of true digital currencies, at least on a domestic level. Part II explains the legal distinctions between the cryptocurrency models proposed by Facebook and others, and CBDCs. The former fulfils the main functions of money by granting a claim to the holder, whereas the latter does so as an 'object' of monetary policy. A Global Stablecoin ('GSC') such as the SHC does not necessarily fall into either camp, but its success as a global reserve currency may hinge upon the fine details of its legal construction. In Part III, one conception of the SHC, based on the 'claims model' is set out. Whilst the use of block-chain technology is undoubtedly novel, there are significant similarities between this version of the SHC and previously rejected reforms to the 'Special Drawing Rights' (SDR) allocated by the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'). It is argued that the extent of the similarities indicates that the claims model is likely to face the same hurdles which stymied the campaign to develop the SDRs into a global reserve currency. This begs the question, however, of why Carney would propose the SHC if the odds in monetary policy were already so firmly stacked against it. Part IV considers the 'objects model' as applied to a SHC. It tentatively concludes that the features of the objects model which distinguish it from the claims model greatly improve its prospects of success. Specifically, the generation of network effect value, as a substitute for the convertibility value of SDRs, may be the decisive contribution of block-chain technology to a truly international currency. The article concludes that a claims-based SHC would, to a great extent, be an attempt to reinvent SDRs in a digital age, and that the advantages of block-chain technology will be insufficient to surmount well-established US monetary policy. The objects model, whilst more ambitious in some respects, constitutes a radically novel proposal which may, for that reason amongst others, gain global traction.

The global financial crisis dominated the international financial landscape during the first 20 years of the 21st century. This paper assesses the contribution of the international coordination of economic policies to contain the crisis. The paper evaluates international efforts to diagnose the crisis and decide on appropriate responses, the treatments that were agreed and adopted, and the successes and failures as the crisis unfolded. International economic policy coordination eventually contributed importantly to containing the crisis, but the authorities failed to agree on a diagnosis and the consequent need for joint action until the case was obvious. The policy actions that were adopted were powerful and effective, but they may have undermined prospects for coordinated responses to crises in the future.

В данной статье рассматривается роль БРИКС в международной валютно-финансовой системе, также обозначается исторический факт появления и развития данного содружества и модернизация основных направлений деятельности в условиях нестабильного мирового экономического роста., This article discusses the role of the BRICS in the international monetary and financial system, also denotes the historical fact of the emergence and development of the Commonwealth and the modernization of the main activities in an unstable world economic growth.

The major international financial crises of the past decades have shown that the international monetary system that evolved in an ad hoc way after the collapse of original Bretton Woods arrangements in the early 1970s must be reformed in a comprehensive way. This is particularly important from the point of view of emerging and developing countries, which are subject to strong boom-bust cycles in external financing, must “self-insure” to the associated risks through the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves, severely face the inadequacies of the crisis management facilities currently available, and have inadequate voice and participation in the governance of the system. On the basis of an analysis of the system, this chapter proposes reforms in seven areas: (i) a better international reserve system than the current fiduciary dollar standard, and particularly one that makes counter-cyclical allocations of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) that increase international liquidity during crises and help fund counter-cyclical IMF lending; (ii) better instruments to guarantee the consistency of national economic policies of major countries; (iii) a system of managed exchange rate flexibility that promotes stability and avoids negative spillovers on other countries; (iv) the regulation of cross-border finance to mitigate the pro-cyclical behavior of capital flows; (v) appropriate balance of payments financing during crises, particularly through financing facilities that are automatic or have simpler prequalification processes and simpler or no conditionality, to overcome the stigma associated with borrowing from the IMF; (vi) adequate international sovereign debt workout mechanisms; and (vii) reforming the governance of the system through a more representative apex organization than the current G-20, stronger voice of developing countries in the IMF, and a “dense” architecture, in which the IMF is complemented with regional and interregional institutions.

