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This paper presents a case study of a proposed regulatory future-proofing framework for the construction industry. The update to the crystalline silica standard by the Occupational Safety a...

Infrastructure projects experience different regulatory impacts during permitting, operations, and decommissioning. However, no framework is in place to provide a foundation for infrastruct...

How long is the coastline of the United States? While it may sound counter-intuitive, there is no objectively true answer to this question. In fact, it is impossible to precisely measure the length of any coastline. A coastline features an endless array of bays and promontories at all scales, from hundreds of miles to fractions of an inch. Thus, the length of a coastline depends on the unit of measurement being used. The smaller the unit of measurement, the more of these bays and promontories are detected, and thus, the longer the coastline becomes. Follow this logic down to the atomic level, and the length of a coastline – any coastline – approaches infinity. This phenomenon is known as the “coastline paradox,” and it is more than just a mathematical curiosity. Because coastlines play such a prominent role in legal frameworks, the coastline paradox presents troubling legal implications at all scales. From international maritime jurisdictions to local real estate markets, the complexities created by this phenomenon are disconcertingly understudied. In fact, the coastline paradox has never been considered as a significant source of legal problems. This article is the first to address the legal implications of the coastline paradox. It begins with an explanation of the coastline paradox and other, similar characteristics of coastlines that defy accurate measurement. Then the legal implications for international, federal, and local legal frameworks are introduced and examined. It is apparent that awareness of the coastline paradox is low, and challenges are scarcely being addressed. While a mathematical solution to the coastline paradox may be impossible, the article concludes with a set of recommendations for coastal stakeholders.

Biscayne National Park is the largest marine national park in the United States. It contains four distinct ecosystems, encompasses 173,000 acres (only 5% of which are land), and is located within densely populated Miami-Dade County. The bay has a rich history of natural resource exploitation, but aggressive residential and industrial development schemes prompted Congress to create Biscayne National Monument in 1968, followed by the designation of Biscayne National Park in 1980. When the dust settled the state of Florida retained key management powers over the park, including joint authority over fishery management. States and the federal government occasionally share responsibility for regulating natural resources, but Biscayne National Park represents a unique case study in cooperative federalism. This article explores these cooperative federalism contours in order to assess whether the park’s management paradigm provides a model worthy of replication. A diverse range of materials were reviewed for this project, including literature and jurisprudence on traditional models of cooperative federalism, federal natural resources laws, national park regulations and policy, Biscayne National Park’s statutory frameworks and legislative history, state and federal management plans, inter-agency communications, and direct stakeholder interviews. They combine to tell a story of cooperative federalism that has been frustrating and, at times, incoherent. But the story also shows that shared responsibility over fishery management has produced beneficial results for the park and its stakeholders by forcing state and federal officials to work together on planning and enforcement, diversifying human and financial resources, and incorporating federal, state, and local interests into park management and policy. The research suggests that future applications of the Biscayne National Park model of cooperative federalism, in which states and the federal government share joint authority over marine resources in some capacity, may enjoy similar success. Il Biscayne National Park e il piu grande parco nazionale marino negli Stati Uniti. In esso sono presenti quattro ecosistemi diversi, comprende 173.000 acri (solo il 5% dei quali sono terreni) e si trova nelle vicinanze della densamente popolata contea di Miami-Dade. La baia ha una ricca storia di sfruttamento delle risorse naturali, ma i regimi aggressivi di sviluppo residenziale ed industriale ha spinto il Congresso a creare il Biscayne National Monument nel 1968, in seguito denominato Biscayne National Park nel 1980. Il Parco e gestito direttamente dallo Stato della Florida, il quale ha altresi competenza condivisa [con il governo federale, ndr] sulla gestione della pesca. Gli Stati e il governo federale a volte condividono la responsabilita per la regolamentazione delle risorse naturali, ma il Biscayne National Park rappresenta un caso di studio unico di "federalismo cooperativo". Questo articolo analizza i confini del federalismo cooperativo, al fine di valutare se tale paradigma di gestione del parco possa fornire un modello replicabile. Una vasta gamma di fonti sono state oggetto di studio per questo progetto, tra cui la letteratura e la giurisprudenza sui modelli tradizionali di federalismo cooperativo, le leggi sulle risorse naturali federali, le regole nazionali sui parchi nazionali, lo statuto del Biscayne National Park’s e la normativa non piu vigente al riguardo, i piani statali e federali di gestione, i comunicati delle agenzie di comunicazione, nonche interviste dirette delle parti interessate. Da tali fonti emerge una storia del federalismo cooperativo che mostra sfaccettature talvolta incoerenti, se non frustranti. Ma al contempo si evince altresi come la responsabilita condivisa sulla gestione della pesca abbia prodotto negli anni risultati positivi per il parco, costringendo funzionari statali e federali a lavorare insieme sulla pianificazione e l’esecuzione, la diversificando le risorse umane e finanziarie, trovando una sintesi tra gli interessi federali, statali e locali nella politica gestionale del parco. La ricerca suggerisce che le future applicazioni del modello di federalismo cooperativo del Biscayne National Park, in cui Stati e governo federale in qualche modo condividono la competenza congiunta sulle risorse marine, possano godere di un successo simile.

Sustainable development integrates economic development, social development, and environmental protection, with three overarching objectives and essential requirements: (1) poverty reduction, (2) changing unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, and (3) protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development. Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is capable of promoting all three objectives by providing stakeholders with a framework for integrating and coordinating the various aspects of water management in a sustainable and holistic manner. This chapter relates the concept of IWRM to development in the context of the international community’s sustainable development paradigm.

Climate change presents the international community with an environmental process that is both challenging to monitor and foresee and requires a complex legal and regulatory framework capable of promoting mitigation and adaptation. In the absence of comprehensive and targeted international climate change legislation, however, some mitigation and adaptation measures are being adopted and implemented through indirect policymaking and regulation. International environmental treaties and customary international environmental laws and principles not specifically focused on climate change may nonetheless indirectly or unintentionally contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts through administration or enforcement of the legal regime. The crucial role that the water cycle plays in climatic processes, however, makes international freshwater and ocean laws and policies a particularly rich source of indirect climate change adaptation and mitigation measures. This chapter analyzes the international legal regimes regulating freshwater resources and ocean and marine resources with an eye toward mechanisms that contribute to – or detract from – climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. I find that potential for regulation of climate change is greatest when treaties are focused on discrete environmental issues such as wetland conservation and pollution from ships, while comprehensive treaties like the Watercourses Convention and the Convention on the Law of the Sea make less tangible contributions to indirect climate change regulation by reinforcing principles of international law that require states to take collective action on international environmental challenges such as climate change.

The Kura-Aras River Basin is the largest and most critical water resource in the South Caucasus. As the primary source of freshwater for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and a significant source for Turkey and Iran, the basin is at the center of a complex geopolitical region. The Kura-Aras has not been managed under a cooperative management treaty since the fall of the Soviet Union and remains one of the most significant watercourses ungoverned by a transboundary agreement. Tense relations between neighbors, as well as ambitious development plans and economic priorities, have pushed international cooperation over the basin to the fringes of the region’s agenda. In this chapter, the Kura-Aras River Basin is examined in order to identify factors inhibiting, and opportunities to promote, cooperation. While a multilateral, basin-wide treaty appears unrealistic given extreme levels of diplomatic discord, opportunities exist to move toward a cooperative management framework through bilateral agreements.

With the current body of international water law limited to customary principles and nascent treaty instruments, the potential for major transboundary water resources conflict is high. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Nile River Basin. At about 6,825 km long, the Nile is the longest river in the world, sustaining the livelihoods of more than 180 million people in 11 riparian countries. And yet, the Nile River continues to flow without a binding cooperative management treaty or agreement. While the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) may soon come into force, it lacks the support and participation of two of the largest players in the region, downstream Egypt and Sudan. Meanwhile, basin countries’ interpretations of customary international water law highlight the inherent and predictable difficulties of reconciling the principles of equitable use and no significant harm. Considering the Nile River Basin’s critical importance to the economic development of basin states, the absence of a binding cooperative management agreement places the Nile River Basin at risk of conflict and continued mismanagement. This chapter analyzes the legal status of Nile River Basin water allocations through the lens of contemporary international water law, a developing body of law struggling to resolve transboundary disputes such as those found in the Nile River Basin.

"The subsidiarity principle of water resources management suggests that water management and service delivery should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. The principle is attractive for several reasons, primarily because: 1) the governance level can be reduced to reflect environmental characteristics, such as the hydrological borders of a watershed that would otherwise cross administrative boundaries; 2) decentralization promotes community and stakeholder engagement when decision-making is localized; 3) inefficiencies are reduced by eliminating reliance on central government bureaucracies and budgetary constraints; and 4) laws and institutions can be adapted to reflect localized conditions at a scale where integrated natural resources management and climate change adaptation is more focused. Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity has been welcomed by many states committed to decentralized governance, integrated water resources management, and/or civic participation. However, applications of decentralization have not been uniform, and in some cases have produced frustrating outcomes for states and water resources. Successful decentralization strategies are heavily dependent on dedicated financial resources and human resource capacity. This article explores the nexus between the principle of subsidiarity and the enabling environment, in the hope of articulating factors likely to contribute to, or detract from, the success of decentralized water resources management. Case studies from Haiti, Rwanda, and the United States??? Florida Water Management Districts provide examples of the varied stages of decentralization."