Dissertação de mestrado em Economia Monetária, Bancária e Financeira, O Sistema de Bretton Woods trouxe várias alterações ao sistema monetário, sendo que o foco desta dissertação irá debruçar-se sobre um deles em específico, os Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Inicialmente os SDRs apareceram como um complemento do dólar americano, mas após o Nixon Shock todos esperavam que a estrutura monetária alterar-se-ia, com o ativo do Fundo Monetário Internacional a ganhar maior credibilidade e status. Podemos dizer que os SDRs apareceram como uma opção viável em detrimento do dólar na estrutura monetária internacional, contudo, este ativo foi posto em segundo plano devido à predominância do dólar, e da adaptação americana à realidade do Sistema Internacional. Com a crise mundial de 2008, este ativo ganhou visibilidade quando certos autores discutiam a possibilidade de alterar a hegemonia do dólar pelos Special Drawing Rights, dado que estes responsabilizavam os EUA e a sua moeda pela eclosão desta crise. Nesta dissertação são estudadas o SDR como moeda cabaz do FMI e o impacto dos seus ajustamentos na taxa de câmbio do dólar americano. Com base na aplicação de diversos modelos que utilizam a taxa de câmbio do dólar americano face a outras moedas internacionais, podemos concluir que de facto certos ajustamentos da moeda cabaz provocam volatilidade na taxa de câmbio do dólar., The Bretton Woods System brought many changes to the monetary system, mainly the creation of the Special Drawing Rights. Initially the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) functioned as a complement to the American dollar and gold, but after the Nixon Shock everyone expected that all the monetary situation would change (the asset would gain more credibility and status). We can say that SDRs appeared as an interesting option as the primary option in the international monetary structure, however this asset was shadowed by the important and strong role of dollar in the international trade/system. With the 2008 financial crisis, this asset earned visibility when certain authors discussed the possibility of transaction of the dollar hegemony to the Special Drawing Rights, given that they blamed the US and its currency for the outbreak of this crisis. In this dissertation we study the SDR as the IMF basket currency and the impact of its adjustments on the US dollar exchange rate. Based on the application of various econometric models that use the US dollar exchange rate against other international currencies, we can conclude that certain basket currencies adjustments cause volatility in the dollar exchange rate.

In this chapter Muddiman draws together the issues identified in previous Chapters and sets out to establish an alternative model for bringing together the environment and economics paying particular attention to both the concept of Ecosystem Services and the potential to embed environmental issues firmly within the financial framework. In particular, this Chapter looks critically at issues of credit provision, land ownership and property rights and the use of sound money. This Chapter presents a completely new approach to environmental valuation. It proposes the establishment of a biodiversity backed financial vehicle, as part of the Special Drawing Right system of the IMF, using blockchain technology to facilitate its use as a global means of settling international debts.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), also known as the Fund, was established in July 1944 as a product of the Bretton Woods conference, with the objective of formulating and implementing monetary arrangements pertaining to exchange rates and international payment mechanisms. In 2012, however, the Fund’s mandate was upgraded to give it more responsibilities encompassing issues that pertain to international macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, in a way the IMF has turned itself into many things, including a financial and macroeconomic advisor, a trade promoter and a development agency, functions that are invariably performed by other international organisations. The IMF portrays itself in a way that is not accepted universally.

The Civil Code of Ukraine there are no specific rules governing contractual relationship currency bank account, and existing norms in the national legislation does not reflect the specificity, complexity bank currency relations; regulations that regulate banking operations in foreign currencies, in some cases inconsistent, uncoordinated and even contradictory; In addition, some based on somewhat outdated today philosophical position, affecting the development bank currency civil relations. Problems about the determination of the legal nature of the contract currency bank account, studied and continue to study the eminent jurist scholars, among which highlight G.F. Shershenevich, C.A. Fleyshyts, I.B. Nowicki, M.N. Agarkova, A.S. Ioffe, N.S. Kuznetsov, I.A. Bezkluboho etc. Purpose of the article – the definition of the legal nature of the contract currency bank account, as well as research and analysis of major scientific debate on the subject. Given the inextricable link between the two elements of a bank account without connectivity relations on the account balance on any loan or of storage, believe that the bank account agreement today is an independent civil - legal contract.